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This thesis advances a new theory to explain the origin of the use in English law. It defines 
a use, in the absence of consensus about definition, as occurring when a person (the 
feoffor) makes an enforceable grant of land (called a feoffment) to another (the feoffee) 
to hold for the benefit of a third party. The thesis is a reassessment of an accepted truth 
that crusaders were the first to make uses. Frederic Maitland, the father of legal history, 
lent his authority to this idea when he suggested that English crusaders employed uses 
in case of their demise abroad. Subsequent legal historians have put forward other 
explanations but none have supplanted Maitland’s authoritative account. Therefore, it is 
necessary to return to and re-examine the development of the use. This thesis shows how 
the legal concept of crusading that developed in the twelfth century attracted both papal 
and secular legal privileges, which effectively fulfilled the function Maitland had ascribed 
to uses. Neither the canon law nor English common law created the use in response to 
the crusading ideology. The current author instead used the crusade lens to move beyond 
Maitland’s thesis to show the first germs of the use are found in the thirteenth-century 
practices of the Exchequer of the Jews. This court stretched the limits of the common law 
to give effect to the intentions of feoffors. While the use is absent during the Ninth 
Crusade, a watershed moment in its development is found in legislation (13 Edw. I, c 1) 
enacted to give paramountcy to legal intention. In moving beyond the Crusades, the thesis 
comfortably strips away an assumed connection to equity to prove that the use is a 
species of common law feoffment with a condition.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Maitland’s Thesis on the Origin of 
the Use and its Links to the Crusade Movement 
 
Frederic Maitland bestowed upon the use an air of mythology that survives into modern 
times as an accepted truth. In a brief passage in Pollock and Maitland’s seminal The 
History of English Law before the Time of Edward I (1898), Maitland commented: 
 
A slight but unbroken thread of cases, beginning while the Conquest (1066) is yet recent, shows us 
that a man will from time to time convey his land to another to the use of a third. For example, he is 
going on Crusade and wishes that his land shall be held to the use of his children, or he wishes that 
his wife or his sister shall enjoy the land, but doubts, it may be, whether a woman can hold a military 
fee or whether a husband can enfeoff his wife. Here there must be at the least an honourable 
understanding that the trust is to be observed, and there may be a formal interposition of faith.1 
 
An association with the crusade, intended as an example (referred to in this thesis as 
‘Maitland’s example’), has eclipsed the argument that Maitland intended to make.2  It 
seems that Maitland’s continued authority as a legal historian is sufficient to give weight 
to the example. The logic behind the argument is sound. The crusader, as a landholder 
who intends to transfer legal possession or seisin, is the feoffor. He holds his land in 
military fee or tenure that his eldest son will inherit under the rules of primogeniture. In 
this scenario, however, the crusader wants to ensure the welfare of his wife, sister, and 
all his children. He makes a use to circumvent the doctrine of primogeniture. The 
crusader enfeoffs or grants the land to another, the feoffee, who agrees to carry out his 
wishes to hold the land for the benefit of his loved ones. Maitland does not support the 
example with evidence but this is no accident. He believed that crusaders made uses, or 
at least had the opportunity to, because the evidence available to him indicated the use 
was part of English law throughout the crusade movement.  
 
The object of this thesis is to test whether crusaders made uses during the crusade 
movement. It is necessary to address this subject because today’s law students often have 
                                                          
1 F. Pollock and F. W. Maitland, The History of English Law before the Time of Edward I, 2nd edn, vol. 2, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1898, p. 230. Note: Translations are my own unless otherwise indicated 
through use of translated sources. 




their first encounter with the use in a brief introduction to courses on equity before 
moving on to treat the subject of trusts in greater depth.3 The story they hear is familiar:  
 
The trust emerged at the time of the Crusades. Knights would leave to go abroad to fight for the 
Crusades and they were likely to be absent for some time, possibly many years. Therefore they would 
leave their property with another who was entrusted with it for safekeeping. The property would be 
transferred into the name of the friend to be kept for the knight’s return and also for the enjoyment 
of the rest of his family.4  
 
This explanation captures the typical student experience, although it may be expected the 
more studious among them would want further detail. Some trust academics 
acknowledge that it is a story of convenience told to students for want of a better 
understanding of the use’s origins.5 The ongoing problem is that the connection between 
the use and the crusade movement persists without having ever been tested. In this 
manner, it has gained the status of an accepted truth in legal history. The current author 
aims to remedy this unsatisfactory situation. The broad scope of the period studied (1095 
– 1381), almost three-hundred years, reflects the fact Maitland did not name which 
crusade he had in mind. The use has been attributed to both the First Crusade (1096 – 
1099) and the Third Crusade (1189 – 1192). Furthermore, the involvement of the future 
Edward I in the Ninth Crusade (1271 – 1272) provides a further opportunity to find 
evidence of the use.  
 
The breadth of the study will provide insight into the development of the use and other 
analogous legal instruments, even if no crusade connection is found. This provides the 
opportunity for a stronger argument than has previously been made about the use’s 
origins. The alternative arguments raised by other legal historians that have broached 
the subject of the use have not been successful in supplanting the popular belief about its 
connection to the crusade. It is also a significant oversight that no previous work has 
seriously considered the common law as a source of the use in English law. For example, 
Greg Kelly begins his chapter in the Law of Trusts with the statement: ‘It is popularly 
                                                          
3 See J. Bray, A Students guide to Equity and Trusts, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 7; S. Atkins, 
Equity and Trusts, Oxford, Routledge, 2013, p. 27. 
4 Bray, A Students guide to Equity and Trusts, p. 7. 




believed that trusts first came into common use during the time of the Christian Crusades 
in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries’.6 Afterwards, he comments: 
 
Unfortunately, this led to numerous disputes between the trustees and the beneficiaries, who 
claimed that they had been deprived of their rights. Often the beneficiaries were minors and 
therefore had no rights or were unable to require the trustees to carry out their obligations. Such 
problems could not be dealt with by the common law Courts in England because they dealt with 
parties on a strict basis according to legal form. These Courts did not recognise or compensate 
beneficiaries because they were not the legal owners. This led to the development of the English 
rules of equity or fairness to overcome the strict application of the common law by the ordinary 
Courts. The Court of Chancery applied rules of equity to require trustees to carry out their 
obligations to the settlor and to the beneficiaries.7 
 
The overarching assumption is that the use, like the trust, is a creature of equity or 
conscience because the common law had no remedy.8 However, an examination through 
the lens of the crusade movement encompasses significant changes in the common law. 
In doing so, this thesis abandons the idea that uses started life as a non-legal relationship 
in favour of the view that a use occurs when: a feoffor grants land to a feoffee with an 
instruction or condition to convey it to a third party who can enforce the arrangement in 
a legal sense. 
 
While there is no agreed upon definition of the use, there are three elements that 
characterise the operation of uses in law that are considered throughout this thesis, 
namely: (1) the landholder grants legal ownership of land to another person (2) with the 
intention the new owner does not retain title but transfers ownership to a named third 
party (3) who is the intended beneficiary of the original grant. Maitland’s example 
incorporates all three elements. The crusader is put into the role of the landholder; 
military fee is a species of landholding capable of being the subject-matter of a use; and 
female relatives are people likely to benefit from the creation of a use. The thesis also 
incorporates the presumption that the crusader could make a use to avoid the rigour of 
laws related to heirship and coverture. Maitland’s example is a useful lens through which 
                                                          
6 G. Kelly, ‘Trusts and Asset Planning: An Introduction’, in S. Sidnell and L. Hamman (ed.), Law of Trusts, 
Wellington, LexisNexis, 2013, para [1.3]. Available from LexisNexis, (accessed 2 August 2017).  
7 Kelly, Law of Trusts, para [1.3]. 
8 See B. Akkermans, ‘Property Law’, in J. Hage and B. Akkermans (ed.), Introduction to Law, Cham, Springer, 
2014, p. 81. 
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to examine the origin of the use in English law since it captures the three elements (1) – 
(3) that will signal its existence. Reference to these elements allows the current author to 
define a use in chapter eight as ‘a private feoffment of land to a feoffee or feoffees on a 
condition to transfer it to some other named person’. In using these elements as a 
framework, the thesis has deliberately avoided the jurisprudential ambiguities 
associated with the tenuous idea that a person could make a use to transfer title to 
personal property. Maitland included a treatment of personal property in his work on 
uses, but also acknowledged that the delivery of chattels can take a myriad of forms.9 The 
crusade example in the body of his work sensibly avoids reference to personal property. 
Its omission in this thesis is intended to avoid conflating the use with other distinct 
arrangements with characteristics that are describable as trust-like in nature.10 
 
It is unavoidable that an examination of the medieval use will encounter problems of 
terminology inherent to trust law. There is a tendency to use the terms ‘use’ and ‘trust’ as 
synonyms since the latter developed as a ‘use upon a use’.11 The consequence of this 
relationship means the language can be confusing. For example, the terms ‘charitable use’ 
and ‘charitable trust’ refer to the same arrangement without distinction.12 Both bear a 
greater resemblance to gifts ad pias causae than the private law uses described in this 
thesis. The thesis avoids the tendency to conflate the use and the trust, but there are 
unavoidable analogies drawn between trusts and related legal instruments. Trust 
concepts are an amorphous subject. It appears the absence of an agreed definition for the 
use is itself endemic to the confusion present in trust law. The same problem of definition 
exists for trusts. Nevill’s Law of Trusts, Wills and Administration, of which I am co-author, 
observes that ‘no one has successfully produced a completely satisfactory definition of a 
trust’.13 It later concedes it is easier to understand trust law by showing what a trust is 
not, namely bailment, agency, debt, and contract.14 The number of modern trusts are 
myriad and include express trusts, charitable trusts, resulting trusts, constructive trusts, 
                                                          
9 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law, vol. 2, p. 230.  
10 E.g. Donatio mortis causa and Donatio post obitum might both be described as trust-like but both are distinct 
forms of gift. 
11 See N. G. Jones, ‘The Use upon a Use in Equity Revisited’, Cambrian Law Review, vol. 33, 2002, pp. 67 – 68.  
12 See N. Richardson and L. Breach, Nevill’s Law of Trusts, Wills and Administration, 12th edn, Wellington, Lexis 
Nexis, 2016, pp. 157 – 158.  
13 Richardson and Breach, Nevill’s Law of Trusts, Wills and Administration, p. 3. 




and other arrangements that seem to fit the trust category e.g. Quistclose trusts.15 Nevill’s 
suggests a trust is an obligation imposed in equity to deal with property in a certain 
manner.16 This is ultimately an unhelpful starting point. Nevertheless, the influence of 
trust law is felt across this thesis. It uses the term trust-like, for example, to refer to 
arrangements reminiscent of trusts because conscience appears to be at the heart of the 
legal relationship. The fideicommissum, later described as a Roman trust, is trust-like 
because the heir holds property under instruction to convey it to another. It is, however, 
a form of legacy.17 It is an unavoidable use of legal terminology to comment that trust-
like arrangements have characteristics reminiscent of uses without necessarily satisfying 
the definition adopted in this thesis. 
 
Writing Legal History 
 
Legal history should not be written with legal practice in mind. No one would suggest that 
a greater understanding of uses will enrich the everyday practice of law. Lawyers do not 
need to know about medieval history to excel in their craft.18 A concession to authorial 
sentiment is the sole reason why the thirteenth edition of Nevill’s Law of Trusts, Wills and 
Administration will include a brief explanation about the use in relation to modern trusts. 
Otherwise, there is little justification for further analysis in a concise manual on modern 
trust law.19 The everyday practitioner often views Legal History as a subject of limited 
utility. 20  As Maitland noted in the nineteenth century, lawyers are, as a rule, not 
historians.21 In his view, this created an unfortunate situation where: 
 
                                                          
15 See also Richardson and Breach, pp. 13 – 19 for different types of trust recognised by law. 
16 Richardson and Breach, p. 3. 
17 Dig. 30.1.1. 
18 Maitland, Why the History of English Law is not Written, p. 16. 
19 See N. Richardson and L. Breach, Nevill’s Law of Trusts, Wills and Administration, 12th edn, Wellington, Lexis 
Nexis, 2016 does not include a passage on the origin of the use. 
20 J. Rose, ‘Studying the Past, The Nature and Development of Legal History as an Academic Discipline’, The 
Journal of Legal History, vol. 31, 2010, p. 127; R. Jarvis, ‘Legal History, Teaching Skills Practicing Lawyers Need’, 
American Journal of Legal History, vol. 53, no. 4, 2013, p. 498; C. Woodard, ‘History, Legal History and Legal 
Education’, Virginia Law Review, vol. 53, no. 1, 1967, p. 90; R. Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations, Cape town, 
Juta & Co Ltd, 1990, p. viii. 
21 Maitland, Why the History of English Law is not Written, p. 17; R. L. Schuyler, Frederic William Maitland, 




The only persons in this country who possess very fully one of the great requisites for the work are 
as a rule very unlikely to attempt it. They are lawyers with abundant practice or hopes of abundant 
practice; if they have the taste they have not the time, the ample leisure, that is necessary for 
historical research.22 
 
Maitland identified that the people who should have an interest in Legal History and 
could become the ablest legal historians are also unlikely to demand a treatise on the use. 
He had pointed out the unfortunate starting point for any inquiry in legal history, and in 
doing so furnished a reason why many other law books are content to repeat a 
romanticised view of history. 
 
An elegy for common law legal history seems to affect every modern treatment. Maitland 
observed that ‘the object of a law school must be to teach law, and this is not quite the 
same thing as teaching the history of law’. 23  He argued that universities ought to 
appreciate that time constraints mean professors can only nudge students towards the 
subject.24 The sentiment survives him. Numerous papers attempt to justify legal history 
in undergraduate curricula by challenging the view that students of law should only study 
the ‘practical subjects’ in their pursuit to become lawyers.25 The dismissal of the subject 
in modern law schools ought to be a surprise because its advocates promote it as a course 
to instill the critical thinking necessary in academic enterprise. 26  Nonetheless, the 
demands of the profession do not require students to have a historical education beyond 
the last fifty years of practice.27 This also explains why the same romanticised view of the 
use persists in law schools. Similar opinions in civil law jurisdictions have also questioned 
the efficacy of legal history to young lawyers. 28  Objections to its inclusion within an 
                                                          
22 Maitland, p. 17. 
23 Maitland, p. 17 see Woodard, Virginia Law Review, p. 92. 
24 Maitland, pp. 17 – 18; see S. Petrow, ‘Overcoming ‘Intellectual Colonialism’, Aspects of the Teaching of Legal 
History in Australia from c 1890 to 2006’, Australia & New Zealand Law & History E-Journal, 2006, p. 17. 
25 Maitland, pp. 16- 17; M. Kirby, ‘Is Legal History Now Ancient History?’, Australian Law Journal, vol. 83, no. 1, 
2009, p. 37; M. Crackanthorpe, ‘The Uses of Legal History’, Law Quarterly Review, vol. 12, no. 4, 1896, p. 350; 
Woodard, Virginia Law Review, p. 90. 
26 C. Fritz, ‘Teaching Legal History in the First-Year Curriculum’, American Journal of Legal History, vol. 53, no. 4, 
2013, p. 380; Woodard, p. 91; M. Hoffheimer ‘Justinian in the Hinterlands: Roman Law as an Introduction to a 
Standard Curricular Course on English Legal History’, Legal Education Review, vol. 1, no. 2, 1989, p. 250. 
27 F. Pollock, The Genius of the Common Law, New York, The Columbia University Press, 1912, p. 7; P. Garlock, 
‘Teaching American Legal History in a Law School’, American Journal of Legal History, vol. 53, no. 4, 2013, p. 385. 
28 T. Duve, ‘German Legal History, National Traditions and Transnational Perspectives’, Rechtsgeschichte, vol. 22, 




undergraduate curriculum, however, are not as pronounced because the profession does 
not exert the kind of vocational pressures on curricula found within common law 
jurisdictions.29 It is unsurprising that desperate legal historians have sought to attribute 
the disinterest of lawyers in their histories to growing commercialisation of the 
profession in the twentieth century. 30  Indeed, the profession must bear some 
responsibility for the fewer law academics in common law jurisdictions who have heard 
of Bracton. A market-orientated approach means that legal history struggles to keep a 
legitimate position in legal education.31 Michael Kirby, a retired Australian High Court 
judge, opined in 2009 that ‘the almost total abandonment of the teaching of legal history 
in Australian law schools is a most undesirable, even shocking, development’.32 The same 
view applies to New Zealand in 2017 despite any changes ‘across the ditch’ since Kirby 
wrote.  
 
The grim picture painted unnecessarily by some commentators appears to foreshadow a 
bleak future for legal history in law schools despite common opinion it should form part 
of the legal curriculum as an optional subject.33 However, the primary issues related to 
the decline of legal history appear to be systemic. Lawyerly disinterest or a profession-
driven market-centric approach to law in New Zealand universities may not provide a full 
explanation for the apparent poverty of legal history. Legal History as a subject appears 
to suffer from a crisis of identity about whether it should be taught under the head of Law 
or History. The confusion appears to stem from a tradition of formalism that isolates Law 
from other disciplines.34 Nonetheless, it is unreasonable to expect medievalists without a 
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legal background to write a history of a private law instrument like the use. The 
formidable barriers of entry created by the legal profession may dissuade historians from 
attempting to examine the historical value of such instruments.35 The specialist tools of 
statutory interpretation, case analysis, and a jurisprudential appreciation of law do not 
form part of the repertoire of an untrained historian. 36  On the other hand, lawyers 
without a background in History are similarly disadvantaged. They are neither expected 
to possess a broad appreciation of historical sources nor to envision a legal instrument 
within its historical context. Moreover, lawyers are unlikely to avail themselves of the 
technical linguistic skills necessary to examine primary sources. It is unsurprising that 
lawyers are content to leave questions about medieval legal institutions to the historians 
who could benefit from their input.37 The barriers of the profession, however, do not 
prevent historians from recognising the value of monographs on subjects related to law. 
For that reason, history-conscious lawyers are prized as being rarer than law-conscious 
historians.38 
 
We do not have to discuss modern legal history in hopeless tones. 39  Historians are 
beginning to reacquaint themselves with the value of law as a historical source. The New 
Zealand experience suggests, however, that there is a need for more discourse between 
this specialist history and other historians. Richard Boast in an article titled ‘New Zealand 
Legal History and New Zealand Historians: A Non-meeting of the Minds’40 argues that 
historians have a low opinion of legal history. He highlights that The New Oxford History 
of New Zealand ‘has well-written chapters on health, sexuality, “sporting spaces”, religion 
and society, on the family, community, and gender – but not on the law and the legal 
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systems’. 41  He indicates Oxford Histories elsewhere feature law and litigation more 
prominently. 42  Boast is optimistic about the future of the subject because of the 
prominence of historians involved in the settlement of historic grievances, and a 
revitalised interest in private law issues in early New Zealand concerning sheep. 43 
However, New Zealand legal historians are focused on New Zealand legal history and 
settler- Māori relations. This focus may make medieval history less appealing to New 
Zealand law academics. New Zealand legal historians more often learn Māori than Latin 
or law French. There remains an absence of dialogue between historians and specialist 
legal historians on the nature of law and its wider societal impacts.44 It is plausible that a 
crusade historian would have found proof or dismissed the notion that uses arose during 
the crusades if they had considered the question. 
 
The intended audience for this thesis are , principally, legal historians. While every 
attempt is made to explain legal terminology and jurisprudential ideas, these technical 
ideas may prove to be a barrier to historians without prior study of law. The legal 
historian with an interest in early modern trusts will benefit most from a thesis on uses, 
and it is hoped the present research will enable them to revaluate the importance of 
equity’s role in the creation of the trust from medieval antecedents. Crusade historians 
ought to find the study of particular interest since it offers a fresh legal perspective on 
areas of private law that many have already engaged with. It may also interest lawyers, 
especially those who specialise in private law, but not with a view to practice.45 The 
interests of historians and lawyers often differ. In a sense, both lawyers and historians 
attempt to make the past meaningful for modern audiences.46 However, the practitioner 
is interested in history for authoritative precedent to support a case rather than using 
historical techniques to create a narrative of the past.47 This creates an irreconcilable 
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conflict because, as Maitland observed, ‘what the lawyer wants is authority and the newer 
the better; what the historian wants is evidence and the older the better’.48 A search for 
authority to support modern legal arguments traditionally begins at the Statute of Uses 
1536 (28 Hen. VIII, c 10), without reference to medieval law, and ignores non-legal 
sources or implications.49 
 
The search for authority in legal practice has unfortunately coloured the study of legal 
history. It is necessary to comment, therefore, that a modern thesis must not limit itself 
to the traditions of common law and equity. The modern assertion that the common law 
comprises only of the threads of judge-made law and equity is wrong. 50  It is also 
disingenuous. Edward Coke stated in the fourth part of his Institutes that the temporal 
and spiritual laws are inextricable parts of the English legal system.51 Further, William 
Fulbecke made the same observation in A Parallel or Conference of the Civil law, the Canon 
law, and the Common Law of this Realm of England when he identified the learned laws 
and the common law as the root and stalk of English law.52 The common law legal system 
included and continues to include customary, ecclesiastical, and civilian traditions. This 
is particularly true for the medieval period. Documents found on the continent could also 
shed light on a general pattern of pan-European legal responses to events such as the 
crusades. The Oxford History of the Laws of England adopts an holistic approach to English 
law, which includes a volume devoted to the canon law.53 Whatever appreciation legal 
historians now have for the expansive nature of English law, however, is challenged by a 
tendency for common law lawyers to minimise the impact of the learned laws.54 There is 
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still institutional reluctance to consider sources of English law outside of the kingdom, 
which includes the Angevin customs (coutumiers) in Normandy.55  
 
Legal historians have typically adopted a doctrinal approach to their subject. The 
doctrinal approach is an application of legal research skills to historical issues and 
principles.56 Douglas Vick argued that doctrinal research is a synthesis of practice and 
academia, which: 
 
… treats the law and legal systems as distinctive social institutions and is characterized by a fairly 
unique method of reasoning and analysis. In its purest form, ‘black-letter’ research aims to 
understand the law from no more than a thorough examination of a finite and relatively fixed 
universe of authoritative texts consisting of cases, statutes, and other primary sources, the relative 
importance of which depends on the legal tradition and system within which the legal researcher 
operates.57 
 
It is an approach that examines legal sources to understand how a law fits within a 
coherent legal system.58 It emphasises ‘the use of reasoning and problem-solving skills 
such as deductive logic, inductive reasoning and analogy’.59 However, a purely doctrinal 
approach is criticisable because it is too inward-looking and technical when prevailing 
trends are more holistic and interdisciplinary in nature.60 Recent developments point to 
greater interdisciplinarity, comparative, and empirical methodologies in legal research.61 
Outside the scope of doctrinal legal thinking is acceptance that the law itself can never be 
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objective and it is shaped by external considerations. 62  The current author views a 
doctrinal approach as a necessary first step to understand the law.63 It is sometimes 
necessary, however, to step outside of traditional legal sources. 
 
Modern trends speak to the value of using non-doctrinal sources to explore the 
development of law within a historical context.64 This approach also accepts that the 
implication of a particular law in society may differ from its theoretical roots. 65  The 
intersection between feminist scholarship and family law, in particular, has attracted this 
kind of analysis. 66  Daniel Smail’s The Consumption of Justice (2003), 67  for example, 
explores court records from Marseilles to analyse the lives and the mindset of people, 
including women, who engaged in litigation. There is recent work on the common law 
that views the subject through a similar lens.68 The common law is, therefore, beginning 
to attract the kind of analysis of law and society done on continental sources. A historical 
analysis to test the veracity of the association of the use with the crusade movement 
intends to shed light on law and the legal responses from royal authority and individuals. 
This approach is more likely to interest legal historians than lawyers.69 It appreciates the 
value of chronicles and other literary sources to understand law and society. An 
interdisciplinary view of law looks inwards at its development and outwards towards its 
historical context to step over the restrictive boundaries of closed disciplines.70 Such an 
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approach inevitably draws criticism and may even be regarded as too far-reaching for 




Treatments on legal history, as with other histories, must include a chapter -here chapter 
two- devoted to historiography. 72  It would surprise historians of other disciplines to 
learn that some legal histories, especially those who take a doctrinal approach using 
statute and case law alone, do not include the kind of historiographical analysis 
considered a standard part of their repertoire.73 The reason for such neglect may lie in a 
misguided belief that the value of a history of law is limited to furnishing precedent for 
lawyers.74 Nevertheless, a special place must be reserved for Maitland, regarded as the 
father of English legal history75, whose work continues to be the centerpiece of modern 
treatments of the subject.76 A history of the origin of the use is no exception. Richard 
Helmholz and Reinhard Zimmermann’s recent treatment of the subject in Itinera 
Fiduciae: Trust and Treuhand in Historical Perspective (1998) observed: ‘F. W. Maitland, 
the English legal historian whose work, now over 100 years old, continues to furnish the 
starting point for a great deal of our understanding of the history of English law’.77 It is 
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necessary to acknowledge, however, that Maitland did not write about the origin of the 
use in a vacuum. Nonetheless, Maitland’s work was beholden to the influence of the 
historiographic trends of the nineteenth century.78 Likewise, this thesis is indebted to the 
work and influences of modern approaches to its subject. Itinera Fiduciae contains 
research from both common law and civil law jurisdictions. The central theme is an 
expansive approach that appreciates trusts may have ties to continental legal 
institutions.79 The editors accept this approach may not discover the germs of the trust 
and do not seek to settle the issue.80 On the other hand, J. M. W. Bean’s The Decline of 
English Feudalism, 1215 – 1540 (1968) and Robert Palmer’s English law in the Age of the 
Black Death, 1348 – 1381 (1993) view the use as a product of English law without 
continental influences.81 There have also been attempts to link the use to a reception of 
Islamic principles into English law.82 To date, however, no legal historian has supplanted 
Maitland’s example as the common narrative for the origin of uses. 
 
The third chapter begins the thesis’s analysis of the evidence that supports an argument 
that the use was available to crusaders from the outset of the crusade movement. Since 
Maitland did not designate which crusade he had in mind, but indicated that it had been 
available since 1066, the First Crusade is a logical beginning to this thesis. It has also been 
considered as a candidate for the origin of the use.83  Jonathan Riley-Smith, Jonathan 
Phillips, and Christopher Tyerman have together shed considerable light on the subject. 
There are many other historians who have made significant contributions. Nevertheless, 
the thesis is particularly indebted to Christopher Tyerman’s England and the Crusades, 
1095 – 1588 (1988), and how the crusades impacted England’s politics and society.84 The 
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First Crusade provides a snapshot into the kinds of arrangements crusaders made. In 
Maitland’s example, the crusader is a knight who is expected to employ complex legal 
devices. Fred Cazel Jr. has provided a valuable starting point to determine how personal 
wealth affected legal preparation.85 Further, the First Crusade also provided a valuable 
template for the future of the movement. The bridge between the crusade movement and 
legal history was last crossed by James Brundage’s Medieval Canon Law and the Crusade 
(1969).86 His work discussed at length how the notion of a crusade jurisprudence, or legal 
principles applicable to crusaders, developed as part of the canon law. Brundage showed 
how votive obligations and specific crusader privileges impacted the canon law even 
though no title dedicated to crusading is found within it or its juristic commentaries.87 It 
is at least plausible that the measures that the canon law introduced to address the 
concerns that crusaders had for family and property could have included the use. 
 
The fourth chapter explores whether the use was available in English law on the eve of 
the Third Crusade. It is acknowledged here that it is probable Maitland had this crusade 
event in mind simply because the Third Crusade garnered the most attention from the 
English-speaking world. Richard I had paved the way for significant English participation 
as soon as he became king.88  Research into the legal history of the Third Crusade is 
benefitted by the two great legal treatises that flank the event. The focus of chapter four 
is on the first. Tractatus de legibus et consuetudinibus regni Anglie qui Glanvilla vocatur, 
known as Glanvill, is a treatment of English law as it stood between 29 November 1187 
and Henry II’s death on 6 July 1189.89 This treatise is yet to be critically analysed for 
evidence of the use. Ranulf de Glanvill, the disputed author of Glanvill, was familiar with 
both the law and the crusade movement. It is reasonable to expect that Glanvill would 
have included the use if it was available on the eve of the Third Crusade. The treatise, 
however, contains no explicit mention of the use. This alone challenges the belief that the 
use was available to crusaders. However, it includes other ingredients found in Maitland’s 
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example. Glanvill offers valuable insight into the nature of landholding and its heritability 
in the late twelfth century. It also outlines the legal concerns that Maitland’s crusader may 
have had about the legal position of his female relatives during his absence. Finally, the 
chapter discusses legal principles that were later explicitly connected to the crusade 
movement. Glanvill outlines relevant legal principles that applied to English crusaders 
from which the use might be found. 
 
The fifth chapter of this thesis canvasses evidence that supports an argument that the use 
developed during the Third Crusade. Maitland believed that the use was available 
beforehand, but it appears that the involvement of Richard I, Coeur de Lion, has added 
another layer of romanticism that bulwarked the popular belief that the use is connected 
to this crusade event. This thesis considers two possible sources. First, the legal measures 
made by Richard in response to legal issues he faced while he was absent. It is prima facie 
difficult to reconcile the popular idea that Richard was a negligent ruler with the idea that 
he introduced novel legal institutions like the use.90 Nevertheless, modern notions that 
Richard is a poor source of legal development does not exclude the possibility it 
developed during his reign. Secondly, it is worth considering that one hundred years had 
passed since the first Jerusalem expedition. It is reasonable to expect that the 
considerable changes in legal thinking throughout the twelfth century ought to have 
changed how crusaders managed their property. Therefore, the use might be found in 
private law legal responses. The Third Crusade, considering Henry’s reforms to English 
law and the scale of the event, does appear to be a candidate. It is also possible that juristic 
reflection about crusade and the law furnished a theory of uses in English law. Bracton’s 
De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae (c. 1235) traces the law since Glanvill and provides 
the strongest picture of how the common law responded to the crusade movement. 
 
An acknowledgement that Maitland did not intend to connect the use to the crusade 
movement means that alternative arguments must be advanced. The sixth chapter of the 
thesis considers the practices of the Exchequer of the Jews as a possible source for the 
use. The court itself is tenuously connected to the Third Crusade. Richard created this 
division of the Court of Exchequer to facilitate collection of royal revenue from Jewish 
                                                          




credit activities.91 Legal historians have overlooked the Jewish Exchequer as a source for 
the use because it does not fit in either the Germanic or Roman schools of thought. 
Subsequently, no one has explored its records through either an expansive or insular 
view of the use. The law practiced in that court was the common law, as it applied to Jews, 
also known as ‘Jewry law’. Nonetheless, it is also possible that England experienced a 
reception of halakha into the common law from the practice of this court. The court 
Jewish is unique because it has a clear timeline that begins in 1198 and ends after Edward 
I expelled the Jews on 18 July 1290. The period canvassed explores the evolution of 
complex legal arrangements during the thirteenth century to determine whether the use 
developed during this period. The argument that the use could have developed in the 
Jewish Exchequer is novel. Moreover, the principles related to safekeeping, attorneys, and 
non-legal arrangements to circumvent the law have qualities associated with trust-like 
arrangements. Therefore, this thesis will examine whether an argument could be made 
that supports a thirteenth-century origin of the use in this overlooked jurisdiction.  
 
The seventh chapter entertains the possibility that the use had a connection to the Ninth 
Crusade. This crusade is not usually proposed as the candidate that Maitland had in mind. 
It is, however, the final English expedition of note and represents the final opportunity 
for the use to develop in response to the crusade movement. Prince Edward’s (later 
Edward I) expedition to the Holy Land resulted in a flurry of legal activity in Chancery.92 
It is an odd feature of earlier scholarship that medieval Chancery is dismissed as a 
possible source for the use. Nevertheless, the Ninth Crusade is unique because it 
benefitted from the systematic organisation of royal protections that Henry III granted to 
crusaders. English crusaders who took part in Prince Edward’s crusade contended with 
the issue of protecting family interests and property during their absence. Furthermore, 
the period is graced with three authoritative common law treatises that record the impact 
of the Ninth Crusade on the law. The short titles of these works are Britton, Fleta, and the 
Mirror of Justices. They are written by unknown authors but together provide a picture of 
late thirteenth- and early fourteenth- century English law. It is surprising that these 
treatises have attracted no commentary in relation to the use despite their pivotal 
commentary on Edward I’s activity as a legislator. If the use is not found, it is necessary 
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to reevaluate the belief that it had a connection to the crusade movement. Clues may be 
found in Edward’s legislation and the valuable insight provided into the growth of the 
common law and its policies at the close of the thirteenth century.  
 
The eighth chapter proposes an original argument that legal historians have prematurely 
dismissed the common law as a possible source for the use. The thesis goes beyond The 
History of English Law to explore whether the use developed in the fourteenth century. 
Sir Francis Bacon, in his The Learned Reading of Sir Francis Bacon upon the Statute of Uses, 
attributed it to the final years of Edward III’s reign. 93  The thesis also proposes a 
conceptual basis for understanding how the use developed in English law in the absence 
of a definitive answer. It canvasses evidence that supports a theory that the use began life 
as one of the many kinds of gift with a condition recognised by the common law. No other 
study has proposed the common law as a source for the use. This challenges the idea that 
the use is equitable in nature, as many legal historians have assumed, and the belief it 
emerged as an illegal or unenforceable arrangement. It also divorces the common law use 
from the equitable trust that developed during the sixteenth century. The thesis also aims 
to furnish an understanding of the legal principles that governed uses in English law. 
Moreover, if the use was a recognised legal instrument, the manner of its enforcement 
must also be discernible. The common law, as recognised in Chancery and the royal 
courts, ought to furnish supporting evidence. There will remain outstanding questions 
about its relationship to civilian jurisprudence and the context of its development. 
Nonetheless, this thesis hopes that a novel argument about the origin of the use will allow 
legal historians to discuss these questions in a fresh light. 
 
The object of the thesis is to examine the origin of the use with reference to the common 
opinion that the use developed in response to the crusade movement. It uses the 
ingredients of Maitland’s example, a template that captures the essential elements of the 
use, as a guide to find the instrument in primary sources both legal and extra-legal. 
Reference to the preparations of crusaders is useful because, as Maitland pointed out, it 
is an occasion where it is reasonable to expect the creation of uses. The fact that the 
Crusades span several centuries means this thesis canvasses significant legal 
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developments between the eleventh and fourteenth centuries. It lends itself to the 
adoption of a chronological structure. The tone of the eighth chapter changes as the thesis 
puts forward a definition of the use rooted in common law principles to supplant the 
belief that the use has a connection to the crusades. Chapter eight, the final substantive 
chapter, makes no reference to crusading. In addition to putting to rest the idea that the 
use has a connection with the crusade, after a rebuttal of Maitland’s argument, the 
conclusions reached would not be possible without reflection on earlier legal 
developments to give greater control over land. By arguing from absence as this thesis 
does; the evidence for the practice of making uses is brought into focus. 
 
An Argument from Silence 
 
The author of this thesis has chosen an argument from silence or absence, argumentum 
ex silentio, as a tool to examine whether there is any truth to the common opinion that 
there is a connection between the use and the crusade movement. It is well-known that 
there is a tendency to avoid negative arguments or arguments from silence. This stems 
from a view that argumentation ought to be positive rather than point to an absence.94 
The absence of evidence means arguments from silence are not typically persuasive. 
Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge here that the merits of an argument from 
silence may vary wildly.95 The success of the argument will depend of the robustness of 
its sources. The requirement that evidence must be robust is found in the conditions that 
Langlois and Seignobos posited in Introduction to the Study of History, which outline when 
a historian can utilise an argument from silence. 96  John Lange summarised these 
conditions as follows: 
 
(1) There is a document, D, extant, in which the event, E, is not mentioned. (2) It was the intention 
of the author of D to enumerate exhaustively all members of the class of events of which E is 
supposed to be a member. (3) The author of D was acquainted with all members of the class in 
question. (4) E must be such that, if it had occurred, the author of D could not have overlooked it.97 
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Lange noted that an argument from silence need not satisfy all the conditions to be 
persuasive.98 He also suggested that the certainty implicit above can be replaced with a 
probable likelihood that a document (D) would have recorded the event (E). 99  This 
acknowledges that the applicability of these conditions relies on a historian’s ‘subjective 
estimations of likelihood’ in the face of an absence.100  It also appears to address the 
naivety associated with an assumption that a source intended to record everything.101 
Therefore, scholarly intuition also plays a significant role when making an argument from 
silence.  
 
Legal sources, as documents (D), lend themselves favourably to arguments from silence 
because their purpose is to provide the reader with a complete and instructive manual of 
the law at the time of publication. Chapter four of this thesis, for example, focuses on the 
treatise Glanvill and its discussion of late twelfth-century law. There is a reasonable 
expectation or probable likelihood that Glanvill would have included the use (E) had it 
existed at the time. The comprehensive nature of medieval legal sources, and legal 
sources in general, means (1) – (4) outlined above may be satisfied as pre-requisite for 
making an argument from absence. The treatise Glanvill satisfies all four: (1) It is an 
extant document that outlines the law practised in the royal courts during the twelfth 
century but does not mention the use. (2) The preface makes clear the author’s intention 
to ‘enumerate exhaustively’ the general customs of which the use is supposed to be a 
member. While Glanvill’s author acknowledges there are unmentioned English customs, 
the intention of the treatise is to reduce into writing the laws practiced in the royal courts 
(Gl. preface). The author also tells the reader that the principal subject of their treatise is 
laws related to real property of which the use is ‘supposed to be member’ (Gl. 1. 5). (3) It 
is safe to say its author was acquainted with laws of real property heard in the royal 
courts.102 (4) The author would not have overlooked the use if it formed part of the law 
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of real property practiced in England. The value of an argument from silence is that it can 
demonstrate an assumed event did not occur when there is near certainty it would have 
been known and recorded.103 Therefore, it can be argued that if the use is not found in 
Glanvill, it is more likely than not that it did not form part of English law when the author 
wrote the treatise. 
 
Since Lange commented on Langlois and Seignobos’ criteria, Mike Duncan has further 
explored the value of arguments from silence. Duncan states that the strength of the 
argument depends ‘on the rhetor’s expert judgment and the audience’s evaluation of that 
judgment, which shifts the burden of proof from the stated evidence’.104 The reader is 
challenged to make a subjective assessment of the value of the argument put to them.105 
This is not an unusual situation. As Lange had previously observed, ‘like most arguments, 
it [the argument from silence] is an instrument which depends for its effect largely on the 
skill and good sense of its craftsman’.106 Nonetheless, an argument from silence requires 
an author to take greater care in researching their evidence. 107  This thesis’s robust 
examination of evidence from the crusade movement recognises that the best way to 
refute an argument from silence is with positive evidence. It adopts an argument from 
silence as necessary to challenge the strength of Maitland’s authority. The connection the 
latter made with the crusade might be speculative, but it is a foreseeable situation where 
people would make uses. Therefore, it was also necessary to accept that evidence to 
support Maitland’s thesis might be found. The success of an argument from silence is 
whether it places the onus back on those who would believe that positive evidence 
exists.108 It is again necessary to note the eighth chapter of this thesis turns to positive 
evidence for the development of the use in English law. It is so placed since one of the 
advantages of an argument from silence is it ‘has an investigative quality that can be used 
as a pathway to further arguments that wield greater probability and acceptability’.109 
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The author hopes, therefore, that the argument from absence has been used to good effect 
to supplant an accepted truth. 
 
The argument from silence made in this thesis benefits from the robustness of medieval 
legal sources, which differentiates them from other historical sources. It is a robustness 
that stems from a need for certainty about legal rights and obligations that directs the law 
towards complete statements either in codifications or juristic works.110 Justinian had 
envisioned in 533 that the Digest would be a perfect statement of law for time 
immemorial.111 However, the later publication of the Novels in 564 is a poignant reminder 
that law was in a constant state of change then as it is now. The motivation of medieval 
authors to provide an instructive statement of law either as a code or on a particular 
branch of private law is no different.112 In understanding that law changes over time, the 
author of this thesis believes that a view of the law in fifty-year increments is the best 
way to examine whether a legal instrument was available in any given period. 
Furthermore, the argument from silence benefits from a core precept of legal thinking: 
reasoning by analogy. It is logical thinking that ‘If circumstances X apply, then 
consequence Y shall (or ought) to follow’ that is applied to like situations.113 It is a way of 
thinking described as fundamental to the common law and case analysis.114 However, 
Alan Watson notes Roman jurists also used reasoning by analogy in thinking about and 
formulising legal principles.115 The same is true about legal thinking in Jewish law.116 This 
common precept offers the legal historian an advantage that other historians do not 
enjoy. A modern lawyer using reasoning by analogy can draw conclusions about the law 
that approach the thinking of a medieval jurist. As Bracton notes, ‘if like matters arise let 
them be decided by like’ (si tamen similia evenerint per simile iudicentur) (Br. ii, p. 21). It 
is therefore possible to get into the mind of a medieval jurist and their legal reasoning in 
a manner not possible for a social historian working on a chronicle.
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Chapter 2. Historiography: The Legacy of Maitland’s 
Thesis 
 
Frederic Maitland ought to be given a dominant role in the historiography of any thesis 
that treats the subject of medieval legal history. His legacy is leaving behind research that 
is still relevant today. The length of his shadow is a testament to the effectiveness of his 
methodology and the careful use of evidence. He is also the only source that historians 
and law academics ever cite for the idea that the use originated as a crusade institution. 
This thesis addresses a subject where the weight of his authority now supports an 
accepted truth. It is an unfortunate starting point. Maitland coined the crusade 
connection as an example and actually believed the use had Germanic antecedents. He 
adopted the views of Anglo-American scholarship to challenge an accepted truth in his 
time: the use had origins in Roman law. Modern historians now reject both schools and 
view the use through two different approaches. First, the historians who take an 
expansive view of the use adopt an interpretation that uses are trust-like institutions 
received into English law through ius commune principles. The second approach adopts 
an insular view that suggests, since the trust is a unique English phenomenon, that the 
use also developed in England without external influence. However, neither modern view 
has supplanted the idea that the use developed out of the crusade movement. A problem 
of definition may explain why. To move beyond Maitland’s thesis, a twenty-first-century 
legal historian must appreciate that a range of jurisdictions operated in medieval England 
and be familiar with their legal treatises. 
 
Frederic Maitland and Nineteenth-Century Historiography 
 
Pollock and Maitland’s The History of English Law was written during a period which the 
legal historian and botanist Roscoe Pound described as a ‘century of history’.1 In the 
nineteenth century, historians had moved away from a treatment of legal history 
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emphasising the timelessness of law, which characterised preceding centuries. 2 
Christopher Parker commented that the nineteenth-century English historian is 
supposed to be an insular character with a myopic view of History.3 Tenuous accusations 
exist that Maitland suffered from Whiggery. 4  Whig historiography, at its worst, is an 
extreme example of English insular blindness and propounds a view of history as an 
evolution, which culminated in England being the zenith of civilisation. 5  This 
interpretation, prominent during the eighteenth century, emphasised continuity, nation, 
and purpose alongside institutions, laws, and customs.6 It would be unwise to suggest 
Maitland or other legal historians leaned towards a particular school; however, they 
seemingly embody both elements of Parker’s description.7 They had individual beliefs, 
thoughts, or agendas that become evident through an analysis of their sources and the 
structure of their narrative. Ultimately, there is no dominant view about the nature of 
nineteenth-century English historiography.8 There is, however, debate about whether 
English historians typically form part of the idealist or positivist schools.9 The idealist 
approach imagines history and law as a gradual unfolding of human experiences through 
unique experiences and responses to unique events.10 Positivist historiography, led by 
Auguste Comte and Henry Buckle, sought to identify rules of history through a scientific 
lens, which remained popular until 1850. 11  Leopold Von Ranke propounded the 
dominant methodology of the period with a view that close analysis of primary sources 
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allowed a historian to write objective history.12 Maitland’s approach to legal history can 
also be examined. 
 
Two schools of legal history dominated nineteenth-century historiography. 13  Henry 
Maine’s Ancient Law (1861) exemplifies the first school of thought. His work dominated 
the Victorian legal science tradition that sought to examine principles of law through an 
understanding of the historical relationships between law and societies. 14  Maine 
modelled his approach on the work of German legal scientists, particularly Carl von 
Savigny, who used history as a tool to explore how the law responded to societal 
developments with the aim of solving contemporary problems.15 Maine took a holistic 
view of legal history that encompassed perspectives from a variety of different disciplines 
such as anthropology, philology, and philosophy.16 This approach had a profound impact 
on the nineteenth-century historiographical tradition. 17  However, the generalisations 
present in his work are too far-reaching by modern standards, although his use of legal 
history to explore the evolution of law remains interesting.18 Maine’s method presented 
an idealistic approach to legal history, which imagines the evolution of human experience 
from basic institutions to more complex social structures.19 The focus of his treatment 
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was largely comparative jurisprudence instead of English legal history. 20  It is 
unnecessary to comment further on his work except to note that the methodology 
employed by Maitland eclipsed Maine’s scientific approach to become the foremost 
model of subsequent historians.21 Maitland’s treatment of legal history might be viewed 
as a reprisal against the short-comings of Maine’s school of thought. 
 
Maitland pioneered a methodology that appears to have been an inherent part of his 
genius for legal history. It is the product of a decision to withdraw himself from legal 
practice to become a medievalist.22  The positive reception of his edition of Bracton’s 
Notebook marked the beginning of a short, but successful, career. 23  Maitland was a 
prodigious writer during his 22 year career despite his battles with illness and winter 
exoduses to the Canary Islands.24 During this time, he demonstrated that lawyers and 
legal technique could shed considerable light on historical understanding.25 Professor 
Maitland’s celebrated place in English historiography means he continues to hold an 
indomitable position in any treatment of medieval history.26 The reference to Maitland’s 
work throughout this thesis is demonstrative of the hold he continues to exercise over 
the subject. He introduced an evidence-based historical technique to nineteenth-century 
legal history, which required a systematic study of the primary source material.27 He 
confined his historical observations to the period that had birthed the legal sources he 
was working with rather than attempting to make generalisations about the evolution of 
history.28 The objective evidence-based interpretation of history by Von Ranke to ‘tell 
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how it really was’ seems to have inspired this methodology.29 Maitland viewed history as 
an open-ended subject that defied attempts to construct definitive narratives. 30  He 
believed the socio-political framework of societies influenced legal development, and 
interpreted the law as a product of human needs and social will. 31  Maitland would 
probably be aghast to learn that one of his examples had become an accepted truth 
without the critical examination of the evidence that this thesis will undertake. 
 
Modern legal historians can continue to learn lessons from Maitland’s sophisticated 
method, or in his words, to pursue a ‘logic of evidence’.32 He used legal records to paint a 
contextual picture of the law to explore the lives of people and wider society.33 In the first 
instance, however, he sought to understand the law itself before attempting to interpret 
it within its social and intellectual background. 34  Maitland’s extensive canvass of 
medieval law and life redefined the history of the common law, which is why his 
scholarship remains authoritative today.35 He excelled at deconstructing historical ideas 
by using primary legal materials while appreciating the continuity present in the 
development of English law.36 His method worked by identifying what was certain before 
working towards what was uncertain.37 This favours a retrogressive historical treatment 
that acknowledges the known results of legal developments before turning to identify the 
causes and processes from which they sprang.38 It did not prevent conclusions in the 
absence of evidence, and Maitland himself was not afraid to offer educated opinions on 
legal development.39 In this manner, his genius aimed to provide a starting point for 
subsequent historians to challenge the ideas presented in his work once more evidence 
became available.40 This was likely his motivation when he published his explanation of 
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the use. William Buckland anecdotally commented on how Maitland gently introduced 
challengeable ideas in such a manner that allowed students to consider they had 
identified the issue themselves.41 The reference to the crusade movement may have been 
designed to tempt some hapless student to pick up where he left off.  
 
It is necessary to comment on what Maitland intended to say about the origin of uses. The 
accepted truth that the use had its origins during the Crusades ignores several other 
examples advanced in The History of English Law.42 It also ignores a note titled ‘on the 
phrase ‘ad opus’ and the Early History of the Use’, which includes several additional pages 
of explanatory material43 and references not considered part of the body44 of the text. The 
body of the text, read together with the explanatory notes, outlines the history of the 
expression and proceeds to discuss its impact on chattels and land, the latter is the subject 
of his crusade example. On the origin of the use, Maitland states: 
 
In tracing its embryonic history we must first notice the now established truth that the English word 
use when it is employed with a technical meaning in legal documents is derived, not from the Latin 
word usus, but from the Latin word opus, which in old French becomes os or oes. True that the two 
words are in course of time confused, so that if by a Latin document land is to be conveyed to the use 
of John, the scribe of the charter will write ad opus Johannis or ad usum Johannis indifferently, or will 
perhaps adopt the fuller formula ad opus et ad usum; nevertheless the earliest history of ‘the use’ is 
the early history of the phrase ad opus.45 
 
Maitland defined ad opus meum in the explanatory notes as ‘on my behalf’ or ‘for my 
profit’ or advantage.46 The word opus carries two meanings. First, it often means ‘task’ or 
‘work’.47  It is the second form, meaning ‘to serve the needs of’ or ‘to benefit’, which 
Maitland connected to the use in the medieval period. Maitland limits his treatment on 
the relationship between the crusade and the use to simply highlight an occasion when 
people might have made it. He did not intend it to become the dominant narrative. 
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Maitland often aimed to provide a starting point for future research rather than have the 
final word on the subject.48 This thesis is a much-delayed response to one of Maitland’s 
challenges. There is no doubt Maitland based his opinion in The History of English Law on 
the evidence available to him. However, he also outlines the motivation for his work: 
 
I have long been persuaded that every attempt to discover the genesis of our use in Roman law 
breaks down, and I have been led to look for it in another direction by an essay which some years 
ago Mr. Justice Holmes wrote on Early English Equity (Law Quarterly Review, vol. i.). Whether I have 
been successful is not for me to say. I will first state my theory and then adduce my evidence.49 
 
Maitland does not outline his reasoning for dismissing a possible Roman law source for 
the use, but makes it clear that he relied on theories advanced by his American 
contemporaries. The comment also shows that Maitland was experimenting when he 
included his explanation of the use. This is clear because, four years prior, he published 
an article titled ‘The origin of uses’ in the Harvard Law Review (1894) as a ‘projected 
sketch to be included’ in his main work.50 He is clearly presenting his work on his theory 
to attract comment before its inclusion in The History of English Law. The fact it later 
appeared unaltered reveals he did not receive the critical review he sought. It is 
reasonable to posit that his work was either commended by his contemporaries, or he 
was met with disappointing silence. This lends itself to a conclusion that his reference to 
the crusade movement was an attempt to enliven the subject. 
 
Traditional Schools of Thought 
 
The collection of essays in Itinera Fiduciae represent modern thinking on the nature of 
both trusts and uses.51 Its editors’ opening chapter begins by canvassing the two schools 
of thought about the origin of the trust, or rather the use, which existed in the nineteenth 
century. The text does not limit itself to English legal history. Its purpose is to assess 
whether there is a historical connection between the English trust and continental legal 
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traditions through a comparative study.52 Richard Helmholz and Reinhard Zimmermann 
identified that two schools of thought have dominated the debate ‘whether the medieval 
use, the parent or at least a lineal ancestor of the modern trust, had its origins in the 
Germanic Salman, or instead in the Roman law’s fideicommissum’.53 The debate between 
each school remained lively at the close of the twentieth century.54 All the contributing 
authors sensibly limited their definition of a trust or trust-like institution to basic trust 
structures.55 We define a bare trust as ‘a trust where the trustee or trustees hold property 
on trust with no active duty to perform except to convey it upon demand to the 
beneficiary or beneficiaries’. 56  This is sensible because it avoids invoking the 
complexities of modern trust law that could cloud the function of uses in medieval 
England and other trust-like structures elsewhere. It is necessary, however, to consider 




Pollock and Maitland wrote of their regret at the beginning of their The History of English 
Law that they had found the state of English legal history much as William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765 – 1769) 57  had left it in the previous 
century.58 However, Pound’s ‘century of history’ also included strong contributions to 
legal history by American historians that mirrored developments in England.59 Pollock 
and Maitland acknowledged their substantive debt to and admiration of American 
scholarship. 60  Maitland had frequent correspondence with American legal historians 
Melville Madison Bigelow, James Barr Ames, and Oliver Wendell Holmes.61 He shared a 
close personal relationship with Bigelow and the correspondence between them and 
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their spouses survive.62 All three had contributed essays on the use to the Select Essays in 
Anglo-American Legal History series. 63  Maitland even commented in private 
correspondence that he thought that Ames’ essay was the best in the series. 64  David 
Rabban’s ‘From Maine to Maitland via America’ (2009) has recently suggested modern 
English legal historians are reluctant to recognise the American contribution and isolate 
Maitland from it.65 It is arguable that one effect of an insular view of legal history is it 
allowed Maitland to cast a longer shadow than he did during his lifetime.66  
 
The influence of American scholarship on Maitland’s work on the use is straight-forward. 
As noted above, Maitland acknowledged the debt he owed to Holmes’ article ‘Early 
English Equity’67 whose theory of the use was almost immediately accepted by English 
and American legal historians.68  Holmes argued that ‘the feoffee to uses of the early 
English law corresponds point by point to the Salman of the early German law … the 
likeness between [them] would be enough, without more, to satisfy me that the latter was 
the former transplanted’.69  The author then connects the feoffee to the power of the 
executor as a German office.70 From Holmes’ starting point, Ames concluded ‘it may be 
conceded that the feoffee to uses, down to the beginning of the fifteenth century, was the 
German Salman or Treuhand under another name’.71 He ties the relief granted in the case 
of a feoffee who failed to perform their obligations to the Chancellor’s sense of justice.72 
The editors of Itinera Fiduciae comment that the speed with which the Germanic school 
of thought was accepted occurred because Maitland was its proponent, and that he had 
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suggested the only reachable conclusion was that the use had its origins in ancient 
Germanic roots that flowered in England.73 
 
The small number of subsequent legal historians that have approached the question of 
the origin of the use have moved away from Maitland’s thesis, and this thesis is no 
exception. The key issue with the Germanic school of thought, as identified by John L. 
Barton in ‘The Medieval Use’, is there is no evidence to support the view that the Germanic 
Salman was ever a part of the customary law in England.74 Maitland was not familiar with 
Anglo-Saxon law and his work on it has attracted criticism from modern historians.75 It 
is curious that he makes no attempt to connect the Salman to those who held land ad opus 
for another. Nonetheless, Maitland believed the use had its roots in a special usage of the 
expression ad opus found in Anglo-Saxon law. In an explanatory note ‘From Frankish 
models the phrase has passed into Anglo-Saxon land-books’ he cites three charters to 
support his argument.76 The charters are formulaic. The first concerns a grant from the 
Mercian king Coenulf to Archbishop Wulfred, made in 809, of twenty-five hides of land 
located in Ilbbinctun, Kent ‘for the use of the Church of Christ and the monks there who 
are in the service of God … free from all secular service except [military] expedition, and 
the construction of bridges and defences’.77 The second charter (822) concerns a grant of 
land by Coenulf’s controversial successor King Beornulf and, although considered 
spurious, provides the basic ingredients of the formula above.78 It reads, ‘Beornulf grants 
to Archbishop Wilfred, ad opus monachorum in the service of God, rights in the land at 
Godmeresham, namely eight plows, free from all [secular] things, except [the three 
common burdens]’.79 The third charter (832) is not a royal grant of land but a private 
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post-obit gift, a bilateral contractual arrangement to take effect after death, made by a 
priest named Werhard that included a condition that the monastic lands granted to him 
by an archbishop would return to the monks after his death.80  
 
The first issue with Maitland’s thesis is that the expression ad opus has no special 
meaning in Anglo-Saxon grants to monasteries. It is, contrary to what Maitland suggested, 
synonymous with ad usum. Numerous charters use the expressions interchangeably 
throughout the Anglo-Saxon period to denote a conveyance of land to monasteries. For 
example, a charter (757 x 758), probably authentic, concerns a grant made by King 
Cynewulf of the Saxons of five manses at North Stoke to a monastery for perpetual 
possession and ad usum neccessarium.81 The interchangeability of the terms is evident in 
both tenth-82 and eleventh-century83 charters. Maitland was correct, however, to suggest 
the rules surrounding monastic lands were antique by the time of the Conquest. The 
venerable Bede reports that the synod of Hertford (673) enacted a canon that ‘it shall not 
be lawful for any bishop to disturb monasteries dedicated to God, nor to take away 
forcibly any part of their property’ (cap. 3).84 The Penitential (668 – 690), attributed to 
the Byzantine Theodore, expands on this rule to state that a bishop could not take 
possession of the monastery even if the abbot commits an offense (2.6.5).85 It further 
provides: ‘It is unlawful for either a bishop or abbot to alienate the land of the church to 
another, even though it is within their power. If either is desirous to alienate the land of 
the Church, they must obtain the consent of the other’ (2.6.6).86 The rule seems to have 
relaxed within a century. The Acts of the Council of Celchyth (816) allowed alienation for 
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the lifetime of one man, with the consent of the monks, provided it afterward returned to 
the Church.87 Charters made by Archbishop Oswald in the tenth century suggests he took 
pains to obtain the monk’s consent for his various alienations when the rule had relaxed 
further to include the lifetime of one man and two of his heirs.88 At no time, however, is 
the term ad opus employed to covey a meaning distinct from ad usum. 
  
Maitland’s decision to invoke Anglo-Saxon monastic charters as evidence of the Germanic 
origins of the use seemed reasonable. There is an implicit trust-like structure implied in 
grants of land to monks.89 The Council of Clovesho (747) states that bishops, abbots, and 
abbesses should set a good example by treating the monks (and nuns) as their children 
rather than as servants, care for the needs of the monastery, and faithfully deal with 
monastic property and not steal it (canon 4).90 The bishop or abbot had decision-making 
power over the community and administered its property on its behalf.91 However, the 
idea that the bishop or abbot was in the position of a feoffee struggles against the core 
precept of corporately-held property that forbids private ownership. 92  Anglo-Saxon 
donors intended to give land outright to a community with the ecclesiastic viewed as 
having a custodial role in respect of his office. This is clear in an abridged charter (832), 
made by King Aðelwulf at the instigation of Archbishop Ceolnoð, which reads that he gifts 
land to the ‘church of Christ at Canterbury ad opus monachorum with fields, woods, 
meadows, and food for 120 pigs … I, King Aðelwulf give these donations to Christ free 
from all secular services except for the [three common burdens]’.93 It is unsurprising, 
therefore, that today’s legal historians have abandoned the idea that the use has a 
Germanic progenitor while the ongoing association with the crusade movement remains 
the dominant narrative. 
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The second school of thought predates the Germanic theory of uses and relied on, 
according to Helmholz and Zimmermann, ‘evidence of the most circumstantial sort’.94 
There is little to add to their summary of the Roman law school of thought: 
 
Whatever the cause, the unanimity and persistence of opinion on the point is quite impressive. Sir 
William Blackstone (d. 1780) concluded that English trusts were “in their original of a nature very 
similar, or rather exactly the same” as the fiduciary institutions of the Roman law, chiefly the 
fideicommissum. Sir Geoffrey Gilbert (d. 1720), prolific treatise writer and chief baron of the 
Exchequer, took the view that legacies in wills had themselves originally been fideicommissa, going 
on to describe the English executor as fideicommissarius. William Cruise (d. 1824), author of standard 
works of real property, summed up what was by then a widely accepted position: “The idea of a use 
and the rules by which it was first regulated, are now generally admitted to have been borrowed by 
the ecclesiasticks [sic] from the fidei-commissum of the civil law”.95 
 
This school, therefore, is built on noticed similarities between the civil law 
fideicommissum and the trust. These similarities are compelling. The Institutes states the 
following arrangement, ‘[A] testator [who] has written ‘Let Lucius Titius be my heir,’ he 
can then add, ‘and I ask you, Lucius Titius, as soon as you can accept the estate, to give it 
to Gaius Seius’ (Inst. 2.23.2). Even a lawyer with a bare acquaintance with legal history 
would quickly recognise a fideicommissum as prima facie meeting the definition of a 
testamentary trust. It was a logical connection to make. It also agreed with the humanist 
sentiments of early modern England to impose the classics onto aspects of its society.96  
 
The Roman law school of thought, unlike its Germanic counterpart, exercised a 
discernible impact on trust law after the Statute of Uses. It is evidence of Helmholz’s 
assertion that ‘it is right to think that some of the elements of trust law in England were 
shaped by the ius commune. The process happened gradually and without much notice 
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being taken of it’.97 Reference to the instrument by English civilians is unsurprising.98 
However, it is clear there was acceptance of the Roman law school of thought throughout 
legal practice. For example, in Penson v Cartwright99 (1615), the King’s Bench heard a case 
to determine whether it should prohibit the Court of Requests from hearing a case that 
concerned a person whose instructions to their executor included: ‘I have, by my will, 
given such particular legacies [and] I would have you increase the same’. The common 
law court reasoned ‘this by the civil law is termed commissum fidei, and held a good 
legacy’. Therefore, the court prohibited the Court of Requests from hearing the case and 
deferred the matter to the proper forum to determine testamentary causes (an 
ecclesiastical court). English lawyers also argued the particulars of trust law according to 
civil law principles. In Pierson v Garnet (1786),100 Lord Chancellor Thurlow sought to 
determine whether the precatory words used by the deceased were sufficient to support 
a trust (i.e. manifest a certainty of intention) ‘according to the notions of the civil law’. 
Therefore, the use’s connection to the Roman law by analogy to the trust, like the crusade 
today, was an accepted truth in English law. One nineteenth-century case notes: ‘Trusts, 
as adopted in our law, we know perfectly well, are taken from the Roman law, fidei 
commissum, a duty imposed upon the good faith, upon a confidence, in the party’.101 The 
legal profession had bulwarked the idea that the use had its origins in the civil law before 
the nineteenth century.  
 
It is unlikely that the strength of Maitland’s authority alone was enough to replace the 
Roman school of thought. Nineteenth-century common law romanticised a nationalistic 
hostility to the civil law that had its origins in the Reformation, which imagined the civil 
law as authoritarian and posing a moral threat to English law.102 In reality, common law 
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jurists, for the most part, cooperated with their civilian counterparts.103  The popular 
narrative persisted, nevertheless, that the nationalistic common lawyer ought to regard 
the civil law as an invasive force to be repelled.104 Pollock wrote scathingly about some 
of his contemporaries in The Genius of the Common Law (1912): ‘I have known good 
English lawyers who can see nothing but barbarism in the Middle Ages. I suspect those 
learned friends of being, I will not say possessed, but in some measure obsessed, by the 
enemy [civil law]’.105 It was an unnecessarily virulent attack on the civil law. The civil law 
influence on English law had already ended when the Probate Act 1857 disbanded the 
Doctors Commons to end the civilian profession.106 Writing shortly before its enactment, 
the civilian John Phillimore thought in Principles and Maxims of Jurisprudence (1856) that 
the common lawyers had a shameful degree of pride in their ignorance of the civil law, 
the common law being poorer for it.107 Nevertheless, Pollock is illustrative of the hostility 
that led to the decline of civil law jurisprudence from English legal thought.108 The climate 
was conducive to a new theory to supplant the old. 
 
Maitland does not appear to be immune from the nationalistic attitude of his co-author 
with regard to Roman law.109 It is a major theme in his English law and the Renaissance 
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(1901) that various jurisdictions attempted to withstand and then succumbed to Roman 
law influence.110 In The Constitutional History of England (1919), he states that the growth 
of the common law during the thirteenth century meant ‘that from the beginning of 
Edward’s reign, English law becomes always more insular, and English lawyers become 
more and more utterly ignorant of any law but their own. Thus English law was saved 
from Romanism’.111 He notes that although the common law lost the structure of a civilian 
system; it resisted the political authoritarianism that Roman law brought with it.112 He 
concluded ‘English law at this early period had absorbed so much Romanism that it could 
withstand all future attacks, and pass scathless even through the critical sixteenth 
century’.113 These opinions seem to be implicit in Maitland’s belief that the trust was 
unique to English law and not found on the continent.114 The Germanic school of influence 
supported his opinion that the use or trust was one of ‘the most distinctive achievement 
of English law’.115 Wormald noted he was far warmer towards continental influences 
from France and Germany, and less receptive to arguments supporting the Roman 
influence on English law. 116  Nonetheless, Maitland’s evidence-based approach rested 
behind his rejection of Roman origins of the use. He understood that legal historians must 
be versed in both the civil law and ecclesiastical traditions of English law.117 Further, he 
actively sought out a remedy for what he felt were defects in his knowledge.118 This led 
him to make a significant contribution that papal decretals were binding in England, 
which led to a famous controversy with the prominent medievalist William Stubbs who 
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posited the opposite view.119 Therefore, Maitland’s rejection of the dominant view was 




The modern debate adopts qualities of the nineteenth-century schools of thought. 
Historians are divided about whether to adopt an insular or expansive view of the trust, 
or in this case, the use.120 Most essays in Itinera Fiduciae took an expansive view: 
 
Continental legal historians are surprised to find that quite apart from the question of the trust’s 
origins, the ius commune played a significant part in the development of the English trust. English 
legal historians are surprised to find that trust-like institution, making use of civilian sources, were 
in place on the Continent, and that they were not simply fideicommissa of the Roman law … The 
Roman and Canon laws were thus a continuing factor in the creation and regulation of trusts.121 
 
The expansive view of trust-like institutions, including the use, draws on ius commune 
influences. Shael Herman’s authoritative work ‘The Canonical Conception of the Trust’ 
demonstrates that trust-like arrangements allowed the Church to reconcile the reality 
that it held property with its spiritual aversion towards wealth by conceptualising the 
clergy as its guardians.122 God took the role of the settlor and ultimate beneficiary of 
ecclesiastic property.123 Herman argues that the canonical usage of the term usus, a term 
that described numerous beneficial interests, was distinguishable from the use because 
the clergy could only ever enjoy a licence to use and not the incidences of ownership.124 
He authoritatively challenged Maitland’s belief that one purpose of the use was to 
accommodate Franciscan landholding. 125  The two arrangements are distinguishable. 
Franciscan landholding relied on a distinction between ownership and possession, which 
allowed the Church to hold an enduring interest as a collegium without invoking 
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individual property rights. 126  This supports Stephen DeVine’s conclusion that the 
Franciscan model of bare ownership had no influence on uses in English law. 127 
Franciscan title to land was a ‘non-transferable, non-heritable and terminable at death’ 
interest in property.128 
 
The editors also advanced the gift ad pias causa as a trust-like device that had long pre-
dated private law uses in English law.129 It was identical in nature to the charitable trust 
or use.130 A thesis on the origin of the charitable use in English law has its clearest germs 
in the ius commune. Cod. 1.3.28.1 permits a bishop to administer pious bequests, namely 
chattels, for the benefit of the poor or the release of captives. 131  One of the most 
significant developments in this area of law is found in the following passage: ‘If he [the 
testator] does not specifically state [in his will] the poor intended to benefit, the holy 
bishop of the town where the testator had his domicile shall receive it and distribute it 
amongst the poor’ (Nov. 131.11.1).132 English courts regularly cited this principle in the 
context of charitable uses to justify that the gift cannot fail for want of uncertain 
persons.133  The public law character of the charitable use distinguishes it from both 
private law uses and trusts.134 However, the rule long predates the civil law. Its principles 
can be found during the Roman Dominate in St. Augustine’s advice that testators ought to 
provide for Christ after their children.135 It is an arrangement that Herman associates 
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with the canonical theory of corporate property. 136  Religious antecedents for the 
charitable trust have also been seen in the Islamic Waqf, neither Roman nor Germanic, 
which may have penetrated English law through contact during the crusade 
movement. 137  Silence about its potential influence is similarly attributed to the 
crusade.138 Michael Gousmett’s ‘Origins of the Trust’ (2017) is the most recent reiteration 
of this connection. The author comments it is interesting to learn that ‘the English trust 
may not have been a creation of English jurisprudence after all, and that it may have been 
predated by a concept originating from Islamic traditions’. 139  Gousmett notices the 
historiographical trend to ignore the possible connection.140 Nonetheless, a thesis on the 
origin of the charitable use (or rather the gift ad pias causa) as a trust-like religious device 
ought to start with the tenets of Jewish law.141 The trust-like elements of the charitable 
use in English law are clear but it invokes the same theory of usus as other ecclesiastical 
property ownership.142 Furthermore, the classical definition of a use, as it appears in 
Maitland’s example, does not include principles related to the law of charity. 
 
Helmholz is an authoritative proponent of a possible ius commune origin of the use. His 
chapter in Itinera Fiduciae, ‘Trusts in the English Ecclesiastical Courts 300 – 1640’, 
describes the enforcement of uses in the ecclesiastical courts.143 He lends his authority to 
the accepted truth: ‘Perhaps, the earliest appearance of such a device in an ecclesiastical 
setting is associated with the Crusades. Early crusaders sometimes conveyed their land 
to a trustee, to be held to the use of their wives or children while in the Holy Land’.144 He 
has fallen into a familiar trap. The only source he cites for this proposition is The History 
of English Law and the example contained within. 145  He adds, ‘the strongest early 
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connection between the Church and the use in England is not, however, related to the 
Crusades, but rather the Franciscans, who arrived in England early in the 13th century’.146 
Helmholz does appear to prove his thesis that fourteenth-century ecclesiastical courts 
enforced uses.147 It is a natural forum because the primary purpose of the feoffment to 
use was to effectively permit the feoffor to devise land. 148  However, he raises two 
additional arguments. The first concerns the common law. Helmholz states, ‘using the 
technical terms of the common law, the feoffees were said to hold the land ad opus. Their 
tenancy was said to be for benefit of the cestui que use, a general term employed to 
designate the beneficiary, present or future’. 149  Helmholz appears to have relied on 
Maitland to reach this conclusion. Second, he argues its enforcement in Chancery arose 
when it supplanted ecclesiastical jurisdiction over feoffment to uses when it offered a 
remedy. 150  The possibility that Chancery or the common law courts enforced uses, 
concurrent with the ecclesiastical courts, has yet to be satisfactorily examined.  
 
On the other hand, the insular approach regards the trust, and uses, as part of an English 
tradition absent from external influences such as the ius commune.151 J. M. W. Bean’s The 
Decline of English Feudalism is the modern starting-point for proponents of an insular 
view of uses. Bean devoted a chapter ‘Origins and Development of Uses’ to the use in the 
above text, which he defined with reference to Maitland’s ad opus hypothesis and its 
usage in Anglo-Saxon law as a Germanic import.152 Bean examined a number of cases that 
he thought illustrated the trust-like character of the use.153 He provides an example of a 
crusader named Sir Otto on the Ninth Crusade where the jurors did not know whether he 
granted his lands to the bishop as a bailiff or ‘with all their rights’ (as a feoffee).154 This 
suggested to the author that the jurors may have been acquainted with the use. The 
distinction between a bailiff who did not have seisin and a feoffee who had ownership 
was plain in the thirteenth century.155 Bean notes the use, as a trust-like device, came into 
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vogue in the following century.156 He posits three strands to determine the origin of the 
use: the existence of a practice whereby one person holds land to the use of another; the 
development of trusteeship; and the development of the executor as an office.157 The 
conclusion that the use found definition in the late fourteenth century defines the scope 
of his study. 158  Bean concluded, despite an insular approach to his subject, that the 
common law had no remedy for the use. He concluded that the Chancellor and the King’s 
council enforced uses outside of common law principles.159 
 
Legal historians have adopted an insular view of uses since Bean. Robert Palmer devotes 
space in his authoritative account of English law in the Age of the Black Death to a 
description of uses in the late fourteenth century, which connects it to the growth of 
Chancery as a court of conscience.160 Palmer’s study made no mention of the use as an 
instrument connected to the ad opus expression during the fourteenth century or the 
crusade movement. He is also highly critical of the expansive approach that Helmholz had 
adopted in previous work.161 Nonetheless, his brief sketch presents a highly persuasive 
account that seldom steps outside the evidence. The author does, oddly, suggest that the 
use cannot be explored purely as a legal instrument.162 He instead calls the instrument a 
social use to reject many earlier arrangements thought to be uses, and emphasises their 
sociological rather than legal importance. 163  This is a more confusing aspect of an 
otherwise excellent treatment. The second author to adopt an insular approach recently 
is Joseph Biancalana in his essay ‘Medieval Uses’ in Itinera Fiduciae.164 The author states 
from the outset that he is setting out to build on Bean’s work to explore a theory of the 
use that is intertwined with the development of Chancery as a court of equity.165 He posits 
three strands, like Bean, which was necessary for their creation, but varies his treatment 
to include ‘the three practices of appointing executors, making grants out to receive back 
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a life estate-remainder settlement, and making conditional grants combined to form a 
feoffment to uses’.166 His work is distinguishable from both Bean and Palmer because he 
accepts the possibility of multiple forums of enforcement, which includes accepting 
Helmholz’s evidence that they were recognised by the ecclesiastical courts.  
 
The Problem of Definition 
 
The absence of an agreed definition of the use is one reason historians have not yet 
produced a satisfactory account of its origin to supplant the belief that it originated with 
the Crusades. There are two principal issues that underlie modern scholarship. The first 
issue is that historians have adopted broad definitions of the use that could apply to a 
variety of devices in the medieval period. Palmer discussed this issue (uncharitably) in 
the following terms: 
 
[A] purely legal definition of the use does not easily define the important changes in landholding in 
late medieval England. Using the purely legal perception, one can find “uses” long before the 
fourteenth century, but uses that are not characterized by the artificiality of the fourteenth-century 
phenomenon. Typical in this regard is [Richard] Helmholz’s description of the use: “the essence of 
the ‘use’ was the separation of legal title to land from its beneficial enjoyment”. The problem with 
that description of the use as its “essence” is that essence was shared by so many earlier phenomena 
from which the use is distinctly different – or else the late-fourteenth century developments would 
not have been as important as everyone admits they were.167 
 
Palmer further complains that historians have confused both guardians of wards and 
bailiffs to property as feoffees.168 The use, while having traditional application to land, 
has also been in arrangements applying to chattels and monies. Maitland accepted uses 
could apply to both and offered the following as an example: ‘William delivers two marks 
or three oxen to John, who receives them to the use [ad opus] of Roger’.169 He admits the 
question of uses on chattels and money is hazy due to nuanced distinctions between 
ownership and possession, and the above example concerns ad opus in the law of 
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agency.170 In contrast, Maitland suggested that uses touching land were clearer because 
of the demarcation between ownership and possession. 171  The evidence suggests 
modern definitions that include chattels and money as uses are also too broad to develop 
a satisfactory account of their origin.  
 
Biancalana’s definition of the use is also illustrative of the dangers associated with a 
broad definition. He avoids some confusion by confining his treatment to land, 
distinguishing uses from other trust-like devices that touch chattels, and the freehold or 
title held by feoffee that distinguishes them from a mere custodian. 172  However, he 
suggests uses achieved a variety of purposes in England: 
 
Medieval uses can be divided into two great classes, those which transmitted land from one 
generation to the next and those which did not. [i] Uses of the [second] class were created to secure 
debts or other obligations, [ii] to avoid creditors, [iii] to evade litigation, and [iv] to circumvent the 
Statute of Mortmain.173 
 
Biancalana cites two fourteenth-century examples of uses under the first head of his 
second class of use ([i] to secure debts) that are not uses.174 The first concerns a licence 
(1375) for Walter fitz Walter to enfeoff three persons of his lands on condition that if 
Walter pays the feoffees or their executors, he may re-enter the premises.175 The second 
concerns a grant (1349) made by the Earl of Lancaster, going to Gascony in the King’s 
service, who granted lands and rents to ‘certain persons’ to hold for twelve years to pay 
back a loan.176  These arrangements are conditional feoffments known as a vifgage, a 
conditional grant of land that allows the grantee to enjoy the fruits of the land for a certain 
term as security for a loan, which is utilised by the Earl during the Hundred Years War in 
the same way that crusaders also employed them. 177  The ultimate purpose of the 
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arrangement of this conditional feoffment is to provide security rather than benefit a 
third party. 178  Palmer similarly conflates pledge arrangements, like the vifgage, with 
uses.179 He indicates that uses allowed control over the particulars of a pledge during the 
fourteenth century to include collateral objects.180 However, the principal purpose of a 
credit arrangement is to secure a loan rather than benefit a third party. 
 
A broad definition of the use has also led legal historians to suggests that its function 
is to circumvent the law. Biancalana states feoffers utilised uses to fraudulently grant 
land to friends to circumvent either [ii] debts and obligations (50 Edw. III, c 6) or [iii] 
litigation (1 Ric II, c 9) while secretly enjoying the profits. However, these statutes do 
not specifically discuss issues of fraud that were unique to uses. The idea of hiding 
property in feoffments (absolute or conditional) is not novel and the law had been on 
guard against such frauds long before their passage. The common law is replete with 
examples of feoffments made for fraudulent purposes. For example, a feoffment with 
a condition could be used to avoid the consequence of litigation.181 In a case dated 
1262, the exchequer intervened to prevent a debtor trying to disperse their goods to 
avoid paying creditors. 182  Furthermore, a felon might attempt to avoid the 
consequence of forfeiture by granting land to another.183 Richard Page ‘on or after the 
day when he was outlawed for the felonious slaying of Thomas Bernard of 
Maderressey’ enfeoffed a number of persons for his life.184 The law sought to overturn 
all feoffments intended to defraud. One case concerned a landholder who enfeoffed the 
defendant of his fee with a clear intention to deprive his lord (the plaintiff) of his legal 
rights (wardship) contrary to the Statute of Quia Emptores 1290 (18 Edw. 1, c 1).185 
The court emphasised this was a ‘feigned feoffment’ made by collusion. Even too many 
‘successive alienations’ of land that raised suspicion might result in an escheat to the 
king and later restoration to the feoffor’s lawful heir.186 The feoffment with a condition 
to achieve an illegal purpose might approach the nature of the use, but the suggestion 
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the principal purpose of the use is fraudulent is a problematic starting point since it 
assumes illegality. 
 
The second issue is that the use has been too long dressed in the clothes of the trust as 
understood in equity. Palmer, like Helmholz in the quote above, states that the 
fundamental characteristic of the use is that it distinguishes between legal and beneficial 
ownership.187 This distinction is used in Nevill’s Law of Trusts, Wills and Administration, 
which defines a trust as an obligation imposed by equity as a consequence of this 
structure.188 Palmer concludes that ‘the use became a secure mechanism enforced by 
state authority not by the alteration of the common law rules, but rather by the 
chancellor’s enforcement of ethical expectations on behalf of people who were intended 
beneficiaries’. 189  The remainder of his treatment is coloured by a definition that 
envisaged the use as cognisant in Chancery according to conscience rather than law. 
Palmer wrote when, in Biancalana’s words, ‘the relation and interaction between 
Chancery as a court of conscience and the common law courts was a largely unexplored 
subject’.190 Dennis Klinck has since demonstrated that Chancery did not have exclusive 
reference to notions of conscience. Klinck concluded that while principles of fairness may 
have influenced the Chancellor, he did not provide a unique forum of equity nor introduce 
into English law a notion of conscience informed by the canon law.191 Klinck cites a case 
from Statham’s Abridgement (1467), heard in 1453 under the head of conscience, as a 
noteworthy exception to a dearth of evidence for equitable reasoning in juridical 
decisions.192 Chief Justice John Fortescue explicitly commented: ‘We are not arguing the 
law in this case, but the conscience’.193 Notably, the judge usually presided over the King’s 
Bench and was not an ecclesiastic.194 The notion of conscience, however, was referenced 
to justify the overturning of a use made to benefit a daughter at the expense of another 
daughter who was her father’s lawful heir. 
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It is a striking feature of the abovementioned case from Statham’s Abridgement that 
the reference to conscience is to overturn a use, which is contrary to modern ideas that 
trust-like devices ought to be enforced by equitable notions. The arguments are worth 
canvassing in further detail. Lawyers for the beneficiary of the use made the following 
argument: 
 
When he declared his will, the daughter had immediately an interest in the land, which he [her 
father] could not defeat afterwards; no more than where a man enfeoffs me to enfeoff another, who 
is a stranger to his blood, he cannot revoke it afterwards … for when he is as well the feoffee of the 
daughter as the feoffee of the feoffor. And if the daughter declares her will to him, he is bound to do 
it after the death of the feoffor. And I think that such a declaration of his will is as strong as a condition 
declared upon a livery of seisin.195 
 
The law argued by the lawyer is: a feoffment made with a condition imposed on the 
feoffee to enfeoff another, in this case a use, must be upheld as a matter of law; the 
daughter can demand the feoffee transfer it to her since she steps into the shoes of the 
feoffor. Lawyer for the heir, however, argued that the feoffor could have revoked his 
will at any time and, as a matter of conscience, obliged the feoffee to re-enfeoff the 
feoffor on discovery of their poverty. Fortescue further reasoned that conscience 
indicated that no father with a full appreciation of their situation would willingly 
enfeoff another to the deprivation of their heir. The case illustrates the danger of 
imposing modern notions of equity onto the use, which is evident by the surprise 
expressed by the modern English translator that ‘our case is not in the Chancery, as 
one might well expect a case of conscience to be, but in the Exchequer’. 196  The 
significance of the lawyers for the beneficiary framing their argument around settled 
common law principles shows that the law pertaining to uses followed livery of seisin 
rather than ideas of conscience or equity. It suggests the origin of the use may not lie 
in equity but the common law. The idea that the use has a connection to the common 
law is explored throughout the thesis in reference to the crusade movement, and 
expanded on in the eighth chapter to put to rest the accepted truth. 
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The tendency to conflate the use with the trust appears to be a lingering consequence 
of the Roman law school of thought that associated it with the fideicommissum. David 
Johnston has authoritatively dismissed the idea that English trusts emerged out of the 
Roman law instrument, but also remarks that the parallels in their respective 
developments are remarkable.197 The association between the fideicommissum and the 
ius honorarium, a jurisdiction exercised by the praetor to supplement and correct the 
rigours of the ius civile (Dig. 1.1.7.1), means English jurists also built on civilian 
jurisprudence to associate the use with equity. The description in Inst. 2.23.1 that the 
origins of fideicommissa, as arrangement formed around notions of good faith (fides) 
and not law, resonated with English jurists. It states that Emperor Augustus 
occasionally ordered consuls to enforce them, but they proved so popular that a 
regular jurisdiction was created during the principate. The implication is the 
fideicommissum shaped the development of the ius honorarium, which George Spence 
thought analogous to the use’s relationship with equity in England.198 English lawyers 
drew analogies between the praetor, who enforced fideicommissa in Roman law, and 
the chancellor and their enforcement of trusts.199 Francis Bacon even calls the praetor 
a ‘chancellor only for uses’.200 The evidence suggests that civil law principles did shape 
the development of trust law in England from the early modern period. 201  In the 
eighteenth century, Chancery demonstrably grafted trust concepts onto the civil law 
donatio mortis causa to extend it to include chose-in-action such as shares.202 As late 
as 1857, the Lord Chancellor in Dodd’s Case treated the terms fidei commissaires and 
trustee as interchangeable expressions.203 Future research will undoubtedly reveal 
further connections between civil law principles and the development of the trust. In 
                                                          
197 D. Johnston, The Roman law of Trusts, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1988, p. 1. 
198 Spence, The Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, vol. 1, pp. 325- 326. 
199 See generally Martínez-Torrón, Anglo-American Law and Canon Law, p. 54; W. W. Buckland, A. D. McNair, 
and F. H. Lawson, Roman Law and Common Law: A Comparison in Outline, 2nd edn, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1965, p. 5; W. Buckland, ‘Praetor and Chancellor’, Tulane Law Review, vol. 13, no. 2, 1939, p. 
163; T. Ridley, A View of the Civile and Ecclesiastical Law, London, Printed for the Company of Stationers, 1607, 
pp. 11 – 12. 
200 Bacon, The Learned Reading of Sir Francis Bacon, p. 16. 
201 On civilians adapting civil law principles for English law see R. Helmholz, ‘The Origin of Holographic Wills in 
English law’, The Journal of Legal History, vol. 15, no. 2, 1994, pp. 97 – 108. 
202 L. Breach, ‘King v Chiltern Dog Rescue: a timely reflection on the donatio mortis causa in New Zealand’, New 
Zealand Family Law Journal, vol. 8, no. 11, 2016, pp. 200 – 204. 




the present thesis, it shows how those principles that shaped English thoughts about 




The continued belief that there is a link between the use and the crusade movement is an 
unfortunate consequence of a common opinion that issues on which Maitland 
pronounced do not need explanation beyond his seminal work. The reliance on the 
accuracy of Maitland’s research by distinguished medievalists discussing medieval law 
and legal institutions illustrates his continued importance in modern histories. 204 
However, ‘legal history, like other history, must always be rewritten’.205 Stroud Francis 
Charles Milsom eloquently sums up the problem as follows: 
 
There are no scholarly miracles; and if writing so old still has authority that is because people do not 
look behind it to the evidence. Reliance is natural when the writing set the assumptions upon which 
generations have worked, when history is so fragmented that nobody looks at the wood in which 
their particular trees were growing, and when the evidence is intractably legal. And Maitland’s magic 
is not confined to the immediacy with which his readers hear disputes. There is also the lawyer’s 
power to impose a simple and convincing pattern upon complex matters. It became a creed because 
it had to be right.206 
 
Modern scholarship must move past Maitland, although not completely abandon his 
technique, to write good historical commentary on medieval legal institutions. The 
excellence of Maitland’s work continues to enthral modern readers. The author’s 
apparent intuition for the medieval accompanied by the eloquent flow of his writing 
means any proposed revision of his work is a daunting challenge.207 Modern historians 
must be prepared to accept Maitland’s treatment of the English use could be wrong. An 
examination into traditionally ignored elements of English law and a different approach 
to the utilisation and interpretation of law and legal sources could shed substantial light 
on medieval history.  
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In moving forward, a flexible approach to the subject of English legal history is necessary 
to satisfactorily examine the origins of the use. Most common law legal academics, it is to 
be expected, are acquainted with Bracton’s On the Laws and Customs of England (c. 1230s) 
as a starting-point for English law in the medieval period.208 The body of common law 
juristic literature, considerably less ample than the civilian works on the continent, was 
never far away from the ius commune tradition.209 Legal historians appreciate that the 
common law is a judge-made formulary system that developed during the twelfth 
century.210 The administration of medieval law often loosely consisted of local laws and 
customs applied on a regional basis rather than a national centralised system.211 England 
is unique because the king succeeded in establishing a distinct customary law throughout 
the kingdom. It is a curious feature of this jurisdiction that the greatest contribution the 
common law has made to the corpus of the law is its official documents rather than 
literature.212 In treating the common law, the legal historian has a problem unique in the 
discipline of Medieval History. Maitland best described it as follows: 
 
To say nothing of the light they [rolls] throw upon every detail of mediaeval life, they contain the 
authorities, and it well may be, ultimate authorities for many a rule of the common law which 
hitherto has been traced no further than Bracton’s unverified assertion. However to print these rolls 
in full would be too large, too costly a task for private enterprise. We have been embarrassed by our 
riches, our untold riches. The nation put its hand to the work and turned back fainthearted. 
Foreigners print their records; we, it must be supposed, have too many records to be worth printing; 
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so there they lie these invaluable materials for the history of the English people, unread, unknown, 
almost untouched save by the makers of pedigrees.213 
 
Legal historians, therefore, must overcome a discordant mass of material. It is a task more 
daunting than the study of continental legal systems.214 The volume of official documents 
and case law in the medieval record presents an intimidating challenge to modern legal 
historians and would likely pose an unassailable barrier to those uninitiated in law.  
 
Historians of English law must also acquaint themselves with England’s civilian tradition. 
It began when Oxford University first taught from Vacarius’ Liber Pauperum in the mid-
twelfth century. 215  A Lectura 216  on Justinian’s Institutes reveals English students had 
access to a professional education on the civil law.217 Therefore, it is unsurprising that a 
professional class of practicing civilians emerged in the following century. 218  The 
ecclesiastical courts provided them with opportunities for employment, particularly in 
the provincial courts of York and Canterbury, and they could expect judicial roles, to act 
as advocates and proctors, notaries, or undertake some other administrative function.219 
The medieval civilian viewed themselves as the equal to their common law 
counterpart.220 Nonetheless, much of the civilian literary tradition is post-Reformation. 
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One of the most eminent authors is Henry Swinburne. He wrote treatises on the learned 
laws in English while at the same time was sufficiently versed in the common law to 
utilise case law.221 His treatise A brief treatise of Testaments and last Wills (1590) and the 
posthumous publication of A Treatise of Spousals or Marriage Contracts (1686) were both 
written for a purely English-speaking audience.222 The practice of civil law in England, 
like other continental jurisdictions, had the opposite problem to the common law as a 
system rich with literature but meagre access to case law.223 
 
The broad lens of the law adopted in this thesis follows the example set in Itinera Fiduciae 
that it is necessary to explore both the common law and ius commune traditions.224 Legal 
historians have occasionally underestimated the value of ius commune sources and their 
impact on English law. John Pocock suggested ‘the Codes and Digest are useless to the 
lawyer because they bear no relation to modern society; they are useless to the historian 
because they are not the law that was practised at Rome at any time in its history’.225 
Legal historians have traditionally neglected its influence on English law partly due to its 
complexity. 226  However, there has been a resurgence of late twentieth-century 
scholarship into how the ius commune has shaped English law.227 It is hoped the analysis 
undertaken by this thesis to examine the canon law concepts of crusading and its impact 
on the common law adds to this body of research. It is justifiable, as Helmholz observed, 
because the excellence of the canon law merits attention, even admiration, from those 
interested in legal development.228  On the other hand, this approach to legal history 
continues to be tempered by a tendency to exaggerate the differences between civil law 
and common law jurisdictions, and ignore their similar historical traditions and legal 
principles.229  Modern common law systems minimise the impact of the ius commune 
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tradition despite its presence in Anglo-Norman jurisprudence.230 Moreover, there is an 
occasional reluctance by legal historians to look to France and other continental places 
as sources for medieval law in England.231 It is hoped that a study of the use in English 
law can overcome such reluctance.  
 
Legal historians can also use law to examine the relationship between law and wider 
society.232 This requires an appreciation that law forms part of a broader social history, 
and acceptance of political and economic influence on legal development. 233  Another 
dimension to social analysis is the use of law as a source to provide insight into the lives 
of people, their emotions, and the relationships they share with others.234 This approach 
indicates historians may take a holistic view of legal history that acknowledges its context 
and appreciates how societal norms shape the law. 235  Charles Donahue Jr notes ‘any 
lawyer who can get a firm understanding of how that interactive process works has 
learned something far more valuable than the factoid that the English law of trusts began 
in the fourteenth century’.236 It is unlikely historians, legal or otherwise, will reject the 
use of legal sources in this manner. Historians are constantly seeking new ways to 
interpret historical materials through a variety of lenses.237 The difficulty lies in balancing 
the legal element with the historical. There exists a transatlantic debate that accuses legal 
historians of being either ahistorical or non-legal but never balanced.238 There is an ever-
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Legal historians continue to mourn Maitland’s premature death. There are opinions that, 
had he survived longer, he could have advanced the historical treatment of legal sources 
even further.240 The method he used was ahead of his time.241 There is no doubt that 
historians should celebrate Maitland’s life and his passion for legal history. At the same 
time, this thesis attempts to follow Milsom’s prudent advice: ‘Another irony of this 
occasion is that historians of medieval England will have to let Maitland die and begin 
again with less static assumptions. They will mind, but he would not. He meant to open a 
subject up, not also close it down’.242 Maitland would have recoiled at the thought that a 
mere example from his pen would have such impact on modern understanding of the use. 
The dominant narrative is not even what he intended. It is plausible that the attraction to 
the crusade example was simply because it was easier to understand than the Germanic 
ad opus that Maitland argued for. His preferred school of thought, perhaps because it was 
not his own, has found few modern followers as a source for the use. However, the Roman 
school of thought seems to have enjoyed at least a partial revival under an expansive 
approach that accepts ius commune influences on English law. The insular approach, 
although Helmholz and Zimmermann are critical of it, demands a closer inspection of 
English legal sources, which remains the foremost barrier to a study of the use. As John 
Baker notes in Why the History of English Law (2000), medievalists continue to struggle 
under the weight of England’s immense riches. 243  Baker predicts that editing the 
yearbooks for the reign of Edward II would not reach completion until 2750 at the current 
rate!244
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Chapter 3. Maitland’s Thesis of the Use Re-considered in 
the Context of the First and Second Crusades 
 
Maitland’s belief that the use had origins before the Conquest means there ought to be 
evidence of its practice throughout the crusade movement. This chapter seeks to place 
the use into that context. Maitland advanced an example in The History of English law with 
multiple elements which connected it to the Crusades.1 The first is that the crusader (the 
feoffor) is a male landholder, a knight holding land in military fee, who wishes to ensure 
the security of loved ones (a wife, sister, son, or daughter) during his absence. Maitland 
touched on a natural human concern. Therefore, the crusader innovates to address 
doubts about the existing law. He comes to an arrangement with another adult male (the 
feoffee) to hold the land ad opus (‘to the use’) of those family members. The legal status 
of these arrangements is questionable. However, Maitland’s suggestion that significant 
disruptions to the ordinary business of life would result in people making radical 
arrangements to protect their interests is reasonable. It is the reasonableness of the 
example that led to it becoming an accepted truth in legal history. The question is whether 
the evidence supports assertions that there existed a direct relationship between the use 
and the crusade movement. The First Crusade is a convenient starting point because it is 
occasionally suggested to have furnished the use, and it illustrates the legal issues of 
crusading and how the law evolved to address them. It also served as a template for later 
legal development. The articulation of a crusade tradition in the twelfth century 
paralleled the growth of the canon law as an intellectual legal system. It is necessary to 





Maitland drew upon a unique historiographical tradition when he placed the use in the 
context of a crusade. The crusades have been a subject of fascination for both historians 
and authors of fiction since the success of the First Crusade. 2  Christopher Tyerman 
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captures the impact of the crusades on the discipline of History when he comments ‘there 
have been no centuries since the eleventh when books on the crusades have not been 
published and secured wide readership’.3 There exists an apparent ‘insatiable demand’ 
for crusade histories.4 Titillation at the suggestion the use has a crusade connection may 
have only grown over time. In the last fifty years, the popularity of the Crusades as a 
subject of study has increased exponentially as an academic subject. 5  Interest in the 
crusades has also inspired popular media such as movies and video games, which are 
fictional accounts that have left a lasting impression on how the modern world views its 
histories.6 Daniel Johnson lamented ‘The facts about the crusades are less familiar than 
the myths’. 7  In New Zealand, a Cantabrian rugby team called ‘Crusaders’ utilise the 
crusader image to highlight the contest element of sport, which likens that particular 
team’s involvement in the competition to a crusade, a relentless pursuit of a goodly cause 
(in this case a trophy).8 Jonathan Phillips states historians have long taken advantage of 
popular narratives to create interest in their histories by exciting the reader and adding 
to the mythology of the movement with allusions to epic.9 This appears to have come at 
the expense of a detailed intellectual examination into the less marketable features of the 
crusades.10 The assumed connection between the movement and the use appears to be a 
result of popularity rather than fact. 
 
                                                          
Present, no. 6, 1954, p. 6; G. Constable, ‘The Historiography of the Crusades’, in A. Laiou and R. Mottahedeh 
(ed.), The Crusades from the Perspective of Byzantium and the Muslim World, Washington D.C., Dumbarton 
Oaks, 2001, p. 2; A. Atiya, The Crusade Historiography and Bibliography, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 
1962, p. 17; J. La Monte, ‘Some Problems in Crusading Historiography’, Speculum, vol. 15, no. 1, 1940, p. 58. 
3 C. Tyerman, The Debate on the Crusades, 1199 – 2010, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2011, p. 1. 
4 La Monte, Speculum, p. 58; Atiya, The Crusade Historiography and Bibliography, p. 17. 
5 K. Qadir, ‘Modern Historiography: The Relevance of the Crusades’, Islamic Studies, vol. 46, No. 4, 2007, p. 536; 
J. Phillips, The Crusades, 1095 – 1197, Harlow, Pearson Education Limited, 2002, p. 1. 
6 Tyerman, England and the Crusades, p. 5; D. M. Hayes, ‘Harnessing the Potential in Historiography and Popular 
Culture when Teaching the Crusades’, The History Teacher, vol. 40, no. 3, 2007, p. 349. 
7 D. Johnson, ‘How to think about the Crusades’, Commentary, 1 July 2005, 
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/how-to-think-about-the-crusades, (accessed 20 July 2017). see 
also C. Tyerman, The Crusade: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 2. 
8 The association between sports as ‘crusades’ is discussed in H. Nicholson, The Crusades, Westport, Greenwood 
Press, 2004, p. xl; Qadir, Islamic Studies, p. 527; T. Tännsjö, ‘Is our admiration for Sports Heroes Fascistoid’, in 
W. Morgan (ed.), Ethics in Sport, 2nd edn, Champaign, Human Kinetics, 2007, p. 431; M. Paine, The Crusades, 
Harpenden, Oldcastle Books, 2001, p. 8. 
9 Phillips, The Crusades, 1095 – 1197, p. 1. 




It is likely that Maitland appreciated the timeless popularity of the Crusades when he 
chose it as the background to an explanation about the function of uses. It is plausible that 
trends in nineteenth-century historiography even inspired him to reference it in his work. 
The nineteenth century is generally regarded as the romantic period of crusade 
historiography because of positive impressions found in the work of its historians.11 The 
crusades had a broad appeal to national enterprise, the human spirit, and the growth of 
the British Empire. 12  There was an appetite for continental works, for example, the 
description of the fame, feats, and sufferings of notable crusaders found in the lectures of 
Heinrich von Sybel, a prominent crusade historian, was sufficiently popular on the 
continent to be worth translating for an English audience.13 English historians produced 
numerous histories of their own. 14  These histories and the work of fictional authors 
provided attractive narratives of the Crusades as a period of chivalry and adventure.15 
These accounts resonated with the social elite who admired the qualities associated with 
and intrinsic to the status of knighthood.16 They were Maitland’s target audience and he 
may have referenced the crusade movement to create interest in uses. Its inclusion may 
also betray his own interests in the crusade movement. The work of his sometime rival 
William Stubbs to edit key primary sources on the Third Crusade would not have gone 
unnoticed.17 Maitland would not have been immune to the appeal of popular histories. 
 
While late nineteenth-century trends shaped Maitland’s example, the present thesis is a 
product of the twenty-first century. It is, therefore, necessary to acknowledge that 
reference to the crusade movement continues to enhance rather than detract from reader 
interest. It is included in the title of this thesis for that reason. The need to reflect on the 
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Crusades is itself a product of Giles Constable’s remark in ‘The Historiography of the 
Crusades’ (2001) that the intellectual study of crusade historiography had attracted very 
little attention.18 This is surprising since John La Monte (1940) discussed the wealth of 
its tradition: 
 
The Crusades have been represented in every phase of historiography from the twelfth to the 
twentieth century; mediaeval piety, Renaissance chivalry, Reformation fanaticism, eighteenth-
century skepticism, nineteenth-century romanticism, and modern critical scholarship have all found 
in them fit subject for comments and interpretation.19 
 
Constable indicates that, despite this lengthy pedigree, the subject of crusade 
historiography is rife with uncertainties. 20  This affects fundamental aspects of the 
subject. Even the elements that define a crusade and the numerals assigned to demarcate 
them are subject to numerous disagreements and reassessments amongst modern 
historians.21  In part, the debate surrounds the term ‘crusade’, a seventeenth-century 
term, which is unknown to the primary sources that simply referred to each event as a 
pilgrimage or expedition.22 Tyerman suggests the paradox of crusade historiography is 
that it emerged out of a nebulous phenomenon spanning two centuries rather than from 
precise events.23 Tyerman indicates in The Debate on the Crusades, 1099 - 2010 (2011) 
that part of the ongoing uncertainty of crusade historiography stems from the fact that 
the crusades are an awkward topic to conceptualise.24  
 
Recent trends appear to be, at least in part, the result of twentifth-century dissatisfaction. 
One commentator of the period suggested that ‘the more that is written, the less there 
seems to be of value to the scientific historian’. 25  Historians answered La Monte’s 
challenge to produce higher quality treatments.26 Two decades later, James Brundage 
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observed in ‘Recent Crusade Historiography: Some Observations and Suggestions’ (1964) 
that the quality of general histories had improved markedly but specialist histories, such 
as economic history, were yet to be explored in detail.27 The author also commented, 
however, there remained numerous unanswered questions about the crusades and its 
legal history such as the nature of crusader privilege, his role as a pilgrim, his juridical 
status and obligations, and so on. 28  The postulation of these questions anticipated 
Brundage’s later monograph on the legal history of the crusades. Brundage’s Medieval 
Canon Law and the Crusade remains the most authoritative statement on the interaction 
between the law and the crusades that this thesis draws upon. Law is absent from 
Khurram Qadir’s observation that most modern crusade histories are either biographies, 
social histories, constitutional histories, or bibliographic studies.29 Nonetheless, modern 
crusade histories must defer to the work of the late Jonathan Riley-Smith and his former 
students, Tyerman and Jonathan Phillips, as the leading authorities in the twenty-first 
century. 30  This thesis is not an exception. Tyerman’s England and the Crusades is 
particularly relevant to this study because the author treats the impact of the crusade on 
the common law as part of his broader history of English society.31 Tyerman and Riley-
Smith fundamentally disagreed on the significance of the First Crusade to the 
development of notions of holy war, and the former suggested that there were no formal 
crusades until Pope Innocent III. 32  Finally, it is worth noting the modern tendency 
amongst historians to frame their narratives around modern geopolitical concerns.33 
Steven Runciman’s multi-volume A History of the Crusades (1952 – 1954)34 is an early 
example of work oft-criticised by historians for contextualising the crusade movement in 
the light of contemporary east-west relations. 35  Phillips rightly observes that the 
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temptation to place the crusade movement in a contemporary frame only serves to 
distort its history.36 
 
Constable identified four schools of modern treatment by historians that are also 
applicable to a legal history. The first are traditionalists who define crusades in 
geographic terms as an eastward expedition, with the capture of Jerusalem at their heart, 
either to assist Christians or liberate the Levant from Muslim occupation.37 Secondly, 
pluralists who focus on the initiation of the crusade, without geographic limitation or a 
central aim, and instead place their emphasis on papal authorisation, recruitment, and 
organisation. While the pluralist study is the more popular lens of study in the modern 
period, and as such includes the varied objectives of the Second Crusade as part of the 
movement, the present study has traditionalist overtones because of its focus on the First, 
Third, and Ninth Crusades.38 This study may also fall within the scope of a populist school 
of thought since it has a heavy emphasis on themes related to the psychological aspect of 
the crusading. 39  This lens of analysis is traditionally concerned with the spiritual 
motivations of crusaders but it encompasses other forms of preparation.40 Therefore, it 
could conceivably extend to legal preparation, and consequently the use. The final school, 
generalists, are concerned with the crusade as a spiritual undertaking and issues 
connected to the notion of holy war.41 The merit behind this school of thought is the 
lesson to avoid imposing modern views onto the medieval world. 42  Such categories, 
welcomed by the lawyer in the legal historian, present only a framework for 
conceptualising historical works and are subject to varying interpretations. 43 
Nonetheless, the focus on England follows a modern trend to place the crusades into a 
national perspective while acknowledging that there is a broad European movement that 
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shaped both ideologies and the law.44 It is open to the reader to determine the school that 
might best fit this thesis. 
 
The reflection on Crusade historiography at the beginning of this chapter, and 
historiographical analysis in other chapters, are a necessary part of a critical examination 
of the development of the use. Not only do references to nineteenth-century trends give 
valuable context for Maitland’s ideas, but they show how trends in scholarship and other 
studies have shaped the present thesis. The focus on the preparation phase of a crusade, 
as the time when crusaders would make uses, benefits from several modern studies that 
discuss legal issues related to private property. For example, Tyerman includes extensive 
comment about the law and crusading throughout England and the Crusades, in addition 
to his chapter titled the ‘The Home Front’ that directly discusses the impact that a crusade 
had on property at home.45 Simon Lloyd’s English Society and the Crusade, 1216 – 1307 
provides a deeper analysis of property law in England during the later crusades.46 This 
thesis also benefited from more general historical treatments of the crusade movement 
that deal with property law. Fred Cazel Jr’s ‘Financing the Crusades’ in A History of the 
Crusades measures the impact that money supply had on property transactions during 
the crusades.47 Therefore, it must be acknowledged that historians have made valuable 
contributions on private law and crusading that complement Brundage’s more general 
jurisprudential observations. The quality of these works suggests to the author that the 
detailed treatment in a thesis intended to rebut an accepted truth may not have been 
necessary had a crusade historian ever turned their mind to the origin of the use. It is 
hoped, however, that the attention of a legal historian and trust expert will furnish fruitful 
insight into the subject. 
 
The First Crusade 
 
The First Crusade served as a template for the interaction between the crusade 
movement and the law. It has also been advanced as the catalyst for the development of 
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uses. In 1095, Pope Urban II responded to requests for aid from Byzantine Emperor 
Alexios with a decree at the Council of Clermont that there should be an armed pilgrimage 
to take back the Holy Land. 48  Whatever was said, Guibert de Nogent represents 
contemporary views in his Dei gesta per Francos (1107 – 1108): ‘the great news spread 
through all parts of France, and whoever first heard the news of the papal will went 
forward to urge his neighbours and family to take the proposed path of God’.49 Guibert 
applied an eloquent style to his history, and the abbot’s work is regarded as a valuable 
primary source for the reception of the crusade message in France and its preparatory 
phase.50 Urban seemed to have sent a clear message that the papal authority supported 
the notion of just war in defence of Christendom. Historians continue to debate issues 
related to the development of the just war concept, and the First Crusade appears to be 
part of eleventh-century trends regarding this notion.51 The second message attributed 
to Urban is the idea that the pope would reward participation with spiritual indulgence.52 
The combination of these factors appears to be why contemporaries considered the 
crusade a form of pilgrimage. 53  Jonathan Riley-Smith comments that Urban had not 
offered anything particular novel but his success lay in his ability to appeal to the 
ambitions of French nobles.54 On the other hand, to regard the First Crusade as a simple 
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pilgrimage distorts the views held by its earliest historians, such as Guibert, that it was 
the most astounding and novel undertaking of the epoch.55  
 
Maitland may have had the First Crusade in mind since knights did leave their families 
and lands to fight a just war in the hope of obtaining some form of spiritual absolution. 
However, not all the people who took part in the First Crusade satisfy this basic outline 
of what it meant to be a crusader. While Urban had framed his message to attract 
magnates and knights capable of realising the military purpose of the expedition, the 
unplanned consequence of success meant the First Crusade quickly outgrew his ability to 
direct it.56 Tens of thousands of people from all echelons of society left their homes.57 The 
future crusader Ekkehard of Aura describes in his Hierosolymita (c. 1107 - 1112) how 
poor families, the sick, and maimed joined the first expedition because of hardships in 
France rather than spiritual motivation.58 Despite possible source bias, it is probable such 
groups did view the crusade as an opportunity to escape the harsh conditions of their 
native lands and settle elsewhere.59 These are the people Maitland did not consider part 
of his example. The idea of crusade as an opportunity for socioeconomic betterment also 
sat uncomfortably with the ideology of spiritual undertaking that Urban had 
envisioned. 60  Typically, the poor did not have the financial means to undertake the 
journey and their survival depended on the charity of others.61 Despite the negative views 
associated with the poor, the eyewitness account of the anonymous Gesta Francorum et 
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aliorum Hierosolymitanorum (c. 1100) seems to count the large group led by Peter the 
Hermit as a legitimate part of the three groups of Franks to depart for the Holy Land.62  
 
The legal arrangements of the poor who took part in the First Crusade are less 
sophisticated than those who better fit Maitland’s model of a crusader. The pauperes who 
joined Peter the Hermit’s expedition rushed to leave before the main force and were 
ignominiously defeated at the battle of Civetot.63 However, the legal arrangements they 
made were common amongst the socially disadvantaged. The decision to undertake the 
journey without sufficient economic means must not have been made lightly. 64 
Nevertheless, the evidence indicates the possibility of a fresh start in the Levant drove 
many to become ‘crusaders’.65 Their legal arrangements, therefore, typically reflect those 
made by people who never expected to return to their homes.66 Guibert records: 
 
You would have seen extraordinary and even comical things, such as the poor attaching two-wheeled 
carts to oxen, as if they were horses, and loading their few meagre possessions into it together with 
their children, while asking at every castle or town on the way whether they had finally reached 
Jerusalem.67 
 
Putting aside the derogatory purpose of this passage, it is clear the people Guibert 
described would have no value for the complex legal devices organised by those who 
wished to return home. Instead, they sold the property they could not take with them, 
such as crops, stock, and other non-essentials.68 It is clear the sale of property was the 
preferred option. Guibert notes that ‘the poor inflamed with the same a desire [as the 
knights, to join the expedition], set out without taking account of the smallness of their 
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wealth or properly disposing their homes, vineyards, and fields’.69 The implication in this 
passage is the poor may have simply abandoned the property they could not sell.70 It is 
more likely than not that they made meagre but absolute gifts of their possessions to 
family and friends, or gifts ad pias causa before undertaking their journey. 
 
Knights are the class of people that Maitland considered could have utilised the use before 
leaving on crusade. There is, however, extensive historiographical debate about what 
characteristics defined a knight or miles because primary sources utilise the term in a 
broad fashion.71 The popular image of the knight is that of an indomitable armoured 
warrior who fights from the superior position of horseback and is a living embodiment of 
chivalry.72 Maitland likely had in mind the Anglo-Norman knight who, according to the 
legal perspective found in Statuta et Consuetudines Normannie (1230), considered their 
horse and arms as a way of life supported by their land holding (cap. 1.2.3).73 However, 
the thirteenth-century view of knighthood does not reflect the eleventh century, which 
tended to characterise the knight by ‘title, vocation, and blood’ rather than simply being 
a mounted warrior. 74  Nonetheless, landholding was associated with wealth. Conor 
Kostick comments that the term knight could apply to a wide range of people who 
participated in the First Crusade including those who lost their economic power.75 It is 
sometimes extended to describe crusade leaders who are not necessarily the people 
ordinarily associated with being knights. 76  He notes, however, that knights are 
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distinguished in primary sources from the basic foot soldier or the poor who formed part 
of crusader armies.77 Knights as crusaders were therefore distinguishable from other 
groups as people with sufficient economic power from the outset to maintain a warhorse, 
pack animals, and a small entourage of supporters.78 In the eleventh century, if uses were 
available, it is reasonable to expect knights to have the personal wealth to necessitate 
them. 
 
It is possible to further narrow down the category of knight that Maitland could have 
considered. The Alexiad, written by the Princess Anna Comnena from a Byzantine 
perspective, states that some crusader leaders, namely Bohemund, intended to ignore the 
object of the crusade to aid the Empire and seize land for themselves.79 Anna viewed the 
crusader counts as intruders, less reasonable than the Turks, who took her father’s 
financial and military support with no intention of keeping their promises to him.80 Her 
view can be contrasted with the tenor of European accounts that suggested their decision 
to settle, unlike the analogous intentions of the poor, were a personal sacrifice. 81 
Nonetheless, the presence of their families and a clear intention to settle reduced the need 
to create complex legal arrangements to preserve their interests at home. Maitland’s 
knight is also distinguishable from what primary sources referred to as knights iuvens or 
youths. Kostick indicates that knights considered iuvens had set out for personal glory 
rather than spiritual considerations.82 In many instances, iuvens may have been in fact 
younger sons seeking to earn status not otherwise achievable at home.83 They are also 
not the kind to prima facie have a family or assets to protect at home. The Norman 
crusader, Tancred, might be counted amongst them as ‘a semi-prince’ who used the 
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opportunity of the crusade to become a lord and subsequent ruler of Antioch.84 Ralph of 
Caen, a follower of Bohemond and Tancred, associated the subject of his Gesta Tancredi 
in expeditione Hierosolymitana (1118) with the qualities of Norman identity (gens 
Normannorum) such as ambition. 85  Ralph’s narrative is that of a young and violent 
Tancred, a Sicilian Norman, who is released from his sins by the act of crusading.86 This 
work suggests that what the Anglo-Normans perceived as the epitome of the crusader-
knight sat at odds with what Maitland or his reader may have expected. 
 
The kind of crusader that Maitland considers could utilise the use is the knight who 
expected to be away from their home for a prolonged period but also hoped to return to 
their families and lands. Guibert’s description of crusader sacrifice resonates with the 
concern that Maitland touched upon:  
 
Leaving behind beautiful wives with their dear sons, for who they put aside their great affection, 
choosing exile. I say nothing about their honours and possessions, which are matters outside of our 
concern. But that which does surprise us: is how married men left their wives, who were bound 
together in love by the gift of children, could be separated without any imminent danger to either.87 
 
The surviving letters of Stephen of Blois to Adela provide historians with insight into the 
affection men had for their wives and children at home. 88  The condition of family 
members at home would have been an ever-present concern for crusaders. Stephen 
charges his sweetest and most amiable spouse (dulcissimae atque amabilissimae coniugi) 
in a letter to diligently ‘do what is right, watch over your lands and children, and your 
vassals, and you will see me as soon as I can return. Farewell’.89 There appears to be a 
concern but not disbelief that she could handle affairs during his absences. Nonetheless, 
                                                          
84 Kostick, pp. 262 – 264. 
85 N. Hodgson, ‘Reinventing Normans as Crusaders?’, in C. P. Lewis (ed.), Anglo-Norman Studies XXX: 
Proceedings of the Battle Conference 2007, Woodridge, The Boydell Press, 2008, p. 120; J. Pysiak, ‘Ralph of 
Caen’, EMC, vol. 2, p. 1252. 
86 Tyerman, The Debate on the Crusades, p. 12. 
87 Guibert, R.H.C. Occ., vol. 4, pp. 148 – 149. ‘Hii uxores clarissimas, cum filiis gratissimis relinquentes, quicquid 
in affectionibus majus est, proposito postposuerunt exilio. De honoribus possessionibusque reticeo, quae 
quidem extra nos sunt. Sed illa stuporem nobis generant: quomodo maritorum uxorumque, sobole mediante 
imo agglutinante charitates, sine alterutrorum periculo abinvicem divelli poterant caritates’. 
88 See Pryor, Arts, p. 57; Riley-Smith, The Oxford History of the Crusades, p. 73. 
89 Stephen of Blois, Epistle, R.H.C. Occ., vol. 3, p. 890. ‘mando ut bene agas, et tibiae tuae egregie disponas, et 




crusaders must have also appreciated the legal difficulties their absence from home 
would have caused family members, in particular, women.90 Leaders rallied crusaders to 
fight by reminding them the reason they chose to leave their families (parentes, uxores, 
filios) and honours was to fight on God’s behalf.91 Furthermore, Urban had urged those 
thinking about joining the crusade to avoid acting rashly and to first seek permission from 
family.92 Family interests were important to crusaders and it is during this preparatory 
phase that crusaders could and did utilise complex legal arrangements. 
 
The Legal Arrangements of Crusaders 
 
The decision to leave home would have been a very personal and emotional event.93 
There is no reason to doubt that husbands and wives debated the merits of the decision.94 
It is unnecessary here to consider the impact of spiritual motivations behind their 
decision except to note that Claude Cahen’s observation in 1950 that ‘gallons of ink have 
been poured out in discussing whether the Crusade at this stage was more or less 
religious or self-seeking’ remains true today.95 What is clear is that each crusader had to 
overcome the formidable barrier of raising the capital needed to fund their expedition.96 
Maitland would have likely appreciated that crusaders entered into certain legal 
arrangements to meet this challenge. It would have been a stressful period for all 
concerned. He counts the use as a mechanism that the worried crusader may have 
resorted to in their efforts to ensure the welfare of family during their absence. However, 
the sale of property to raise the fluid capital necessary to buy equipment sat at the 
forefront of each knight’s crusade preparations. Guibert outlines the short-term impact 
this had on the French market: 
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It was astounding to see everyone buying high and selling low: the rush to leave meant they paid 
high prices for whatever was necessary for the journey; and sold cheaply the valuables they had, and 
for so very little when before neither prison nor torture could have torn them away; now they sold 
everything for a few scant coins.97 
 
Guibert had earlier imputed that the poor made imprudent alienations, but it is plain from 
the above passage that the economic conditions brought about by the First Crusade 
affected everybody. Riley-Smith poignantly notes that every transaction compounded the 
inflationary conditions.98  Guibert’s passage serves as an example of the tendency for 
sources to distinguish the transactions of knights, as the intended crusader group, from 
those of the poor.99  
 
Riley-Smith notes that the eleventh-century economy limited most legal arrangements 
made by knights to either selling property or raising loans.100 The fact that money was a 
particularly scarce resource during this period means that knights possessed only limited 
liquid savings to fund a journey. 101  If a knight chose not to sell property, the other 
available option was debt. An ill-financed knight may never begin the journey or be forced 
to turn back. 102  The need for crusaders to convert property into portable wealth or 
money is a characteristic of the entire crusade movement. Riley-Smith suggests the grim 
economic reality of crusading was that the costs outweighed any opportunity for 
wealth.103 Elsewhere he notes the trepidation that crusaders must have faced because 
‘whether a crusade was a success or a failure, every crusader risked death, injury, or 
financial ruin, and apprehension shrouded the charters issued before departure like a 
cloud’.104 Nonetheless, crusaders did go into debt to fund their expedition. Monasteries 
played a crucial role in the provision of credit. Recueil des chartes de L’abbaye de Cluny 
(1091-1210) has a small number of charters illustrating mortgages, defined simply in this 
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thesis as a security over land, which crusaders made on the First Crusade. Constable 
describes them as a valuable source of evidence that describes details not found in 
narrative accounts of the crusade despite the risk of fraud or later interpolation.105 The 
valuable insight charters provide into the specific nature of a legal transaction means 
evidence for the use might be found in this kind of source. 
 
The charter evidence illustrates what historians already know about the use of loans to 
raise money.106 However, it is possible that the use could take the shape of a term or 
condition in a mortgage arrangement. One charter (1096) states how the knight Achard 
of Montmerle (debtor) delivered everything he held in the town of Lurerciaco, and his 
manses at Vergerio and Coohot, to the abbot Hugo at Cluny in exchange for 2000 solidos 
and four mules so that he could take part in the Jerusalem expedition.107 The charter 
attaches several conditions as additional security that strengthens the position of the 
monastery as creditor. The first is the appointment of guarantors to ensure the 
agreement is honoured and to remedy any unforeseen issues. The second condition is 
that if Archard should die or decides to stay in the Holy Land then the monastery shall 
have full ownership of the granted property. Finally, a condition exists that the monastery 
shall have the property with perpetual rights if he returns but dies without legitimate 
heirs. Achard was a celebrated champion and the amount lent reflects his socioeconomic 
power.108 This mortgage arrangement can be compared to another arrangement (1096) 
made with the crusaders Bernard and Odo for their manses at Mâcon for the much lower 
sum of 100 solidos.109 The same conditions are attached. However, this charter provides 
additional information that the grant of property to the abbey in the absence of lawful 
heirs is for the salvation of the grantor’s soul. Crusaders often made donations of this 
kind.110 In both cases, the final condition has donative characteristics and acts as a gift ad 
pias causa that is ancillary to the primary mortgage arrangement. The evidence from 
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mortgage charters does not suggest, however, that the use was available during the First 
Crusade. 
 
The principal concern of mortgage charters of this kind is to transform immovable wealth 
into portable capital to fund expeditions. Both charters state in their preamble that the 
debtors are entering the transaction to pursue their desire to join the crusade. Bernard 
and Odo also add that they are going on crusade for indulgence or the remission of their 
sins (penance).111 However, a secondary concern about family members is also clear. 
Bernard and Odo framed the operative condition of the gifts ad pias causae to ensure they 
do not deprive their lawful heirs of their patrimony after the death of the crusader. Such 
concerns about family members are the function that Maitland attributes to the use, 
although the retention of family patrimony is merely incidental. However, there existed 
a clear tension between the disposal of wealth and the interests of family members who 
stayed behind. Fred Cazel Jr. observes that: ‘a man who had a family or expected to return 
from the Holy Land would hesitate to dispose of the source of his and his family’s 
livelihood. But the examples are too numerous to name more than a few’.112 The financial 
burden would have been shared by the family unit.113 Wives committed personal wealth, 
as in Adela’s example, to their husband’s journey.114 There is evidence that wider family 
members also gave up portable wealth to support crusaders.115 However, there is no 
evidence that French crusaders utilised the use to address the very real worry that 
crusaders would have had about leaving their families. 
 
English involvement in the First Crusade 
 
Thomas Fuller, in his major historical work The History of the Holy War, described 
England as ‘the Pope’s pack-horse in that age, which seldom rested in the stable, when 
there was any work to be done’.116 However, the strongest argument against the use 
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appearing in England during the First Crusade is that the ‘papal packhorse’ is nowhere to 
be seen. Orderic Vitalis states that news of the First Crusade reached England and caused 
great excitement, and many people took their families on crusade.117 The English author, 
however, appears to have given a broad account of the movement across Europe. Its 
mention appears to be part of his decision to incorporate Baldric of Bourgueil’s Historia 
Ierosolimitana into his work. 118  The Peterborough Manuscript of the Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicle confirms that news of the crusade reached England in Easter 1096, causing 
great excitement, and that ‘countless people set out with women and children because 
they wanted to war with heathen nations’.119 However, it continues: 
 
1096. … Through this journey, the king and his brother Earl Robert became reconciled, in that the 
king went across the sea, and redeemed all Normandy from him for money … This was a very heavy 
year throughout all the English race, both through manifold taxes and also through a very grievous 
famine which very much afflicted the country in the year. Also in this year, the head men who held 
this land regularly sent an army into Wales, and greatly afflicted many a man with that; but there 
was no success in that, but the destruction of men and waste of money.120 
 
The impression given by the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle is that the English were either too 
busy fighting the Welsh or too impoverished to contribute soldiers to the First Crusade.  
 
The view of England being unable to commit to the First Crusade because of internal 
conflict resonates with modern accounts about the decades that followed William I’s 
death. 121  His successor, William II or Rufus, faced numerous threats. 122  The most 
formidable threat was from his elder brother Robert, Duke of Normandy, who his father 
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passed over as heir to the English kingdom.123 Tensions between the father and his eldest 
son transferred to the brothers. Robert Curthose tried to assert his influence over the 
English government and pressed his claim to its throne in 1088 in a failed bid for 
power.124 In 1091, William retaliated in an attack on Normandy that ended in a treaty.125 
The abovementioned passage from the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle shows the events of the 
First Crusade had finally reconciled the two brothers. In England, it was a temporary 
reprieve from inter-sibling conflict.126 It is reasonable to suggest William was pleased to 
see his brother go. William continued to face numerous issues while his brother 
crusaded. 127  He and his vassals were preoccupied with the consolidation of Norman 
power in England, which required them to direct their energies against Scotland and the 
Welsh.128 The situation in England prevented William from joining the crusade.  
 
The existence of threats was a good reason for the kingdom of England to avoid sending 
men to the crusade. However, the kingdom did play a small role in the events of the First 
Crusade. William had a passive role as a mortgagor. He loaned his brother 10,000 silver 
marks that he mortgaged over the entire duchy of Normandy.129 It is also possible that 
the dynastic connections he had with Robert and Stephen of Blois meant his family in 
England and Northern France was represented without his presence. The excuse that it 
would not be prudent for the entire family to join the expedition would be reasonable. 
Furthermore, William could take immediate control of Normandy if Robert died on 
crusade. 130  The absence of an active participation from England, however, led the 
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English-born archdeacon Henry of Huntingdon to take a break from his narrative of 
English history: 
 
On account of the magnitude of this event, I beg the reader’s indulgence for a digression, for it would 
be impossible to keep silent about the wonderful and mighty works of God, even if I should wish or 
be compelled to do so, since they concern the duke of the Normans.131  
 
His account of the First Crusade drew upon Gesta Francorum et aliorum 
Hierosolimitanorum rather than an English crusading tradition.132 The absence of active 
participation from a king or an earl means there is little reason to justify the creation of 
the use in response to the First Crusade.  
 
Chronicle accounts show that some Englishmen took part in the First Crusade. It appears 
that they left England under the banner of Robert Curthose. Albert of Aachen in Historia 
Ierosolimitana (1102), the author not relying of the Gesta Francorum et aliorum 
Hierosolimitanorum, counts English (angli) amongst the gens of the Christian 
multitude.133 He did not participate in the crusade but used oral accounts from returning 
crusaders to construct his narrative.134 It is likely they knew of English participation. 
Fulcher of Chartres mentions that both Normans and English (Normannis et Anglis) 
fought under Robert.135 On the other hand, Ekkehard indicates that Scottish and Welsh 
forces joined the English. 136  It is possible that chroniclers exaggerated English 
participation to illustrate the widespread appeal of the crusade message. Evidence that 
English fought in the crusade is harder to find. A potential issue is uncertainty about who 
might be regarded as English. For example, Ralph of Caen notes an important instance of 
English involvement when he states the Angli who joined Tancred did so because of his 
loyalty to Alexios (their lord) and ‘as a matter of prudence because having removed 
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themselves from Norman yoke; they once more submitted to it’.137 The note appears to 
be illustrative of Ralph’s Norman bias and illustrates potential difficulties with identifying 
how many crusaders came from England. The evidence suggests this unit of English 
served in the Emperor’s Varangian guard and were descendants of Anglo-Saxons who 
escaped the Conquest by immigrating to the Byzantine Empire.138 If so, then it is unlikely 
they made uses. This group of English was subject to Byzantine rather than English law. 
The eyewitness account of Raymond d’Aguiler in Historia Francorum qui ceperunt 
Iherusalem provides the clearest example of English involvement when he mentions how 
thirty ships of Angli made the treacherous journey from England and aided the crusader 
armies by keeping supply lines open.139 The emphasis placed on their journey suggests 
English involvement was an exception to the norm. It appears that William’s 
preoccupation with immediate threats to his kingdom had kept most of the English at 
home. Even if the use was available, as Maitland suggests, there is no evidence to suggest 
that English crusaders on the First Crusade ever used it.  
 
The First Crusade as a template for legal development 
 
Canon law jurists, called canonists, were the first to articulate jurisprudential concepts 
associated with crusade and crusading. If the use developed as a direct response to 
crusade activity, it is reasonable to suggest that it emerged out of the canon law during 
the twelfth century. The period that historians occasionally refer to as the Twelfth 
Century Renaissance would seem a probable period for its placement. 140  Both the 
development of law and the rise of a legal profession are included in the buzz of 
intellectual activity.141 Furthermore, the canon law was a living system that could readily 
                                                          
137 Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi, R.H.C. Occ., vol. 3, p. 649. 
138 J. Birkenmeier, The Development of the Komnenian Army, 1081 – 1180, Leiden, Brill, 2002, p. 232. 
139 Raymond d’Aguiler, Historia Francorum qui Ceperunt Iherusalem, R.H.C. Occ., vol. 3, pp. 290 – 291. 
140 See generally C. Haskins, The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1957, 
p. 94; W. Nitze, ‘The So-Called Twelfth Century Renaissance’, Speculum, vol. 23, no. 3, 1948, p. 465; and more 
recently, R. N. Swanson, The Twelfth-century Renaissance, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 2; 
C. S. Jaeger, ‘Pessimism in the Twelfth-Century Renaissance’, Speculum, vol. 78, no. 4, 2003, p. 1152; especially 
S. Kuttner, ‘The Revival of Jurisprudence’, in R. Benson, G. Constable and C. Lanham (ed.), Renaissance and 
Renewal in the Twelfth Century, Toronto, Toronto University Press, 1991, pp. 299 – 324. 
141 Brundage, The Medieval Origins of the Legal Profession, p. 76; Kuttner, Renaissance and Renewal in the 




adapt principles for legal usage.142 Roman law principles in the Digest, rediscovered in 
Pavia (c. 1100), are a possible source from which a canon law notion of the use could 
develop. The important place of Roman law in contemporary politics, namely the 
Investiture Contest (1075) between Gregory VII and Henry IV, and in higher education 
indicates jurists had a sophisticated grasp of its principles.143 The painstaking work of the 
civilian glossators who shaped the civil law for contemporary usage led to the expression 
‘what the gloss does not recognise, the court does not follow’.144 In the early twelfth 
century, a Bolognese monk named Gratian, and probably others educated in the civil law, 
published the first canon law code to elevate the ius canonicum to the same standing as 
the Roman codes.145 Gratian’s Concordantia discordantium canonum (c. 1140s), known as 
the Decretum, even refers to the fideicommissum in the body of his work. C 12, q 3, c 3 
defines it as a testamentary device (a legacy146) alongside gifts ad pias causa and other 
benefices that bishops may deal with in favour of the Church. Its inclusion in the Decretum 
indicates that knowledge of fideicommissa had not furnished a canonical theory of the use. 
However, it is worth examining whether the use developed as part of a canon law 
conception of the crusade movement.  
 
The crusade movement, as it is known, is itself a product of twelfth-century reflection on 
the First Crusade. 147  The canon law principles related to crusading grew out of the 
theological concept of just war, namely what it meant to be a miles Christi and how the 
law could assist such people.148 There is an ongoing historiographic debate about the 
nature of just war and its relationship to the crusade movement, but it is derived from 
Augustinian notions, which define it as a defensive action against an aggressor that is 
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legal, sanctioned by a legitimate authority, and conducted with good intentions.149 Prior 
to Urban’s call-to-arms, eleventh-century theologians debated whether war had a 
legitimate place in Christian doctrine.150 Pope Gregory VII took the initial steps in 1074 
when he too framed aid to the Byzantine Empire as a defence of the Christian faith.151 He 
believed the knights who fought in defence of Christendom (and Rome) were like 
martyrs. 152  The manner in which he framed his message, concerning the relief of 
Byzantium rather than the deliverance of Jerusalem, may be a reason why the First 
Crusade did not occur two decades earlier.153 Regardless, after the First Crusade, the 
message that wars approved by God were just resonated in twelfth-century literature.154 
For example, Henry of Huntingdon stated that God approved of the war-like Normans, 
rewarded them with conquests, and sided with them at the Battle of the Standard (1138) 
against Scottish forces so they could avenge wrongs committed against the Church.155 
The knights who fought in such wars would be granted spiritual rewards. 156 
Furthermore, the rise of permanent military associations such as the Hospital of St. John 
and the Order of the Temple with monastic precepts of poverty, chastity, and obedience 
further crystallised just war precepts. 157  Popular support for the ideologies of these 
orders is evident in the substantial donations granted to them to protect the Holy Land.158 
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The articulation of a legal definition of just war as a principle of the ius gentium, or law of 
nations, dominated the attention of canonists after the First Crusade.159Causa 23 of the 
Decretum treats the subject alongside actions that may be brought against the heretics 
who harm the faith. C 23, q 1 reconciles how Christian tenets of peace can agree with 
armed resistance against evil out of necessity. The second question emphasises that war 
is just when it is to defend against attacks from other people or there is a lawful edict to 
recover property (C 23, q 2, c 1). This refers to war as a ius gentium principle (Dist. 1, c 
9). It includes the example of Jews who waged a just war against the Amorites (C 23, q 2, 
c 3). Gratian also offers justification for the First Crusade. C 23, q 8, c 11 refers to a rescript 
by Pope Alexander II to all the bishops of Spain as evidence that a retaliatory war against 
Jews and Saracens is just if they drive Christians from their towns and homes. However, 
the just war concept alone did not create the crusade movement. Urban’s decision to 
connect the ideas of just war and pilgrimage during the First Crusade meant regulations 
applicable to the status of pilgrim extended to milites Christi.160 This natural link to tenth- 
and eleventh-century pilgrimages formed the foundation of jurisprudential rules related 
to crusading.161 Nevertheless, the focus on just war concepts suggests canonists were not 
particularly concerned with the creation of a body of private law principles associated 
with crusade activity. With the benefit of modern reflection, it can be said that the far-
reaching consequences of the First Crusade was the creation of a new institution that 
necessitated new legal frameworks to be established.162 However, the evidence suggests 
that the private law principles that could have included a canon law concept of the use 
were the result of a flurry of legal activity in response to the Second Crusade. 
 
A Second Crusade in the tradition of the First 
 
The attention of contemporaries after the First Crusade had turned to the question of 
defining the legal implications of the crusader, as a new kind of warrior-pilgrim, who 
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enjoyed spiritual rewards but also needed special legal protection.163  Furthermore, a 
crusade movement becomes discernible shortly after the First Crusade when preachers 
focussed their sermons on the devotional character of its success and exemplifying the 
justness of their cause. 164  Later crusaders adopted a practice attributed to the First 
Crusade of sewing crosses onto their clothing to signify their status.165 However, the next 
significant advancement in crusade jurisprudence came fifty years after the First Crusade. 
Zengyi’s capture of Edessa prompted Pope Eugenius III to issue a bull called Quantum 
predecessores on 1 March, 1146, which dressed a new expedition in the clothes of the 
first. 166  The broad message of the bull to protect Christians resulted in concurrent 
crusades against Slavs east of the Elbe, and the Iberian Peninsula, which is a geographic 
disparity that agrees with the pluralist rather than traditionalist view of crusading.167 It 
is evident Eugenius reflected on the strengths and weaknesses of Urban’s campaign with 
probable regard to histories written by its contemporaries.168 He directed his message at 
knights with the intention of making clear that the business of the cross was not for non-
combatants.169 The participation of King Louis VII and Conrad III indicates he gained 
some measure of success in defining the crusade as a military action led by secular rulers 
under the banner of the Church.170 In the end, Bernard of Clairvaux undermined this 
message by preaching the crusade to pauperes with the effect that similarities may be 
drawn between the participants of the First and Second Crusades.171 Nonetheless, the 
laws Eugenius issued in Quantum predecessores were a product of reflection on the 
success and shortcomings of the First Crusade. It is the final part of the bull that outlines 
the Crusader privileges that are most important to determine whether the use has a 
canon law connection to the crusade movement.  
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Gratian had completed his work in the same decade as Eugenius issued Quantum 
predecessores, and the Decretum has a brief mention of the legal consequences of the First 
Crusade. C 23, q 8, c 9 concerns a decretal issued by Pope Celestine III on the exercitui 
Francorum, preceding other examples of just war, which reads: 
 
Every man who sets aside fear and terror, to go against the enemies of the holy faith and its 
opposition, is driven to manly deeds. The almighty God knows that if you should die for the true faith, 
for the deliverance of God’s country, and the defence of Christendom then you shall be first into 
heaven.172 
 
There is no passage in the Decretum that suggests canonists expected a need for novel 
legal devices to protect crusaders.173 The idea of legal privileges granted to a person as a 
variation of the general law, on the other hand, had fully developed (Dist. 3, c 3). It is 
probable that the privileges stated in Quantum predecessores were entirely novel. Phillips 
indicates Eugenius based his privileges upon the precedents set by Pope Urban II and 
already established canons. 174  However, Eugenius appears to have interpreted those 
precedents with a significant degree of latitude. He drafted the bull to meet a twelfth-
century ideology of crusading rather than directly incorporate laws from the First 
Crusade. This is apparent when Eugenius confirms crusaders will receive, for their 
efforts, the ‘remission of sins which our aforesaid predecessor Pope Urban instituted’.175 
Quantum predecessores seems to have crystallised the notion that crusaders would enjoy 
a remission of sins despite Urban referring to a remission of penance. 176  Instead, 
Eugenius had followed twelfth-century narratives that seemingly reflect on what Urban 
ought to have promised crusaders.177 The topic of remission of sins remains intensely 
debated amongst historians and it is unnecessary to comment any further.178 Relevant to 
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the development of uses, however, is the fact Eugenius outlined the practical problems 
crusaders would face, how the law would assist their financial preparations, and how the 
Church would protect their interests during their absence.  
 
Quantum predecessores instituted regulations to facilitate the types of financial 
arrangements that Eugenius expected crusaders to make. The First Crusade had provided 
a template for the financial costs associated with crusading and the value of mortgage 
arrangements.179 Quantum predecessores provides: 
 
Whoever is burdened with debts, and has undertaken the holy journey with pure hearts, does not 
have to pay usury on past loans, and if they or others acting for them bind themselves to usurous 
contracts by oath or faith, we absolve them by apostolic authority. They are permitted to raise money 
on their lands or other possessions, after informing their relatives or lords, for otherwise they will 
not wish or have the means to go, so they are free to pledge to the church, ecclesiastical persons, or 
others of the faithful without any risk of suit.180  
 
This is a novel introduction to the canon law to facilitate credit arrangements while 
ensuring crusaders would not be made financially destitute. 181  He also allowed the 
Church to raise money to furnish crusaders with loans through the alienation of land or 
other property.182 The privileges associated with raising capital also allowed knights to 
mortgage property without permission from their lords or families, although the 
obligation remained to inform them of their decision.183 Therefore, crusaders could make 
grants of land that included conditions analogous to those made by their predecessors 
that contained instructions about the dissolution of their estate in the event of their death. 
The provisions related to finances shows that the canon law created novel laws to 
facilitate crusading and it is at least plausible the use could be included among them.  
 
                                                          
179 Phillips, The Second Crusade, p. 56; Brundage, Medieval Canon Law and the Crusade, p. 160. 
180 Doeberl, Monumenta Germaniae Selecta, vol. 4, no. 16. ‘Quicumque vero aere premuntur alieno et tam 
sanctura iter puro corde inceperint, de preterito usuras non solvant, et si ipsi vel alli pro eis occasione usurarum 
astricti sunt sacramento vel fide, apostolica eos auctoritate absolvimus. Liceat eis etiam terras sive caeteras 
possessiones suas, postquam commoniti propinqui sive domini, ad quorum feudum pertinent, pecuniam 
commodare aut noluerint aut non valuerint, aecclesiis vel personis aecclesiasticis vel aliis quoque fidelibus libere 
sine ulla reclamatione inpignerare’. 
181 Brundage, Medieval Canon Law and the Crusade, p. 176. 
182 Phillips, The Second Crusade, p. 57. 
183 Phillips, p. 57; Brundage, Medieval Canon Law and the Crusade, p. 176. 
83 
 
The more important provisions in Quantum predecessores, regarding a possible 
relationship between the use and the crusade movement, concern the episcopal 
protection of crusader assets and their families. It states:  
 
We, by the authority of God, concede and confirm, that the wives and children [of crusaders], their 
goods and possessions, remain under our protection and that of archbishops, bishops, and other 
prelates of the Church of God. By the same apostolic authority we prohibit all suits against all things 
held in quiet possession at the time when they took the cross, until such they return or there is 
certain knowledge of their death.184  
 
The text appears to be a restatement of Canon 10 of the First Lateran Council 1123.185 It 
appears the canon law had reacted shortly after the First Crusade to address the worries 
that crusaders had about their families and property. The text reads:  
 
To those who set out to Jerusalem to defend the Christian people against the tyranny of the infidel, 
so that they might receive effective aid, we grant them a remission of their sins, and declare their 
homes and families and other goods will be under the protection of Saint Peter and the Roman 
Church, just as the lord Pope Urban decreed. Therefore, whoever distrains or takes away from them, 
while they are committed to the path, shall be punished with excommunication.186 
 
The reference to Urban in both passages followed what Guibert recorded: ‘[Urban] also 
cursed with a horrible anathema all those who might dare to harm the wives, sons, and 
possessions of those who took up God’s journey for all of the next three years’. 187 
Quantum predecessores seeks to reassure crusaders that the Church imposes an active 
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duty on bishops to protect crusader interests within their dioceses.188 This policy had the 
effect of suspending legal obligations that concern their estates, including debt and 
lawsuits, from the time that a crusader took the cross to the time he either he returned or 
there is notice of his death.189 These regulations address the issues that Maitland raised 
about the well-being of English crusader estates during their absence. However, this 
protection appears to have excluded the need to develop the use or analogous device at 
canon law since the Church itself would step in as a custodian to safeguard crusader 
estates. 
 
The possibility that the use developed in England in response to the development of a 
legal concept of crusading is also doubtful. England remained disengaged from the 
crusade movement during the first half of the twelfth century. The kingdom had little 
involvement in military affairs in the East after the First Crusade, and Henry I even 
refused to meet Bohemond in England (later agreeing to meet him in Normandy) out of 
fear he would lure Englishmen to his campaign against Byzantium (1107 – 1108).190 The 
Anarchy (1135 – 1153) is the foremost reason why there was no significant English 
involvement in the Second Crusade.191 The ongoing political conflict between Stephen 
and Mathilda meant both parties stymied efforts to recruit crusaders in their contested 
realm.192 However, there was a noteworthy English contingent in crusading activities in 
Iberia.193 The eyewitness account of the priest R[aoul] in De expugnatione Lyxbonensi 
provides a detailed description of English involvement.194 It is likely the author was a 
retainer of Hervey de Glanvill, the Anglo-Norman commander, and his account is 
sympathetic to his leader.195 He is also careful to note where English crusaders came 
from. For example, he includes an anecdote about the success of seven youths from 
Ipswich with a siege engine referred to as a Welsh cat.196 R[aoul]’s work does not focus 
on the ‘Englishness’ of the Anglo-Norman contingent. Instead, it records that Hervey’s 
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address to his troops emphasised the tradition of Norman martial prowess.197 Despite 
the distinction made between gens, the geographic focus of Hervey’s levy was 
predominantly in England.198 Their efforts appear to have been cause for celebration in 
England as Roger of Howden could later reflect (perhaps with bias) that the English found 
greater acclaim than the better equipped Frankish and German expeditions.199  
 
The positive results of the Lisbon campaign must have been a glimmer of light in the 
climate of disillusionment that followed the Second Crusade.200 However, the absence of 
royal involvement, necessary for a large-scale campaign, meant the crusade was not a 
significant event in English history.201 For analogous reasons outlined above about the 
First Crusade, it also unlikely that the use would have developed in response to the 
Second Crusade. English chroniclers could once more treat a crusade as a diversion to 
their narrative. The Middle English Prose Brut makes no mention of it. 202  John of 
Salisbury devotes his attention in Historia Pontificalis (1163), likely written during his 
exile from England, to condemning Conrad and Louis’s leadership, their sins, and the 
harm they caused the faith. 203  The few English who did participate in their eastern 
adventures were met with suspicion.204 Consequently, the impact of the legal privileges 
in Quantum predecessores on English crusading is unclear. Hervey’s expedition makes it 
clear that crusade recruitment had reached England.205 It is also likely the bull arrived in 
England as part of Eugenius’s appeal for English support.206 If not, Bernard’s open letter 
to the English also outlined the privileges associated with taking the cross, although it is 
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not known how widely it was disseminated.207 Nonetheless, the absence of a canonical 
concept of the use coupled with the lack of royal involvement is a good reason to doubt 
whether the use had a relationship with the Second Crusade. The First Crusade and its 
conceptualisation in Quantum predecessores did, however, provide a foundation for 
future pronouncements of crusade ideology, the law, and crusader privilege. 208  It is 
necessary to examine these developments to authoritatively dismiss the possibility that 




Brundage’s Medieval Canon Law and the Crusade traces how the canon law developed 
principles related to the crusade movement. Crusade vows occupy much of his work, 
which includes the process of their refinement in canonist literature and their impact on 
the movement.209 On the relationship between the canon law and the crusade movement, 
he concludes: 
 
It is remarkable how little of the papal legislation regarding the privileges and the practical problems 
of crusaders found its way into the canonistic collections of the middle ages and into the 
commentaries of the canonistic writers. Although the canonists recognised the crusader’s status, 
obligations, and privileges, they never really came to grips in a systematic way with the problem of 
clarifying his role in medieval society. While canonists treated the problems of numerous other 
groups and institutions of their society specifically and coherently in special treatises and 
commentaries, no treatise De crucesignatus has yet been discovered throughout the vast literature 
of the medieval canon law.210 
 
However, he makes no mention of the use in his work. The establishment of canon law 
privileges associated with crusading appear to have excluded its development nor is it 
found later. In Audita tremendi (1187), Gregory VIII begins the Third Crusade by calling 
for a just war to avenge the atrocities perpetrated by Saladin on Christians in the 
Levant.211 The Church focussed its energies on preaching its crusade message while the 
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Third Crusade itself would be dominated by secular monarchs.212 Ane Bysted suggested 
the Pope’s principal preacher, Henry of Albano, exercised considerable influence on the 
emphasis that crusaders needed to avenge the injuries that the Saracens committed 
against God.213 Crusaders are reminded that their reason for joining the crusade is to seek 
spiritual rewards rather than monetary gain. Nonetheless, there is no mention of the use 
in the bull. 
 
Audita tremendi follows the traditions established in Quantum predeccessores. It restates 
the established privileges, follows a similar structure, and adopts familiar terminology.214 
The Third Crusade presented an opportunity for crusaders to both redeem themselves 
and the mistakes of the disastrous Second Crusade.215 Gregory cloaked the privileges 
related to canon law protection in familiar terms: 
 
The goods and families [of crusaders], from the time they take the cross, are under the protection of 
the Holy Roman Church and also, the archbishops and bishops and other prelates of the Church of 
God, it is granted that until they return or there is certain knowledge of their death, that they shall 
remain free from legal actions against them and the integrity of their goods in the meantime will 
remain intact and unmolested.216 
 
This restatement suggests that Quantum predeccessores had settled the basic outline of 
canon law privileges concerning the protection of crusader property and their families. 
Innocent III restates the privileges again in Post miserabile (1198), on the eve of the 
Fourth Crusade (1202 – 1204), as follows:  
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To allow all to prepare expeditiously to give aid to the land of the nativity of our Lord, we take the 
goods of those who have assumed the cross under the protection of Saint Peter and ourselves, and 
also under the protection of the archbishops, bishops and other prelates of the Church of God…217 
 
The temporal privileges were not expanded on until the Fifth Crusade (1217-1221), when 
Innocent’s bull Quia maior (1213) repeated almost verbatim Canon 71 of the Fourth 
Lateran Council that included an exemption from tolls and taxes, freedom from paying 
interest, postponing the repayment of debt until their return, and protection of the 
crusaders’ person alongside the protections offered to family and property. These 
privileges remained the starting point for the interaction between the canon law and 
crusading for the remainder of the crusade movement.218  
 
Brundage identified several issues with the operation of papal protection that remained 
unresolved. The foremost being that the full extent of crusader privileges is found in papal 
bulls and there is no significant canonist commentary on them.219 Brundage indicates 
their undefined scope proved problematic throughout the crusade movement. He 
provides the example of Bishop Ivo who heard a case (1106) concerning Count Rotrou II 
of Perche, who built fortifications on a crusader’s land during their absence. 220  Ivo 
reports in his letter that he treated the issue as sui generis and referred the case to the 
papal curia with regret he could not determine the scope of the papal protection. 221 
Brundage was able to adduce two additional examples from the Quaestiones Londinenses 
(1196 – 1217) that are clearer about the scope of papal protection.222 The first concerned 
Richard I’s seneschal, who banned two papal legates from entering Normandy during the 
King’s absence, which concluded that papal protection allowed him to forbid papal 
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legates from entering land under crusader privilege.223 The second held that a bishop 
could not violate the privilege of a crusader.224 Nonetheless, it appears the papal curia 
determined the scope of the protection purely on a case-by-case basis, and no further 
articulation of the principle was needed beyond the blanket protection offered by the 
bulls. The evidence suggests there was no need to further clarify the law. Brundage 
concluded ‘on the whole, complaints about violations of the privileges of crusaders were 
comparatively few in number and minor in extent’. 225  Instead, crusaders more often 
abused the privilege by seeking to escape legal obligations or unfavourable political 
situations.226 On the use, its development in the canon law was not necessary to bulwark 
the broad ecclesiastical protections already available to crusaders. 
 
A fetter on the operation of crusader privileges suggests why the canon law did not 
furnish the use as part of its crusade jurisprudence. Crusaders usually had a right to have 
an action heard in the ecclesiastical courts for violations of privilege. 227  However, 
Brundage observes: 
 
The first significant limitation [to this right] came late in the twelfth century, when a decretal of 
Alexander III directed that the ecclesiastical courts were not to deal with cases in which feudal 
tenure and other purely secular affairs were at issue, even when such cases involved crusaders.228  
 
The use as a species of grant of land ought to have fallen into this prohibition even if had 
it been available to crusaders as part of the canon law. This interaction is only 
hypothetical, but the absence of significant military participation from England until the 
late twelfth century means this decretal was already in effect by the Third Crusade. It 
must be noted, however, ‘as miserabiles personae, crusaders fell into a peculiar class. 
Although most of them were laymen, they had legitimate rights to ecclesiastical 
protection and thus were subject to secular courts in some matters and to ecclesiastical 
courts in many others’.229 Therefore, a potential relationship might exist between the use 
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There is no evidence to support the argument that the canon law developed the use in 
response to the First Crusade, or in the later articulation of legal principles related to the 
crusades. Neither did Maitland intend to make such an argument. His reference to a 
crusade in his example must be placed into a context that popularised views of the 
movement. The temper of crusade historiography has changed significantly since 
Maitland wrote during a time that, according to La Monte, did not produce an accurate 
history because of sentimentality. 230  However, while modern historians regard the 
quality of histories on the Crusades produced in the last sixty years as much higher; the 
continued desire to attribute the use to a crusade shows the strength of romanticised 
notions of crusading. The attribution to the First Crusade appears to be a consequence of 
romanticism rather than evidence. The First Crusade started as a broad movement in 
France and the Empire, and if the use was available to crusaders, it might be found on the 
continent. It appears the kind of crusader Maitland imagined for his example, the popular 
image of the crusader knight, better suits the Third rather than First Crusade. 
Nonetheless, knights are the group expected to make complex legal arrangements. The 
use does not appear to be part of their toolkit to protect their interests. Further, the 
argument in favour of the development of the use in England during the First Crusade 
would also have to grapple with the fact there was no significant English participation.  
 
The impact of the First Crusade is important, however, because it left a strong impression 
on medieval historiography that contemporaries of later crusades drew upon to 
construct a tradition.231  It is reasonable to suggest that English law received the use 
during this process. The impact of the First Crusade on the law was not immediate since 
‘it took much of the early twelfth century for the crusade idea to be formulated in both 
theology and law’.232 However, the notion of a crusade jurisprudence appears in the bull 
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issued by Pope Eugenius to begin the Second Crusade without reference to uses. The 
privileges granted in the bull formed a template that persisted into the thirteenth century. 
The canon law instituted a regime of papal protection to achieve what Maitland had 
described to be the function of uses during the Crusades: the protection of persons and 
property. Once more, the absence of royal involvement in the Second Crusade presents a 
formidable barrier to the development of uses in England. However, the privileges 
developed in the papal bulls show that a terminology associated with a legal concept of 
crusading existed. This challenges Tyerman’s view that there existed a ‘terminological 
vagueness’. He opines that ‘for clarity, definition, and uniformity, one must look at 
Innocent III and beyond. The twelfth century is crusading’s Dark Ages’.233 The absence of 
a canon law principle devoted to the use, however, indicates it bears no connection to the 
primary source of crusade jurisprudence: the canon law. It is, however, necessary to 
consider how England’s secular laws responded to the crusade movement.
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Chapter 4. Did Glanvill deal with Maitland’s notion of Use? 
 
Maitland’s example suggests that the use was available to crusaders on the eve of the 
Third Crusade. This chapter examines whether there is evidence to suggest the use 
formed part of English law during the twelfth century. The growth of the crusade 
movement and the rise of the common law occurred together. It is reasonable, therefore, 
to expect them to influence each other. This assumption supports the idea that uses 
existed in anticipation of the Third Crusade. If the law recognised the use in any form, it 
should be discernible in England’s first book of the common law. Its author Ranulf de 
Glanvill, if he is the author of Glanvill, had intimate connections to the crusade movement. 
It is reasonable to expect him to include the use if it had utility to English crusaders. The 
chief justiciar ought to have at least appreciated its existence. Another reason to suspect 
the use was available during this period is that the elements Maitland associated with 
making uses are all found within the treatise. Namely, principles related to military fee 
and the degree of control exercisable over its fortunes. The most important concern for 
the crusader, and it is implicit in Maitland’s example, is the apprehension of death. 
Maitland would have appreciated the principles that became operative when a crusader 
died. His awareness of those principles framed his crusader’s concern about female 
relatives. Finally, it is important to examine how the law engaged with crusades. 
Therefore, this chapter analyses the law in Glanvill to determine whether there is 
evidence to support the accepted truth that uses were available during the late twelfth 
century.  
 
The Crusade Movement and the Common law 
 
The Third Crusade, as Christopher Tyerman observes, was for the first time in England ‘a 
political priority, touching the lives of many who never contemplated leaving their homes 
as well as the numerous minority who did’.1 Once more, the goal was to liberate the Holy 
Land from the inimici Christi.2 The participation of a king meant the crusade attracted 
notable English persons from his inner circle.3 Furthermore, its principal participants 
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were knights rather than the large groups of ‘unruly’ pauperes found in the first and 
second crusades.4 Tyerman’s England and the Crusades provides an authoritative account 
of the demographics of this expedition. Numerous notable persons from the political and 
administrative elite became crusaders, whose accompaniment could include knights, 
companions, relations, or neighbours.5 English crusaders typically divided into groups 
based on martial obligations, dynastic ties and, geographic and socio-political 
connections. 6  Jonathan Riley-Smith observes that lordship played an increased role 
during the Third Crusade and contrasts it with the prominence of familial influences in 
earlier expeditions. 7  Tyerman identifies fifty-nine named crucesignati in Pipe Roll 
evidence. While he acknowledges this is not an accurate representation, he is able to 
provide some outline of the geographic impact of the crusade ideology which includes: 
‘Staffordshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Berkshire, Yorkshire, Huntingdonshire, Norfolk, 
Suffolk, Sussex, Wiltshire, Bedfordshire, Northamptonshire, and London’. 8  The 
Itinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi, sometimes attributed to Geoffrey of 
Vinsauf, states a multitude of English foot soldiers and auxiliaries also accompanied 
Crusader-knights to the Holy Land.9 The lords exercised control over the composition of 
these forces by deciding which of their pauperes and unfree villeins could join them.10 
This crusade, more than its predecessors, was an expedition for the wealthy.11 Jonathan 
Phillips suggested, ‘the Third Crusade could lay claim to being the greatest crusading 
expedition ever’.12 It is also the most probable candidate for a connection between the 
use and crusading in English law. 
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The impact of the crusade movement in England after the Second Crusade seems to 
support an argument that connects the use to the Third Crusade. Henry II had made 
Outremer a central part of royal policy because of dynastic ties to the region, which were 
created when his grandfather, Fulk of Anjou, became king of Jerusalem and established 
an Angevin line there.13 The extent of his interest in the Holy Land included taxation on 
his subjects (1166, 1185) and a substantial legacy in his will.14 He overtly devoted his 
patronage to the military orders and ensured they were represented in his court.15 The 
operation of canon law is also apparent in Henry’s various unfulfilled vows to take the 
cross (1170, 1172, and 1185).16 It is possible, as Tyerman has speculated, that he was 
using the law as a political tool to address Capetian threats. 17  Gerald of Wales’s 
Expugnatio Hibernica provides a critical report about Henry’s refusal to fulfil his vows 
when Heraclius, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, pleaded for him to take the cross at Reading 
(1185). Gerald records that Henry offered to send money but refused to go because 
Phillip II posed an impossible risk to his French domains, and he would not divert John 
from his prepared campaign in Ireland.18 Gerald’s criticism of Henry in the above episode 
reflected a general feeling of disappointment felt by some contemporaries.19 Nonetheless, 
English chroniclers mirrored the interests of canonists to focus their attention on the law 
of vows rather than other private law arrangements. For example, Roger of Howden 
reports that Henry’s crusade vow in the Charter of Absolution, in penance for killing 
Thomas Becket, included a term that the pope could defer it. 20  Further, Ambroise’s 
L´Estoire de la guerre sainte suggests Henry is a cautionary tale of a common canonist 
warning: those who make vows should immediately take steps to fulfil them. 21 
Nonetheless, the comments from chroniclers indicate England had engaged with the legal 
aspects of crusading in a manner that had received the most attention from canonists. 
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England did contribute to the secular arm of crusade jurisprudence. The Saladin Tithe 
(1188) was the most visible ordinance issued by Henry (and the king of France, Phillip 
Augustus) at the request of the Holy See in preparation for the Third Crusade. 22  It 
provided for the collection of a tax of one-tenth of rents and movables from each person 
not participating in the crusade.23 There is no use mentioned in the Saladin Tithe but 
Maitland praised it as an important milestone in English law since it represents the first 
secular attempt to tax chattels.24  The tithe may have also influenced his view of the 
probable crusader who made the use. It similarly envisioned knights as crusaders since 
it excluded the arms, horses, and clothing of a knight from taxation (cap. 1). This lends 
further weight to the suggestion Maitland had the Third Crusade in mind when 
constructing his example. The Assize of Arms (1181) had made clear before the creation 
of the tithe that such armaments are movables directly attached to the holding of a 
military fee (cap. 1).25 It appears the tithe’s exclusion of military chattels is an attempt to 
put pressure on the knights who held them to join the crusade since those who took the 
cross were exempted from the tax in its entirety (unless they took their vows without 
their lord’s permission).26 It also shows that the secular branch of the crusade movement 
could produce novel legal institutions in response to the Third Crusade, and England was 
an active contributor to its jurisprudence. It is apparent ample opportunity existed for 
the use to develop within this framework more than in earlier crusades. 
 
In addition to making the Holy Land a central part of his administration, Henry 
concurrently oversaw significant legal reform in England. Glanvill enjoys a special place 
in all historical discussions about the twelfth-century common law. It ought to be 
acknowledged that the notion of a common law jurisprudence in the twelfth century is 
somewhat anachronistic since the subject of its evolution out of the curia regis remains 
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subject to historical debate.27 The term royal justice is probably a more apt description of 
the law practised in the curia regis during its early stages.28 Furthermore, a somewhat 
inaccurate historiographical tradition exists that identifies Glanvill as the first book of the 
common law.29 Important to the present thesis is that the text is perfectly poised for an 
examination about whether the use would have been available to crusaders on the eve of 
the Third Crusade. As Paul Brand notes, ‘the clearest overall view of this newly emergent 
English ‘Common Law’ is to be found in the pages of the legal treatise known as Glanvill, 
which was completed, though not necessarily all written, in the final years of Henry’s 
reign, between 1187 and 1189’.30 It is unclear why Maitland decided not to refer to this 
work during his inquiry into the origin of the use. 
 
It is worthwhile revisiting this text to look for clues about the origin of the use considering 
recent revisions of Maitland’s research. First, his assumption about the heritability of 
tenure since the Conquest may have influenced his view of the concurrent availability of 
the use, but it has since been shown that concepts of heritability emerged slowly in the 
early twelfth century.31 Second, Maitland believed the common law, by the time Glanvill 
addressed its subject, had grown out of a slow process of legal development during the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries.32 However, the accepted view is that the common law 
grew rapidly as part of Henry’s reign, which stood as a watershed period for reforms in 
all facets of government.33 England appeared to command much of his attention, and 
administrative reforms were not uniform throughout the Angevin Empire. The ‘intensive 
and authoritative’ character of royal power in England did not reflect the situation 
elsewhere.34 It is Henry who established in England a system of courts dispensing justice 
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in a routine fashion in circuits throughout the kingdom. 35  The creation of a custom, 
developed around the notion of royal justice, was a response to the growing 
dissatisfaction of lords’ courts.36 Therefore, Maitland may have fallen into the tendency 
in law to impose continuity where none exists. Catherine M. A. McCauliff’s caution applies, 
‘imposing later terminology on early cases brings a false clarity that does not reflect the 
real story of these cases, the effort to grapple with the facts and to provide a meaningful 
solution to conflicts as they arose’.37 The narrative of the use still being in popular usage 
from the Conquest to the twelfth century, with origins in Carolingian law, seems to 
suggest such an imposition.  
 
The treatise Glanvill is a monument to the juridical advancements under Henry’s reign 
and new attitudes towards administration. It is unlikely that the judicial function of the 
curia regis would have expanded without Henry’s intervention.38 His reforms benefited 
from the intellectual approach to law dominant during the twelfth century and the 
growing importance of legal documentation. 39  This led to the development of 
standardised procedural machinery.40 The text is reminiscent of the Decretum because it 
brings together and organises common law writs into a single body of work. Its purpose 
is to place English law into a written tradition.41 In doing so, the author demonstrates 
sufficient understanding of the civil law to include its terminology and to import its 
principles, particularly when it treats the subject of debts. 42  Ralph Turner cautions 
against suggestions that the common law as expressed in Glanvill grew out of civilian or 
canonical tradition. 43  He notes, however, the models were at least available to the 
author.44 The evidence suggests that the work benefited from reflection on this tradition, 
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but without burrowing substantive content as is apparent in Bracton’s treatise. The 
genius of Glanvill, unlike other works of the ius commune, is that it addresses a completely 
new system of law.45 It aimed to furnish a practical manual on procedure within the curia 
regis.46 However, the access its author or authors had to writ collections and possibly a 
register of writs, in addition to assizes, also enabled them to provide commentary on 
substantive legal principles.47 Its thorough treatment of the law allowed it to go beyond 
its intended audience of justices and clerks, and find favour from consumers of royal 
justice.48 The text outlines the position of the king and private law arrangements.49 Both 
were relevant to crusaders. 
 
Glanvill and the Crusades 
 
There is no direct mention of crusading in Glanvill despite the growth of crusade 
jurisprudence in the twelfth century. However, a relationship between the treatise and 
crusading ought to exist if the authorship of the law book belonged to Ranulf de Glanvill. 
Legal instruments associated with the crusade, including the use, might be expected to 
appear within because of his personal connections to the movement. There is doubt, 
however, that he is the author. The text itself does not bear a statement of authorship and 
the association exists namely because it bears his name.50 The connection seems to be 
supported by an apparent statement of attribution by Roger of Howden: ‘in the same year 
[1180], King Henry appointed Glanvill, the most learned justice in England, under whose 
wisdom preserved the unwritten laws, which we call English laws’.51 It became a common 
opinion, in the absence of other candidates, that ‘his [Glanvill’s] monument, as every 
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lawyer knows, is the first great treatise on English law which bears his name’.52 However, 
Howden’s weak attribution, despite his being Glanvill’s contemporary, has led modern 
scholarship to question whether he really was the author of the work.53 The issues of 
authorship, like the origin of the use, also attracted Maitland’s attention as one of the 
great unanswered questions in legal history. He appears to be the first to raise doubts 
about Glanvill being the author of the treatise.54  Josiah Cox Russel, in his defence of 
Glanvill as its author, criticises modern historiography on this subject and states: ‘since 
Maitland’s guesses were usually regarded as brilliant conjectures, doubt was cast upon 
Glanvill’s claim, almost universally granted until then’.55 The author here draws attention 
to the creation of another accepted truth based on Maitland’s authority. 
 
Historians do agree that the author (or authors) of Glanvill is a person(s) of original 
intelligence with an in-depth knowledge of the workings of royal justice. 56  Glanvill 
certainly had the reputation during his lifetime to meet these criteria. 57  William of 
Newburgh held Glanvill in high esteem and described him as ‘a man powerful and wise’ 
(vir potens et prudens) and later as ‘a man of splendid wisdom’ (homo praeclarae 
prudentiae). 58  Gerald of Wales describes his friend in similar terms. 59  However, the 
proximity of their relationship, coupled with the fact Gerald does not attribute the work 
to Glanvill, serves only to raise further doubts. William, noted for his detailed descriptions 
of important figures, makes no mention of the law book attributed him.60 However, the 
picture of Glanvill’s career demonstrates the depth of his involvement with the 
administration of royal justice. He served mostly as a Sheriff (1163 – 1176) and may have 
entered the royal purview as early as 1171, which is evident from his role as a witness to 
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a royal charter.61 William reports he captured the Scottish King William the Lion in 1174, 
which marks the beginning of Glanvill’s success as Henry’s follower.62 Henry appointed 
Glanvill a royal justice in 1176, and he may have undertaken the role of chief justice as 
early as 1179 before his official appointment a year later.63 In addition to his judicial 
duties, Glanvill led multiple military campaigns and diplomatic missions. 64  He even 
became regent of England during one of Henry’s absences in France.65 Maitland would 
comment on Glanvill’s character that ‘The picture we get of him is that of an active, 
versatile man, ready at short notice to lead an army, negotiate a peace, hold a council, 
debate a cause; above all faithful to his master’.66 It is unsurprising that Maitland also 
concluded that Glanvill could not have found the time for juristic activity.67 Historians 
have also proposed Hubert Walter, Geoffrey Fitz Peter, and Godfrey de Lucy as potential 
candidates with as little success. 68  Turner has persuasively dismissed Maitland’s 
favoured candidate, Hubert Walter, because of his education and lack of eloquence.69  
 
If Glanvill is the author of the treatise, his connection with crusade activities in England 
indicates he would have been aware of any noteworthy legal development, such as the 
use, which was worth mentioning in a treatment of private law. His first connection is 
familial. His ancestor, Hervey de Glanvill, earned fame for the Glanvill family by leading 
the English contingent during the Second Crusade. It is possible the crusader status of his 
ancestor also helped Glanvill start his career.70 Such ties to the crusade were a source of 
personal honour and reference for descendants of crusaders.71 Russel goes so far as to 
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suggest that pride motivated Glanvill to pen De expugnatione Lyxbonensi.72  Although, 
Turner argues that Russel’s suggestion that Glanvill wrote two texts in his life might be 
‘over-stretching the matter’.73 Further candidates for the authorship of Lisbon bear no 
connection to the law tract.74 Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assert Glanvill’s natural 
interest in his ancestor would result in an explicit acknowledgement of legal principles 
relevant to crusaders that had developed in English law. Another connection that Glanvill 
had to the crusade movement, mentioned by Gerald of Wales, is that after Henry took the 
cross at Gisors in 1188 he returned to England and held a council.75 It is probable Glanvill 
appreciated the legal implications of taking a vow and could advise Henry accordingly. 
The subject of crusade vows does not appear in the treatise. This is to be expected since 
the canon law is not its subject. In contrast, the use concerned land and it would be an 
aspect of crusading worth broaching in the treatise.  
 
The final connection that Glanvill has with the crusade movement is his direct 
involvement in the Third Crusade.76 He had the misfortune of dying at the siege of Acre 
in 1190 while accompanied by family members, Roger de Glanvill and Hubert Walter, and 
his steward Reiner.77 It was a poetic end for a man with ancestral ties to the crusade. The 
circumstances of his death may suggest why Glanvill did not receive greater acclaim for 
the treatise. His involvement in a crusade at the age of seventy does not seem planned. 
Instead, he may have fallen victim to the steps that Richard I took to purge his court of his 
father’s former followers.78 Maitland suggested: 
 
Henry seems to have trusted him [Glanvill] thoroughly and to have found in him the ablest and most 
faithful of servants. Henry’s friends had of necessity been Richard’s enemies, and when Henry died, 
Richard, it would seem, hardly knew what to do with Glanvill. He decided that the old statesman 
should go with him on the crusade.79 
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There are reasons to suspect Richard may have compelled him. Chroniclers record a 
narrative that Richard allowed Glanvill to resign as chief justiciar because of his advanced 
age, which enabled him to fulfil his crusade vows. 80  William of Newburgh laments 
‘[Glanvill] solemnly renounced his office and had less able successors’.81 It is difficult to 
reconcile a view that Glanvill resigned from a judicial posting due to the weariness of 
advanced years and yet considered himself energetic enough to join the crusade ahead of 
Richard’s forces (not with the King as Maitland asserts). Richard of Devizes’ suggestion 
that Glanvill could have earned remission by paying a fine appears to be an attempt to 
absolve Richard of responsibility for the death.82 The author, his work detailing twenty-
seven months of Richard I’s reign, took a positive view of the King.83 It is arguable that 
Richard’s disfavour undermined Glanvill’s reputation so only a bare attribution of 
authorship remained. Nevertheless, it appears that Glanvill’s connection to the crusade 
movement bore no influence on the construction of the treatise.  
 
Arguments for and against Glanvill as author is guesswork. Historians continue to suggest 
that he did not take a direct hand in writing the treatise.84 Turner suggests ‘it is more 
likely that the author was one of the thirteen justices active in the curia regis in the decade 
spanning 1179-89’.85 John Hudson, on the other hand, opines ‘the work reflects the civil 
servant’s pride in his craft’, which suggests the possibility it may have been the work of a 
clerk of lesser status.86 Turner also entertains the possibility of multiple contributors. He 
suggests that this accounts for an unwieldy structure and later uncertainty about who 
wrote it.87 Turner reasoned that the only conclusion reachable is that Henry had people 
within his court capable of shaping Royal justice into a legal system.88 This brings the 
question of authorship back to Maitland’s conclusion that ‘we may safely say that it was 
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not written without Glanvill’s permission’.89 Resolving the question of authorship would 
have provided a clearer picture of the treatise’s connection to the crusade movement. The 
only conclusion reachable is that the treatise coincided with a growing interest in 
crusading in England. To move forward, it is necessary to consider Maitland’s conclusion 
that the question of authorship is irrelevant in light of its content.90 Nevertheless, it can 
be safely be asserted that had Glanvill or another whom he supervised been familiar with 
the use as an instrument available to crusaders that they would mention it in the treatise. 
There is, however, no explicit title devoted to the subject. 
 
Military Fee in the Twelfth Century 
 
The suggestion the use was available before the Third Crusade is more probable than a 
connection to the First Crusade. Three fundamental ingredients, each connected to the 
nature of land and its inheritance, form part of Maitland’s example. The first ingredient 
in Maitland’s example, the feoffor being a landholder enfeoffed in military fee, had 
undergone significant legal development. Maitland understood military fee as a species 
of land tenure available in England since the Conquest and not before.91 He benefitted 
from J. H. Round’s seminal argument that:  
 
In approaching the consideration of the institutional changes and modifications of policy resulting 
from the Norman Conquest, the most conspicuous phenomenon to attract attention is undoubtedly 
the introduction of what it is convenient to term the feudal system.92  
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Modern scholarship has moved beyond the interpretation of a ‘feudal system’ reduced to 
its military aspects, and it is now best to avoid the perils of that phraseology. 93 
Nonetheless, the legal principles that concerned military service were an important part 
of Anglo-Norman jurisprudence. .94 The basic features of land held in military fee were 
the same in both Normandy (Summa de Legibus, Dist. 3, c 26) and England (Gl. 9.1) during 
the twelfth century. The personal relationship between lord and vassal was a necessary 
element to assign military fee, and contemporaries acknowledged fidelity and martial 
service as key ingredients for the security of the realm.95 It is expressed in legal terms in 
the passages devoted to the institution of homage where a vassal agreed to be bound to 
their lord’s court while enfeoffed.96 The relationship continued until the death of one 
party or some other intervening event dissolved it. 97  It is important to distinguish 
homage as a personal relationship founded upon reciprocity from fealty or a declaration 
of loyalty. For example, the Assize of Northampton required English knights to swear 
fealty to the king in addition to the homage given to their lords (cap. 6). Fealty was often 
something additional to the homage oath. English law on the eve of the Third Crusade 
required knights to render military services as part of their vassalage ‘save for the loyalty 
due to the king and his heirs’ (salva fide debita domino Regi et heredibus suis) (Gl. 9.1). The 
parallel passage in the Norman Summa de Legibus prescribed the following form ‘I 
become your man to bear your faith against all men, save the faith of the Duke of 
Normandy’. (Dist. 4.27.1).98  
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The basic elements of holding land in military fee had been a long-settled part of English 
law before the Third Crusade. This was, as Maitland found, a necessary step towards the 
development of uses in English law. However, the relationship between a knight’s 
obligation to their lord and crusading has received scant scholarly attention in modern 
times.99 This is a surprise since the idea of crusade as a form of military expedition and 
the legal principles concerning holding military fee were an intimate part of the crusade 
movement.100 The gap in scholarship is likely due to the difficulty of finding evidence to 
support an assertion that a particular person was a knight.101 Nonetheless, since 1145 
non-legal crusade sources couched crusade ideology with allusions to legal concepts such 
as ‘lord’, ‘vassal’, ‘fidelity’, ‘benefice’, and ‘martial obligation’. 102  Thirteenth-century 
crusade literature illustrates the value of this terminology to the movement. The Dame 
Einsi est Qu’il M’en Couvient Aler (1239) states, ‘I am prepared for your service and fully 
equipped: I go to you as your vassal, blessed father Jesus Christ’ (St. 4, l. 29 - 30).103 A 
sermon of James of Vitry written about 1240 highlights the value of this temporal analogy 
to promote a spiritual cause to the laity.104 He states: 
 
The Lord has indeed suffered the loss of his patrimony and wants to test his friends and find out if 
you are his faithful vassals. He who holds a fief from a liege lord is rightfully deprived of his fief if he 
abandons him, when he is involved in a war and his inheritance is taken away from him.105 
 
James is not suggesting that crusaders are legally bound to God in vassalage.106 However, 
the metaphorical reference reflects the reality that the law did bind many crusaders to 
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follow their lords. 107  The crusades for the vassal-knight, notwithstanding possible 
spiritual motivations, were also an exercise in military service that they were legally 
obligated to perform.108 The sermon also carries a more literal legal warning about the 
consequences of abandoning legal obligations.109 Non-legal sources also anticipated legal 
problems. For example, the Angevin Parti de Mal et a Bien Aturné (1189) referred to 
possible legal difficulties in the Third Crusade when it described the possibility that a 
knight may have performed homage to two lords.110 
 
The idea that vassals would accompany their lords to liberate the Holy Land directly 
invokes the law related to military fee and highlights the importance of the vassalage 
relationship implicit in Maitland’s example. One reason why we would expect to see uses 
in Glanvill, as an institution connected to military fee, is plain at the outset of the treatise: 
 
When any one complains to the lord king or his justices concerning his fee or free tenement, if the 
case is such that it ought to be, or the lord king wills that it should be tried in his court, then the 
complainant shall have [a] writ of summons (Gl. 1.5).111 
 
The use directly concerns the subject matter of Glanvill. The curia regis heard all matters 
pertaining to land in England, which includes incidents of land ownership such as homage 
and relief owed to lords by incoming tenants (Gl. 1.3). This jurisdiction reflected the wider 
policy of royal interest in the control of subinfeudations in England. 112  The greater 
freedom given to knights to control their fees is conducive to the development of uses. 
Maitland, however, posited his example that the use existed in the environment of the 
crusade with the assumption that the heritability of tenure had existed since the 
Conquest.113 His error does not materially impact the possibility of the use being available 
before the Third Crusade, but it lends further doubt about whether it was available in 
England during earlier crusade events. 
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The evolution of the English situation proved more amenable to the development of the 
use. Hudson indicates that the reforms to heritability resulted from the need for certainty 
after the Anarchy.114 It is apparent that the expansion of royal power over sub-tenants 
during Henry II’s reign resulted in laws of inheritance that developed at the expense of 
the lord’s control over the succession of their fees.115 The heritability of military fee was 
still being settled. On one hand, it is apparent that lords could still determine whether 
their vassal’s heir inherited land held in military fee which was subject to the payment of 
a relief.116 On the other hand, vassals hardened their claims to the heritability of freehold 
land with the additional security of their landholding provided by royal authority.117 
Susan Reynolds in Fiefs and Vassals: The Medieval Experience Reinterpreted suggests 
Henry’s reign marked a series of reforms that distinguished England from the 
continent.118 The thrust of his reforms concerned how the law would address legal issues 
pertaining to land.119 Historians debate whether the rights of tenants that grew out of 
Henry’s reforms were deliberate or accidental.120 They had a significant impact on the 
social fabric of English society. By 1180, subinfeudations became rarer because the lord 
could only recover a fee by escheat, or failure of heirs, which reduced potential income 
from landholding.121 In the thirteenth century, it became common practice for lords to 
substitute grants of land for other methods to retain their vassals’ services.122 Historians 
have frequently suggested the far-reaching consequence of reform was to change the role 
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of knighthood in England.123 Therefore, an assumption about the heritability of military 
fee during the Third Crusade would be correct in the context of the example of uses, but 
Maitland did not appreciate its novelty.  
 
The English king, in his capacity as duke, wielded a similar jurisdiction in Normandy in 
an analogous court that possessed a similar vehicle of administration and a system of 
writs (Summa De Legibus, Dist. 1. 2. 2).124 It is worth noting, however, why the character 
of military fee in England had the ingredients necessary to develop the use in the twelfth 
century, but the instrument is not found in Normandy. Firstly, whatever parity existed in 
the development of English and Norman law ended when Philip Augustus asserted 
Capetian authority over Normandy and severed the duchy from England in 1204. 125 
Otherwise, it is possible the passage of time would have brought the legal systems closer 
together. Secondly, the unknown author of Gesta Regis Henrici Secundi (1192), a text at 
one time attributed to Benedict of Peterborough, indicates that Henry considered his 
holdings in England differently from the ‘other lands across the sea’ under the lordship 
of the French king. 126  His proximity to the court suggests the different regime of 
succession laws in the respective jurisdictions reflects a variance in policy towards 
different parts of the realm. 127  F. M. Powicke suggested that English law was in a 
transitional stage of development and did not influence Norman rules.128 Within the first 
hundred years after the Conquest, Normandy furnished rules that strengthened the 
position of the lords; while the emphasis on royal power in England allowed English 
knights to enjoy greater freedom of alienation.129 In Normandy, the legal principles that 
developed around succession to all species of land allowed a lord to influence the choice 
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of heir.130 It is therefore unsurprising the use is absent from the surviving Norman law 
books because it favours the ability of the feoffee to control their fee irrespective of their 
lord’s wishes. The loss of Normandy and its subsequent divorce from England confined 
the use to a peculiarity of the latter jurisdiction. It is prudent, therefore, to continue an 
analysis of uses in England independent of Norman influence.  
 
Heritability and the ability to control descent 
 
The second ingredient in Maitland’s example, after land being held in military fee, is a 
presumed ability to control descent. Henry’s reforms had at least made it possible for the 
use to have a connection to the Third Crusade. Crusaders exercised more control over 
their fees than their predecessors. 131  Henry had even removed the rule that obliged 
crusaders to require permission from their family members to alienate land.132 Glanvill 
clarifies how the reformed land law operated in the curia regis, and the extent that a 
person could exercise control over their estate.133 However, there is no title devoted to 
the use nor other principles that indicate it existed when Glanvill was written. The 
evidence suggests that the use was unavailable on the eve of the Third Crusade. A 
restrictive interpretation of the doctrine of primogeniture is a possible reason why the 
use did not develop at this stage. Maitland would have appreciated that whatever his 
crusader-knight wished for their children, they had to work within the rules of 
primogeniture. The law guaranteed a portion of heritable land to children ‘for God alone, 
not man, has the power to make an heir’ (quia solus Deus heredem facere potest, non homo) 
(Gl. 7.1). The policy that guided inheritance to land was predominantly concerned with 
who was the nearest descendant rather than who was next-of-kin on the ascending line 
(e.g. father, grandfather).134 The crusader who had one son over the age of twenty-one 
years had the clearest expectations after their death: their land would descend to their 
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son as their heir (Gl. 7.3).135 If the crusader had no lawful heir, the land reverts (escheats) 
back to the lord because ‘the ultimate heir of any person is their lord’ (ultimi haeredes 
alquorum sunt eorum Domini) (Gl. 7.17). The use, if it existed, would run counter to this 
policy.  
 
The operation of law would have impacted on the way in which crusader-knights planned 
their estates. It is clear the first point of inquiry concerned the nature of their fee. 
Maitland’s crusader is a knight. Glanvill states ‘for if he was a knight, or holding by military 
fee, then, according to the law of the kingdom of England, the eldest son succeeds to his 
father in everything, so that none of his brothers can by right claim any part of it’ (Gl. 
7.3).136 Maitland also indicates his crusader had multiple children. The law distinguishes 
between children and grandchildren, and male and female issue (Gl. 7.5). This could 
require the court to make complex calculations about consanguinity. Glanvill provides 
that sons and daughters in the first degree succeeded before grandchildren or the 
collateral line of the second degree (brothers), which followed the canonical rules on the 
subject (Gl. 7.3; Gl. 7.4). The common law would later express this rule as ‘where there 
are two or more males in equal degree, the eldest only shall inherit, but the females all 
together’.137  Maitland appreciated that the rationale behind the descent of land is to 
ensure the unity of the fief through a single male heir capable of performing service.138 
The idea of unity also appears to have extended to the armaments of the knight that 
formed part of the fee to keep the costs down for the incoming heir (Assize of Arms, cap. 
5).139 The strict operation of law appears to explain why exceptions would not be found 
in Glanvill as the purpose of uses would be to deviate from the general rules of 
inheritance. 
 
Maitland’s crusader would have entertained significant concerns about leaving behind a 
male heir in their minority because his lord would take custody of his fee and the body of 
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his heir if he died while crusading. The lord would continue to have wardship of both until 
his heir reached the age of twenty-one (Gl. 7.9). The rationale for wardship is that the lord 
would train the minor in martial combat.140 This custodial arrangement is the closest that 
Glanvill comes to the use. Maitland did not confound the two institutions. He understood 
wardship as a species of guardianship over the ward and his property, allowing him to 
take rents and profits for the ward’s maintenance, which was enforceable against 
outsiders.141 The law also required a lord to restore the inheritance to the heir in good 
condition after the wardship (Gl. 7.9). The obvious threat to the crusader is that the lord 
could exert considerable power over the crusader’s family and property, and even 
commit waste. George Spence, Maitland’s contemporary, observed in Equitable 
Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (1846) that later knights would eventually employ 
the trust to avoid this situation. 142  However, Glanvill supplies no solution to the 
concerned crusader. The problem is addressed once again in Magna Carta 1215. 143 
Chapter Four reads: ‘The guardian of the land of an heir who is under age shall not take 
from those lands except reasonable rents, customary dues, and service without 
destruction or damage to men or property’. 144  Maitland likely considered the use a 
method to avoid the vicissitudes of wardship but not a restraint on the institution.145  
 
The options available to the crusader to avoid either the rules of descent or the potential 
consequence of a wardship were limited to inter vivos transactions (those made during 
the lifetime of the feoffor) before they left on crusade. The use in Maitland’s example was 
made inter vivos. In Glanvill, two kinds of inter vivos arrangement were available to 
crusaders to control their lands. Firstly, the law allowed a knight to dispose of a 
reasonable part of his heritable land provided there is livery of seisin, or delivery of 
possession, otherwise the feoffment is incomplete (Gl. 7.1). The reasonable part 
mentioned in the text refers to a third. It is evident that the law favoured strangers over 
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younger sons because the latter could only be enfeoffed with the permission of their 
lawful heir (Gl. 7.1). The position of illegitimate children is strengthened here because of 
the rules related to bastardy, which meant the law disqualified them from ever being 
heirs (Gl. 7.13; Gl. 7.16). Incidentally, the common law would famously reiterate the law 
in Glanvill (Gl. 7.17). The Statute of Merton (1235) (20 Hen. III, c 9) makes clear that ius 
commune principles surrounding legitimisation were not part of English law. The risk to 
the crusader is their fee escheated to the lord if their bastard died without issue (Gl. 7.16). 
In this manner, crusaders could control descent by alienating it to a stranger or a bastard 
without reference to the use. However, the use is not a feoffment that simply alienates 
land. Further, Tyerman suggests crusaders tended to avoid outright alienations of their 
property in the manner outlined in Glanvill because it would disinherit their heirs.146  
 
The second, and closer, arrangement that approaches the use in Glanvill is a lawful 
mortgage that obligated the mortgagor to keep the property intact (Gl. 10.8). This appears 
to be the foremost strategy by English crusaders to minimise the financial impact of the 
crusade on their families, although temporary hardship was expected.147  A mortgage 
arrangement, unlike a use, allowed the creditor in possession to treat the property like 
their own. They received seisin for a definite term until the debtor can redeem it. This 
kind of conditional arrangement is closer to the use but its principal purpose is to benefit 
the creditor. The fact the mortgagee will probably keep the land intact for the crusader’s 
heir is merely a consequence and not its intended function. English law allowed an heir 
to bring a plea against the creditor to have the land returned to them unless reasonable 
cause is shown not to compel its return (Gl. 10.10). However, it did not recognise the heir 
as having an enforceable legal interest akin to an intended beneficiary. Instead, the 
foremost question that the law concerned itself with was whether someone was seised of 
land or not (confitebitur rem illam suam esse, aut dicet eam suam non esse) (Gl. 3.1). A 
warranty, an assurance as to a fact or quality, comes closer. Nonetheless, the notion that 
independent interests attached to land in the form of a warranty remained in the early 
stages of development during this period.148 The legal action arose because the warrantor 
failed to protect the warrantees’ seisin, and not because of a recognised beneficial 
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interest. 149  The evidence suggests the law had no concept of the third-party 
enforceability associated with the use at this stage beyond the concept that a person 
might be seised for a definite term. 
 
The strongest weapon that the crusader had in their arsenal to protect their land against 
intrusions from strangers (after forcible ejection) was a writ to disseise the trespasser 
known as novel dissessin.150 This required the curia regis to undertake a factual inquiry 
into whether a landholder had been disseised of their fee.151 It determined the lawful 
owner of the land. The writ of novel disseisin applied ‘when anyone has unjustly and 
without a judgment disseised another of his free tenement’ (Gl. 13.32).152 The writ of 
mort d’ancestor, available to their heir, evolved out of the expansion of the rights of 
tenants and the heritability of tenure. 153  The Assize of Northampton (1176) made 
available a writ mort d’ancestor to an heir against anyone who disseised them of their 
ancestor’s land (cap. 4).154 Henry directed this chapter against the lords who refused to 
admit their tenant’s heir. 155  However, it is understood in Glanvill as a writ available 
against anyone who interfered with the rights of the heir (Gl. 13.2). 156  The rationale 
behind these writs, Brand observes, was to avoid the wrongful disposition of land and to 
avoid the negative impact that forcible dispossessions and repossessions would have on 
public order.157 These writs provided a remedy for crusaders against trespasses but are 
not evidence that supports the existence of the use in Glanvill. To the contrary, their 
existence suggests that the law did not perceive the use or a similar arrangement as 
necessary to protect crusader lands. 
 
Legal position of Women 
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The final ingredient in Maitland’s example is a crusader concerned about his wife, his 
sister, and his daughter and whether they can be enfeoffed of military fee or whether the 
land will descend to them. It is to the historian’s credit that he devoted attention to his 
legal history to ‘half the inhabitants of England’.158 Further, the use was a tool that would 
eventually be used to advance the legal interests of women. Maitland likely knew the 
concerns of his crusader was unjustified since women could hold military fee.159 The 
crusader’s doubts seem to reflect a societal view that a woman only had intermediary 
legal interest in a fee because an incoming husband would be expected to take 
possession.160 This view was situated in the law because although a woman could swear 
fealty to a lord; only a man was capable of performing homage and rendering military 
service (Gl. 9.2). Maitland intended to touch on an emotionally charged subject: concerns 
about family and the perceived vulnerability of women. Geoffrey of Vinsauf attempted to 
recapture the emotional impact on family members by stating that ‘whoever set out with 
their family members, kin, or friends were regarded by them with looks of love and when 
their loved ones departed, they were unable to hold back their devotion and sorrow’ 
(2.6).161 He described the cheers of a crowd and the tearful goodbyes of family members, 
in particular women. 162  Women were officially not allowed to participate in the 
crusade.163 In reality, washerwomen and prostitutes accompanied the army and some 
women may have even had combat roles.164 Nevertheless, Geoffrey depicted women as 
enthusiastic supporters of the crusade (who would have joined but for the weakness of 
their sex), but bore the trauma that an absent crusader would leave behind.165  
 
                                                          
158 Pollock and Maitland, The History of English Law, vol. 1, p. 482. 
159 Pollock and Maitland, p. 482. 
160 J. Brundage, ‘Widows and Remarriage: Moral Conflicts and their Resolution in Classical Canon Law’, in S. 
Walker (ed.), Wife and Widow in Medieval England, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan, 1993, p. 25; Hudson, The 
Oxford History of the Laws of England, p. 807. 
161 Geoffrey de Vinsauf, Chronicles and memorials of the reign of Richard I, p. 148. ‘… qui progrediebantur cum 
suis familiaribus, cognatis vel amicis, eosdem caritatis intuitu prosequentibus, discedentes nimirum amici ab 
erumpentibus ex pietate sive mœstitia lacrymis se nequibant cohibere’. 
162 Geoffrey de Vinsauf, Chronicles and memorials of the reign of Richard I, p. 148. See also Ambroise, The 
History of the Holy War, p. 34. 
163 Geoffrey de Vinsauf, Chronicles and memorials of the reign of Richard I, p. 33. 
164 H. Nicholson, ‘Women on the Third Crusade’, Journal of Medieval History, vol. 23, no. 4, 2007, p. 349. 




The inferior legal status of women may have been a cause for concern for married 
crusaders.166 The common law doctrine of coverture, existing for the greater part of its 
legal history, distinguished the status of married women (feme covert) and unmarried 
women (feme sole). The former were under the power of their husbands (baron).167 This 
doctrine meant commentators considered the status of feme sole to be a superior legal 
condition.168 It is expressed in Glanvill as follows ‘the wife is, in a legal sense, under the 
potestas of her husband’ (Gl. 6.3).169 English law on this subject is reminiscent of the 
Roman law concept of marriage cum manu and the apparent loss of legal status (capitis 
diminutio minima) and property rights that accompanied a woman’s entrance into the 
potestas170 of her husband as akin to his daughter (Gai. 1. 108 – 115).171 Eighteenth-
century common lawyers found such a comparison useful because the effect of marriage 
likened a wife’s legal status to an infant.172 However, the theological notion that marriage 
created a unity of person influenced the creation of the common law doctrine rather than 
the archaic form of Roman law marriage.173 The concern Maitland’s crusader had about 
the doctrine, expressed by Coke, is ‘a man may not grant nor give his tenements to his 
wife during the coverture, for that his wife and he be but one person in the law’. 174 
Maitland challenges the idea that the doctrine had far-reaching societal implications by 
suggesting community between spouses tempered the harsh consequences of the wife’s 
legal condition. 175  It is very likely that she would have been party to her husband’s 
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decision to go on crusade. 176  Further, his absence may not have affected the daily 
management of the fee which was overseen by his tenants.177  
 
In the absence of a use-like device, the concept of dower allowed a wife to enforce a legal 
interest in her husband’s estate. The text makes clear that English law had a unique form 
of dower that concerned the creation of a third interest in freehold lands at the time of 
marriage called marriage hood or a woman’s reasonable dower (Gl. 6.1; Gl. 7.1). She 
owned the land, but could only enforce that right after her husband’s death (Gl. 6.17). In 
the meantime, the following rule applied (Gl. 6.3): ‘It is known, that a woman does not 
have the power to make any disposition of her dower during her husband’s lifetime … 
Therefore, anyone who has a wife may gift, sell or alienate her dower in whatever way he 
pleases’.178 This left a widow in a vulnerable position because whether she could enter 
the land turned on the question, once again a matter of fact, whether her dower was 
vacant or not (Gl. 6.4). The crusader in Maitland’s example may have alienated dower 
land as part of his financial preparation. If this was the case, then the land would not be 
vacant and she would have to rely on her husband’s heir to provide her with reasonable 
compensation if he died on the expedition (Gl. 6.13).179 Society expected the heir to assist 
in the recovery of dower land because a husband cannot devise it without their 
consent.180 Otherwise, a crusader who alienated dower land could have rendered his wife 
destitute. 181  The decision to alienate land would have been somewhat reckless and 
counter-intuitive to Maitland’s crusader who wished to protect his wife’s interest. The 
existence of dower did guarantee her some legal protection despite her reduced legal 
status. 
 
Maitland’s crusader is also concerned about the status of his daughters and whether they 
can hold military fee. The common law only permitted a military fee to descend to a 
daughter if the crusader died without a legitimate son because ‘a female never shares in 
an inheritance with a male’ (mulier numquam cum masculo partem in aliqua hereditate 
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capit) (Gl. 7.3). If a man has multiple daughters, however, they succeeded together save 
the capital messuage (primary residence) for the eldest daughter (Gl. 7.3). Therefore, a 
daughter might hold military fee if her father died on crusade. Nonetheless, the crusader 
still had to consider the institution of wardship if his daughter was a minor (Gl. 7.12). The 
different ages of majority between men and women means inheritance of patrimonial 
estate is one of the few instances where the law benefitted the latter first. Once married 
with the consent of her lord, the incoming husband would perform homage to the lord to 
acquire the fee.182 The crusader’s sister, in terms of inheritance, is in an even weaker 
position. Since she is on the collateral line, the land would only descend to her on the 
failure of brothers (Gl. 7.4). The crusader could alienate, as mentioned above, part of the 
land to her as a stranger but she would lose power over it if she married. Furthermore, as 
Maitland indicates, the crusader could hope she or any other stranger would take care of 
his family’s interests. Alienation in this manner would create more risks than it would 
solve since it meant divesting the family of their legal rights to his property if he should 
die. The use, however, does not appear to be an option to protect the interests of the 




The procedural rule known as essoin is the closest Glanvill comes to addressing a legal 
principle applicable to the crusade movement. It is a rule that appreciated the natural 
concern that a crusader would have for their family and property during their absence.183 
The Canon law anticipated these concerns with privileges.184 However, English law also 
contributed to the body of crusade jurisprudence. The belief that the use existed on the 
eve of the Third Crusade arose because of the expectation that the common law would 
also respond to the crusader’s legal needs. And it did. An essoin allowed a party to excuse 
themselves from appearing in court for some special reason such as an infirmity (Gl. 
1.11). The possible excuses that allowed a person to plead an essoin were countless as it 
pertained to questions of fact.185 Undoubtedly, it was available for crusaders and the 
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evidence would suggest the courts appreciated its applicability to the movement. It is a 
secular expression of the canon in Audita tremendi that furnished a privilege to prevent 
legal proceedings against crusaders until they returned home or died.186 The evidence 
suggests that Brundage’s observation that ‘there is ample evidence from the thirteenth 
century judicial and administrative records of the English kingdom that the crusader’s 
essoin was frequently pled and was almost always respected in the royal courts’ likely 
applied to the twelfth century.187 
 
The idea that a crusader could plead an essoin would have encountered no conceptual 
difficulty in the curia regis. There were two options available to them under the law, 
which once more reflects their dichotomous nature as both warrior and pilgrim. The 
essoin de esse in peregrinatione allowed at least a year and a day for a pilgrimage to 
Jerusalem or a discretionary period if elsewhere (Gl. 1.29). Pilgrims enjoyed a 
significantly longer period than other persons going overseas who had forty days to 
answer a summons (Gl. 1.25). However, most crusaders during the Third Crusade were 
directly under the command of Richard.188 Therefore, a crusader could also plead essoin 
per servitium regis throughout the entire time they were in the Richard’s service 
(provided they were not someone usually in the king’s service) (Gl. 1.27). However, the 
chapter states that the essoin only applied in blanket form if the king summoned the 
essoiner. If they had entered the king’s service voluntarily and went overseas, the forty-
day period applied. Since Glanvill is silent about the crusader, it is unclear what rules 
applied, although the later adoption of a year and day as enjoyed by the pilgrim suggest 
the courts applied it to the crusader without conceptual difficulty. In practice, it was likely 
a matter of when a crusader returned or the court received notice of their death. 
Nonetheless, English crusaders attempted to avoid the possibility of lawsuits arising 
during their absence by resolving legal disputes before leaving. 189  This probably 
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presented another opportunity to acquire funding.190 If they wished, however, a crusader 
could abuse the rule to avoid legal actions by taking the cross and claiming essoin.191 
 
The crusader who wished to plead an essoin had to appoint an attorney to act on their 
behalf.192 This rule is straight-forward. The purpose of the essoin is to recognise the 
principal is unable to come to court (Gl. 1.19). It is an exception to the general principle 
that a person cannot put another in their place without also being present in court (Gl. 
11.1; Gl. 11.5). Brundage notes, citing Fleta and the Patent Rolls from Henry III’s reign, 
that: ‘In England, it was common for crusaders to secure from the king the right to appoint 
attorneys, usually laymen, to defend their interests before the royal courts’. 193 
Nonetheless, Tyerman adduces evidence that attorneys safeguarded crusader property 
during their absence. He cites the example of Geoffrey Hose from Wiltshire who paid the 
exchequer £100 to hold his land in peace and appoint an attorney.194 The purpose of the 
appointment was to buttress other legal protections that a crusader enjoyed. 195  An 
attorney is not the feoffee to use found in Maitland’s example for the simple reason that 
they did not have ownership and cannot answer for land (Gl. 3.1). Such persons did not 
have a common law action if they were deseised of the land.196 A custodian of the land 
also owed a principal warranty over land to maintain its integrity while in their care, and 
an action to recover escambium, land of the same value of that lost, could be brought 
against them.197 It is clear Maitland did not conflate the role of attorney with the use 
although he noted, ‘the germ of agency is hardly to be distinguished from the germ of 
another institution which in our English law has an eventful future before it, the use, trust 
or confidence’.198 The procedural rules surrounding essoin are far removed from the 
ingredients that Maitland identified as relevant to the use but do demonstrate the 
emerging common law could engage with crusading. 
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The absence of the use in Glanvill challenges Maitland’s suggestion that knights used it as 
part of their crusade preparations. Nonetheless, the argument that the use did have a 
connection to the Third Crusade is more reasonable than the connection with its 
predecessors since it did have a profound impact on English history. 199  The crusade 
movement also had the opportunity to shape secular law by occasion of their concurrent 
development. Furthermore, Henry II’s administrative and legal reforms in England 
enhanced the position of crusaders. They exerted more rights over their land than earlier 
crusaders.200 However, there is no title or legal principle devoted to uses in Glanvill. If 
Ranulf de Glanvill wrote or supervised the text, and the use did exist, then he did not 
include it despite his experience with the crusade movement. Even if he did not write the 
treatise, its absence demands explanation. The simplest being that the use was not 
available to crusaders before the Third Crusade. An absent title, as Brundage noted for 
the canon law, is not necessarily surprising for legal instruments associated with the 
crusade.201 Nonetheless, it is reasonable to expect if the use existed that it would be in 
Glanvill, which the author wrote to furnish a clear and complete statement of the law 
related to land. The evidence also suggests, contrary to Maitland’s original theory, that 
the use did not form part of English law after 1066. Instead, Glanvill is the result of settling 
common law principles. 
 
Glanvill offers legal historians the best snapshot into English law on the eve of the Third 
Crusade. The elements of the law Maitland identified as relevant to the creation of uses 
are present and treated in detail: military fee, descent of land, and probable concern 
about the legal position of women. Maitland, however, did not fully appreciate the novelty 
of the common law principles expressed in Glanvill. Military fee was an established 
landholding at the beginning of the twelfth century, but the rules related to the 
heritability of land were novel to English law before the Third Crusade. Maitland believed, 
erroneously, that English law had settled questions about heritability of military fee soon 
after the Conquest. 202  The novelty of the law appears to have created a sense that 
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additional instruments, like the use, were not necessary to enhance the safeguards 
recently introduced. However, Maitland’s crusader also contemplated that the operation 
of law may not protect his interests. Tyerman indicates situations may have arisen while 
crusaders were absent where the courts could not intervene.203 Maitland’s crusader also 
appears to have an apprehension of death. However, the use does not appear to have been 
available to deviate from the negative consequence of primogeniture and wardship. 
Furthermore, crusaders could not make uses or other arrangements to support female 
relatives beyond what the law allowed. In some cases, however, a person had no remedy 
at law and had to rely on the discretion of the king to protect their interests.204 There is 
no hint of a secular notion of crusade jurisprudence in Glanvill, not even concerning 
essoin, which Angevin jurists remedied after the Third Crusade. The evidence suggests 
that the author(s) of the treatise, in the late twelfth century, were happy to leave the legal 
elements of crusading to the canonists. 
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Chapter 5. Use-Like Legal Devices as Responses to the 
Third Crusade, 1187-1192 
 
The belief that the use has some connection to the Crusades often settles on the Third 
Crusade as the crusade Maitland had in mind. It is a logical connection. The Third Crusade 
is known to have had a profound impact on English history. It is likely that popular 
perceptions about Richard I as a legendary figure strengthened this belief. Nonetheless, 
no justification has ever been provided for the assumed relationship between the use and 
the Third Crusade beyond what can be found in Maitland’s example. Therefore, this 
chapter seeks to determine whether there is evidence to support the belief that the use 
arose during or as a direct response to the Third Crusade. It is first necessary to examine 
the legal measures Richard, England’s crusader-king, took in the preparation phase of his 
crusade. These measures are divisible into steps taken to address general crusade issues, 
and those taken to protect the private property of crusaders. Richard’s engagement with 
the law took advantage of the Angevin legal and financial apparatus that historians have 
frequently praised. 1  Maitland indicated that the use could be found in private 
arrangements. The second source of evidence, therefore, is the private arrangements 
made by crusaders to deal with their property. English knights confronted the same kinds 
of issues, including the protection of their family and property, which characterised legal 
preparation of earlier crusades.2 However, their legal arrangements were coloured by the 
availability of subsidies that, for the first time, alleviated some of their stresses associated 
with a prolonged absence. Finally, it is necessary to examine the impact that the Third 
Crusade did have on English law to determine whether the use developed as a reflection 
on this third Jerusalem expedition. 
 
Romanticism in Third Crusade Historiography 
 
Romantic elements in the historiographical tradition of the Third Crusade may explain 
why academics in law schools seldom support their assertions that it is somehow related 
to the use. Reference to popular ideas associated with crusading also seems to explain 
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why law students are willing to believe the connection despite a dearth of evidence. The 
Third Crusade inspires more romantic recasting from both academics and fictional 
authors than any other crusade event.3 Historians give it special attention because it 
boasts the participation of powerful rulers, interesting figures, great events, and contains 
many allusions to epic.4 James Reston Jr, in Warriors of God: Richard the Lionheart and 
Saladin in the Third Crusade (2001), commented: 
 
The Third Crusade, spanning the years 1187 – 92, is the most interesting of them all. It was the 
largest military endeavour of the Middle Ages and brought the fury of the entire crusading 
movement to its zenith. Perhaps more important, it brought two of the most remarkable and 
fascinating figures of the last millennium into conflict: Saladin, the Sultan of Egypt, Syria, Arabia, and 
Mesopotamia; and Richard I, King of England, known as the Lionheart.5 
 
Histories are frequently framed by the conflict between the Richard Coeur de Lion, King 
of England, and his Moslem opponent Sultan Salah ad-Din.6 Numerous monographs and 
journal articles on both attest to the popularity of their rivalry.7 The Third Crusade, it 
would seem, is dominated by heroes and villains. 8  It is unsurprising, therefore, that 
biographical histories are at the forefront of Third Crusade historiography because they 
appeal to popular interest in the fascinating personalities and heroism of their 
protagonists.9  Robert Irwin observed that historians have made use of the novelist’s 
toolkit to present their work on the Third Crusade in a manner more exciting than 
fictional romance.10 Lawyers might also be forgiven for trying to enliven their subject by 
drawing on the same toolkit with the accepted truth of the use being a mythology built 
upon mythologies. 
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The character of Richard I may share a portion of the blame along with Maitland for the 
accepted truth that now exists in equity courses. The significant role of an English 
monarch gives English-speaking readers a greater sense of connection to the Third 
Crusade than any other crusade.11 Richard is often cast as a hero whose legend, like the 
use, is more widely known than the details of his life.12 Both fiction and non-fictional 
accounts use Richard’s character as an exemplar of chivalrous knighthood, which 
emphasises his bravery, intelligence, brashness, honour, and other qualities reminiscent 
of epic heroism.13 Even the less flattering account by French author Louis Maimbourg’s 
History of the Holy War (1686) admits the English king’s courage, while praising Phillip 
Augustus, despite a description of Richard as a person devoid of kindness, debauched, 
and a money-waster. 14  The positive qualities resound deeper in English histories. 
Geoffrey of Vinsauf adulates Richard by saying: 
 
He had the virtus of Hector, the magnanimity of Achilles, neither inferior to Alexander nor to Roland; 
he outshone many illustrious characters of our own times. He who had the liberality of Titus, and 
that which is rare in a soldier, the eloquence of Nestor, and the prudence of Ulysses.15 
 
In addition to an eyewitness account, the author’s use of epic shows off both his refined 
skills as a writer and his admiration for the King.16 Modern allusions to classical epic to 
describe Richard’s character continue today.17 His qualities as a ‘warrior-king’ have often 
provided historians with an irresistible template to compare with Saladin, who also 
enjoys similar renown, as a legendary figure known for his wisdom.18 However, Maitland 
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may not have had Richard in mind when he thought about his example since nineteenth-
century historiography painted Richard as a dedicated warrior but a ruler derelict in his 
duty to England. 19  It is a view that continues to influence modern novelists and 
moviemakers who present him as a courageous but a simple-minded king.20 
 
To challenge romantic notions about Richard I and the Third Crusade, the modern law 
student has access to exceptional histories that do not cast their subject in the romantic 
glow of yesteryear. John Gillingham stands out as one of the most authoritative voices. He 
has written extensive biographical accounts on the life and reign of Richard,21 including 
his crusade activities and time in captivity in the Empire,22 with the intention of filling the 
gaps in knowledge created by romanticised accounts.23 Writing in 2013, Ralph Turner 
and Ralph Heiser noted trends in modern scholarship that signal: ‘In recent years, 
scholars employing different criteria have undertaken a re-evaluation of Richard by 
seeking to place him in his proper late twelfth century context and to judge him by the 
standards of his own age’.24 The shift away from romantic accounts has provided insight 
into Richard’s preparations and those of his crusaders. The same historiographical trends 
extend to modern treatments of the Third Crusade. As a subject, the Third Crusade is 
often addressed in general histories 25  or in thematic treatments 26  alongside other 
crusades. Christopher Tyerman, for example, devotes a chapter to the plans, recruitment, 
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and financing of Third Crusade as part of a wider exploration into the broad impacts of 
the crusade movement on England.27 These histories have been valuable to the present 
thesis. However, Legal History remains on the periphery of Crusade scholarship.28 The 
dearth of legal histories devoted to private law and the Third Crusade may explain why 
the apocryphal law student continues to believe the use is somehow connected to the 
crusades. Furthermore, the legal and administrative success of Henry II, discussed in the 
preceding chapter, have preoccupied legal historians. It could easily be assumed when 
reading The History of English Law that the most interesting legal development during the 
Third Crusade is that Richard’s regulations contained the first recorded instance of 
tarring and feathering. 29  This thesis goes someway to fill the gap in Third Crusade 
historiography with respect to the private law use. 
 
If Richard is, as popularly accepted, a negligent ruler or unlikely source for legal 
innovation, the attraction of connecting the use to the Third Crusade appears to have 
reconciled otherwise mutually exclusive ideas. It is a common narrative device in modern 
story-telling that brawn and brains are opposite forces. However, prior to the nineteenth 
century, historians perceived Richard as a capable ruler. Thomas Fuller in his Holy Warre 
(1639) thought Richard settled matters at home ‘with the skill of a thousand princes’ 
before his departure.30 This view of the King is more resonant with the idea that the use 
developed as a response to the Third Crusade. Furthermore, modern historians have 
reassessed the character of Richard to recognise him as innovative and capable ruler.31 
For example, historians continue to view him as a courageous leader but also recognise 
that he made the strategic decision to ensure the long-term survivability of Outremer at 
the expense of his ability to capture Jerusalem.32 Evidence that supports a connection 
between the use and the Third Crusade may be directly attributable to Richard. 
Gillingham observes that ‘Richard’s overriding priority was now the crusade. 
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Contemporaries were unanimous in believing this was his highest duty … that the 
prolonged absence of the ruler on crusade would create problems was obvious. They just 
had to be faced.’ 33  More plainly, Richard’s focus included the anticipation of legal 
problems that he or his crusaders were likely to encounter. He similarly directed his 
attention towards the security of his realm and legal issues that may arise during his 
absence.34 Richard attended to both. It is at least plausible that the use could have been 
part of his early law-making. 
 
Richard might be forgiven for a lack of jurisprudential flair with the laws he made at the 
outset of the crusade. He is remembered primarily as an absentee king who spent a mere 
six months in England during his reign. Gillingham reminds us that Richard was foremost 
a continental ruler who counted England amongst his domains, and not the reverse.35 
However, the evidence suggests Richard spent his time productively. He made all the 
arrangements he could in the brief nine months allotted to the administration of his 
domains. Contemporaries note Richard appointed William Longchamp as both 
Chancellor and Chief Justiciar of England so that he held the highest secular offices.36 The 
fact that William also held a powerful spiritual office as papal legate in addition to his 
bishopric in Ely prompted Richard of Devizes to note that William held all the exalted 
offices in England, which made him almost as powerful as the King. 37  It might be 
suggested such appointments were an inappropriate coalescence of executive and 
judicial power in the hands of a single person when other kings may have distributed 
such power.38 Nonetheless, there appears to be some agreement amongst historians that 
Richard made appropriate appointments, and Longchamp’s later vilification did not 
diminish his decision-making. 39  Gillingham suggested that Richard’s preparations at 
home would likely have been effective but for the event of the King’s imprisonment, and 
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the fractious relationship between John and Longchamp.40 Nonetheless, it is clear that 
Richard arranged affairs in England in a hurry. Geoffrey makes this clear when it states 
that ‘having made the necessary preparations for his journey, and having arranged the 
affairs of the King of England as much as time permitted, without delay, he returned to 
Normandy’. 41  They also reflect a broader pattern of a king wielding his power and 
working within the existing law to protect his subjects and their subjects from the effects 
of political threats. 
  
Richard’s contribution to Crusade Jurisprudence 
 
Richard made numerous legal contributions to the Third Crusade. His most visible 
measure to protect crusader property is the Treaty of Nonancourt (13 January 1190) with 
Phillip Augustus to ensure co-operation between the two kingdoms ‘to keep faith with 
each other and their respective armies’ on pain of excommunication anathema.42 The 
effect of this statement was to ensure that the land of crusaders would be protected from 
trespassers external to the realm. It was similar in nature to the treaty signed by Henry II 
and Louis VII as part of their crusade preparations.43 Richard of Devizes believed a treaty 
was necessary for both kings to feel secure enough to leave their respective realms.44 
Lesser counts and barons also affirmed the agreement to keep the faith between each 
other.45 The treaty itself was not intended to address private law issues, where the use 
might be applicable, but to protect crusaders from major political upheaval. 46  It 
illustrates, nevertheless, that Richard was sympathetic to their concerns. Further, the 
evidence suggests Richard understood the impact of the legal arrangements he made. 
When the parties agreed to the treaty, Richard had already decided to repudiate a 
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betrothal with Phillip’s sister in favour of an alliance with Navarre. 47  Phillip, 
understandably angry, returned from the Holy Land before Richard to instigate an attack 
against his territories.48 However, the effect of the treaty made Phillip’s barons reticent 
to join the King in attacking the lands of a crusader.49 The value he placed on the law to 
effect an outcome is further demonstrable by the use of oaths taken from his brothers, 
the Scottish king, and Welsh princes to further ensure the security of the realm.50 Richard 
was not as simple-minded as popular portrayals have suggested. 
 
The general regulations he made during the crusade do not introduce the use despite 
Richard being engaged with legal issues associated with crusading. His legal measures, 
however, indicate a king using the law to address logistical concerns associated with 
crusading. Richard of Devizes even suggests that Richard acquired the name ‘the Lion’ 
because of how he interacted with the law: 
 
The king of France concealed whatever his men did or suffered, or kept silent about it. The king of 
England giving no heed to the nationality of anyone involved in a crime, considered every man his 
subject and left no offence unpunished. For this reason the Griffons [Greek-speaking Sicilians] called 
one king the Lamb and the other the Lion.51 
 
This description identifies Richard as an effective administrator of justice rather than a 
legal innovator, and this distinction appears to characterise his legal activity at the outset 
of the crusade. The view of Richard as using the law to achieve specific outcomes is 
evident in the regulations he made during the crusade. At Messina (20 June 1190), he 
introduced regulations to address murder, theft, bad language, gambling, desertion, 
inflation, and restrictions on the sale of commodities within the army such as bread, flour, 
meat, and wine.52 The concern with logistics and military discipline seem to highlight 
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Richard’s extensive experience as a military commander.53 Richard made law with an 
immediate purpose in mind. He also made law that impacted upon private property 
where it benefitted his soldiers. For example, he restricted the testamentary dispositions 
of crusaders to half their personal property with the other half entering the common fund 
controlled by ecclesiastics and military orders.54  
 
Richard took steps to protect private property interests in his territories before and 
during the crusade on a case-by-case basis. J. H. Round’s Calendar of Documents Preserved 
in France Illustrative of the History of Great Britain and Ireland includes many examples 
of Richard granting (either property or privileges) or confirming grants to ecclesiastics 
made by himself or his family early in his reign.55 Richard appears to have addressed 
ecclesiastical matters56 and secular57 issues both immediately before his departure in 
late June and July, and six months later around late December and January (1190/1191). 
The charter evidence suggests it is also unfair to suppose Richard neglected his royal 
duties either before or during his campaign. His busy timetable is evident in a charter (7 
August 1190) that suggests Richard granted privileges to the abbey of La Boissière at 
Marseilles ‘on the day we set out for Jerusalem, the first year of our reign’. 58 Several 
charters from his French domains demonstrate how he protected private property rights 
while on crusade. In Normandy, Richard granted (9 October 1189) protection to the 
person and property of Walter de St. Valery, immediate access to justice if this protection 
was violated, and prohibited legal actions against his property during the King’s 
absence.59 The protection explicitly states that Walter’s lands were to be treated as if they 
were part of his demesne. He extends this protection to the abbey of Ardennes, and once 
more makes an order that it is not to be impleaded from the day he sets out to the day he 
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returns. 60  In a slight variation, the protection he grants to the abbey of Lonlay in 
Normandy states that actions touching the land can only be heard by himself or his chief 
justiciar during his absence.61 The above examples from Round’s Calendar do not concern 
crusader lands. Nevertheless, they do offer insight into how Richard’s protection 
operated to secure private property rights for a prolonged period. It is an approach, 
however, which is not conducive to a jurisprudential creation of uses. 
 
The Calendar shows that Richard replicated the legal activity in his French territories 
within his English kingdom, which indicates he broadly applied grants of protection 
across his realm. A charter (1189) concerns a ‘grant by the king to the nuns of Saint-Mary 
in Wikes, of a fair to be held yearly at Michaelmas for three days, and confirmation of all 
grants to them by [Henry II], with a further grant of freedom from all pleas and suits etc. 
in the king’s land’.62 In another charter (1189), Richard instructs his sheriffs and officers 
to enforce the liberty of Westminster Abbey.63 He reiterates his instructions in another 
charter to command his sheriffs and officers to treat his grant of lands and rents to the 
abbey as if they were part of the royal demesne.64 Richard utilised the sheriff’s office to 
protect lands in England at a local level, similar to the situation in his Norman duchy, and 
granted them the power to seize offenders.65 A charter granting a monetary gift and other 
liberties clearly indicates that the people charged with upholding royal grants in his 
absence were the sheriffs, justices, and bailiffs, on penalties of a ten-pound forfeiture.66 
There is no conceptual difficulty with the idea that Richard could extend this protection 
to crusaders. The full implications are found in a charter (10 November 1189) 67 
addressed to all his Norman liegemen (and subsequently others)68, which confirms all the 
grants of land to the Knights’ Templar throughout Normandy, and grants them release 
from services except those owed to himself. Richard adds their properties should be 
protected as if his own and that any controversies ought to be heard before himself or his 
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seneschal.69 Richard instructed his castellans and bailiffs in the manner of his English 
sheriffs to protect, maintain, and advance the property held under his protection and to 
pursue suits against transgressors.70 There is a further dimension to this charter that 
requires explanation. He states anyone who had custody of Templar property must guard 
it against harm. 71  The legal implications of this added duty are unclear but it 
demonstrates that Richard used the apparatus available to him to protect property rights 
during his absence.  
 
There is evidence that Richard did extend the above protections to English crusaders and 
he instructed William Longchamp to safeguard their interests. In a series of charters, the 
Chancellor prohibited several churchmen from interfering with property held by the 
deceased Archbishop Baldwin or bringing proceedings against his lands. 72  The 
testamentary wishes of Baldwin, who had died at the siege of Acre, were also honoured.73 
Ecclesiastics such as the archbishop supported the army and even had combat roles in 
the expedition.74 Longchamp also forbids the bishop of Bath, and the abbots of Reading 
and Waltham from bringing proceedings against abbot William of Saint-Mary, and the 
monks there who hold the church at Eynesford and a chapel at Farningham. He makes 
explicit reference to the crusader status of William in his letter: 
 
Since William journeys forth to capture Jerusalem, in his absence he possesses the church and chapel 
lawfully and in peace. Hence we strictly prohibit that which is against the assize of crusaders such 
vexation or molestation, greater still that he holds the church and chapel by donation in the memory 
of Baldwin, archbishop of Canterbury. We do not expect that condition of the archbishopric, as long 
as it is in the protection of the lord King and ours, be any way altered.75 
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This charter might be interpreted to mean that crusader lands must be free from 
interference and indicates that they are under the protection of the King and Longchamp 
as chancellor. An alternative view is that the protection granted to Baldwin extends to 
William since his land is in the protected archbishopric. By analogy, if Richard extended 
his protection to his tenants-in-chief, their knights would also be protected. The reference 
made to the assize of crusaders indicates secular protection of spiritual crusader 
privileges. By contrast, the arrangements mentioned in the previous chapter by Geoffrey 
Hose in 1188 may not have come under royal protection since he left before the main 
force.76  
 
The use is absent from the abovementioned measures that Richard made to protect 
private property interests. His arrangements after his return from imprisonment by the 
Hohenstaufen reinforce the idea he wielded law-making as a tool to accomplish specific 
objectives.77 He returned to a plethora of internal political problems in England, including 
John’s rebellion and personal collection of royal revenues, the external threat posed by 
Wales, reduced revenue from the prerogatives of royalty that had been unavailable to his 
officers, and the extraordinary taxation to raise the king’s ransom (1193).78 Richard is 
largely remembered for his successful defence of Normandy (1193 – 1198) in the final 
years of his reign.79 However, he also attended to outstanding legal issues immediately 
after he returned. The Articles of Eyre (1194) states in its first chapter that the articles 
‘concern new and old pleas and all those not yet determined before the King’s justiciars’ 
(cap. 1).80 The apparent retrospective effect of the articles means these laws are intended 
to include matters that Richard could not address, and reviews and pleas that are 
summoned by royal writ, the chief justice, or those persons otherwise before the courts 
(cap. 2). The measures Richard passed had a sweeping effect, and included: the return of 
land to the King that escheated after his departure for the Holy Land (cap. 3), 
ecclesiastical donations (cap. 4), guardianship of children (cap. 5), marriages of young 
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girls and widows (cap. 6), the prosecution of wrongdoers and those harbouring them 
(cap. 7), and forgers (cap. 8). Chapter 9 speaks to Richard’s reputation as an administrator 
of justice because it deals with the attacks on the Jewish community by crusaders, 
including their punishment, which occurred at the outset of his expedition.81  
 
The abovementioned articles pursue specific legal objectives rather than introduce novel 
institutions. Richard appears to have been limited in what he could accomplish, and the 
evidence suggests he never turned his mind to the use. The absence of articles concerning 
trespassers against crusader lands suggests such an arrangement was not even perceived 
as necessary during the Third Crusade. The Articles of Eyre initiate an inquisition into 
chattels owned by crusaders who died before they reached Jerusalem to determine ‘who 
held them, what they are, and what they are worth’.82 Tyerman opines this is an example 
of Richard stepping over ecclesiastical primacy in crusade administration.83 An exercise 
of authority in this manner seems to reflect how the King engaged with the law, which is 
also evident when he famously ignored the canon law condemnation of tournaments 
(1194). 84  It is implicit that trespassers against the estates of crusaders would be 
remedied. There are several reasons that, when considered together, may explain why 
the Articles do not discuss trespassers against crusader lands. The first is that, as a rule, 
the opportunity to secretly interfere with movables such as chattels is greater than 
immovables such as land. Legal issues of this kind would have been known to the courts. 
Second, the King appears to have protected crusader land with the effect of reducing the 
opportunities for analogous trespassers. Finally, the operation of law as mentioned in the 
above chapter created a degree of certainty about who inherited to the crusader’s estate. 
The use would have been an unnecessary addition to laws functioning as the King 
intended. 
 
Private legal arrangements during the Third Crusade 
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The private legal arrangements of crusaders are another likely source for the use. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the Third Crusade was a significant event in England 
that affected all aspects of society. Tyerman states English crusaders, like their 
continental counterparts, included skinners, blacksmiths, millers, cobblers, tailors, 
potters, butchers, vintners, and bakers. 85  These men appreciated that crusading 
demanded they risked both their lives and their property.86 Each English crusader, even 
those described as burgenses and rustici in the Saladin Tithe, held land in some form.87 
Furthermore, even landholders who did not participate in the Third Crusade made legal 
arrangements to support those who did.88 Legal historians might expect the use to appear 
somewhere amongst the numerous arrangements that touched land. Tyerman’s research 
leads him to echo the concerns of Maitland’s crusader: 
 
Crucesignati were not unaware of the risks they ran and the need to find some sort of reliable 
security. The search for protection, especially where the only heir was a daughter, was a major theme 
of many departing crusaders’ arrangements. The need for extrinsic guarantees was self-evident; 
dangers threatened from all sides.89 
 
However, most arrangements made by English crusaders followed the same pattern of 
legal arrangements made by their predecessors on the First Crusade with the exception 
that money had become readily available, and they did not compete to the same extent to 
raise it. 90  Their pre-occupation, nevertheless, remained with financial and spiritual 
support for the crusade.91 
 
Tyerman cites numerous charters demonstrating that crusaders frequently sold, leased, 
or mortgaged land in anticipation of the Third Crusade.92 The Angevin government took 
steps to enable crusaders to make the legal preparations necessary to undertake the 
expedition.93 Tyerman observes that the ‘[canon law] crusade privileges were closely 
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integrated into the common law and administered by a usually sympathetic 
government’.94 He outlines the temporal privileges operable during the Third Crusade:  
 
... protection for the crucesignatus, his family, and property; accelerated litigation before his 
departure; essoin of court after his departure; freedom to sell, lease, or mortgage property with the 
consent of the interested parties; moratorium on debts; exemption from interest; and immunity 
from taxation.95 
 
The use, it might be noted, does not appear in this list. Furthermore, the secular arm also 
took an active role in the promulgation of law related to crusading. The ordinances issued 
by the Council of Geddington (1188) addressed matters such as restrictions on gambling 
and female participation (stat. 1 – 5).96 It made no reference to the use. Both canon law 
and secular sources also illustrate how significant debt law was to the corpus of crusade 
jurisprudence.97 It had been important since the First Crusade. The evidence suggests 
that few crusaders were willing to take the cross without a clear legal statement on the 
treatment of crusader debts.98 The Geddington ordinances allowed creditors to enjoy the 
fruits of land lawfully pledged for a period of three years after the crusader set out, but 
without collecting interest on the money (stat. 6, 7). However, it was in the interests of 
both debtor and creditor that the law was clear. Richard and Phillip addressed residual 
uncertainties about the operation of this principle when they passed the regulations at 
Messina that clarify ‘if any crusader having begun their mission receives a loan from 
another man, then he shall pay his debt. If he takes a loan before his mission, he does not 
have to pay during his journey’.99 
 
The terms contained in mortgages to protect the interests of family members is the 
closest that crusade jurisprudence comes to contemplating a private law use-like 
arrangement over land. Crusaders on the Third Crusade pledged land or an interest in 
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land to a creditor to hold for a term, protecting it while in their possession (else they 
commit waste), to be returned to them.100 It has the effect of carrying out the primary 
purpose of Maitland’s use: safeguarding the land and the interests of family members 
during the crusader’s absence.101 Furthermore, the arrangement is transitory in nature 
unlike an outright alienation because the land would pass back into the patrimony of the 
crusader. Finally, the creditor is not enfeoffed fully of the land and so never acquires full 
ownership of it. However, the principal difference that distinguishes the use from a credit 
arrangement is the latter is a species of obligation. Both parties enter the arrangement 
with the primary purpose of obtaining a benefit for themselves and not with a mind to 
benefit a third party. If a credit arrangement benefits a third party, it is incidental to its 
primary purpose. Nonetheless, credit arrangements could include terms to benefit third 
parties or achieve purposes outside the scope of a simple loan. These auxiliary purposes, 
as evident in First Crusade charters, could ensure safeguards are established to ensure 
devolution of land to the desired heir.  
 
The attempts that creditors and crusader debtors made to circumvent the law come even 
closer to the theory of the use during the crusades. The grant of a mortgage with a 
condition annexed to it could circumvent the law, which is a characteristic often 
subscribed to the use. For example, a charter (1189) records Lord Guy of Dampierre-
Saint-Dizier, a crusader, gave a rent of 5 muids of wine from the vine at Moëlain and half 
a muid of wheat, on condition that if the vine did not produce 20 muids, as previously 
enjoyed by the lord, the annuity would be allocated the following year.102 The effect of 
this charter is to guarantee a return on a loan, effectively interest, contrary to strict 
prohibitions against usury. The practice happened in England. A charter (1190) made 
after the coronation of Richard I describes how William de Turevill pledged to Richard of 
Kent to hold all his lands at Woodcote and Chelmscote in exchange for thirty-three silver 
marks.103 The editor, J. H. Round, indicates the rent arrangements behind this charter 
evaded the prohibition of usury and allowed Richard to enjoy the difference between the 
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nominal rent and the real annual value.104 He hypothesised that William de Turevill had 
been a crusader and this charter is an example of a mortgage arrangement between 
Christians. 105  Aside from using the arrangement to circumvent the general law, a 
mortgage with a condition annexed has only a passing similarity to the use. There are 
further examples of credit arrangements that avoid debt terminology altogether by 
taking the form of mutual gifts.106 However, the passing similarities are not sufficient to 
subscribe to a theory about the use as part of the Third Crusade. 
 
Why no use during the Third Crusade? 
 
The Third Crusade strained the fabric of English society, and it might be expected the use 
might have alleviated some of the pressure on individual crusaders. J. H. Round’s analysis 
of the 1189 pipe roll evidence showed the significant financial burden of the Saladin Tithe 
to meet the costs of crusading.107 The Saladin Tithe, however, was not sufficient to fund 
the expedition.108 King Richard’s previous military experience meant he appreciated that 
military campaigns demanded vast sums of money to be successful.109 Therefore, the 
King set out to raise money in any manner he could during his time in England, which 
contemporaries did not comment upon warmly. 110  William of Newburgh put the 
following words into the King’s mouth: ‘I would also sell London if I could find a suitable 
buyer’. 111  Nonetheless, Richard successfully raised the money he needed. Richard de 
Devises reports that the fleet departed in splendour.112 Because of the King’s efforts, 
Tyerman comments, ‘the Anglo‐French expedition which set out two years later came to 
be dominated by the personality, followers, and resources of Richard I, whose superiority 
in men, money, and equipment was acknowledged even by hostile witnesses’. 113  He 
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suggests the Messina decree forbidding crusader serjeants and sailors from changing 
masters without permission was a French response to prevent Richard outbidding Phillip 
for men.114 It is clear that English Crusaders benefitted from this money. 
 
Crusaders on the Third Crusade had more options than their predecessors and could 
draw money from private arrangements, the royal treasury, and the central fund. The 
greater availability of wealth and its redistribution to crusaders allowed them to make 
more prudent legal arrangements than their predecessors. The central fund, consisting 
of assets from dead crusaders, was intended to be a safety-net to benefit the deceased’s 
servants and the poor (Geddington Ordinances, stat. 8).115 This fund was only of marginal 
significance to most crusaders.116 In contrast, the royal treasury introduced in the Third 
Crusade fundamentally changed crusading as the royal apparatus actively sought to ease 
the financial burdens of crusaders.117 Richard, it appears, had raised sufficient money to 
pay his crusaders and cover part of their costs.118 His direct contribution to crusader 
costs may have allowed the King to tarry and pursue other objectives such as the 
conquest of Cyprus without protest, a position unlikely if crusaders did not enjoy direct 
financial support. Furthermore, he had even set money aside to support the wives of 
crusaders in hardship.119 The existence of the royal treasury appears to have mitigated 
the loss of land associated with the crusade movement and, therefore, partly negated the 
function of the use to protect family patrimony. Nonetheless, the alienation of land was 
contrary to social mores about dynastic continuation tied to its ownership, and Tyerman 
suggests its practice is a peculiarity of the crusade movement.120 
 
The evidence suggests crusaders who left with Richard were better off than the 
contingent who left for the Holy Land before the King. Ambroise suggests that knights 
committed themselves to the crusade even if it meant selling off their inheritance.121 This 
passage indicates a significant practice of alienation existed at the expense of family 
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welfare. Alienation appears more frequently in charters made by those who left before 
Richard. For example, in 1188 a Norman knight named Paien du Bosc alienated, with his 
wife’s consent, a vineyard to Bishop Maurice of Paris in perpetuum and received 20 solidis 
except for the 8 denariis tax levied as an additional payment to the ‘holy knights’ or their 
successors.122 Another example is found in the charter made by Reginald of Disesia who 
donated land to the monks of Cluny for the redemption of his soul.123 They would possess 
it free from further sale or donation. The willingness to alienate patrimony would also 
appear to apply to English arrangements. Walter Le Nair gave to the nunnery at Swine 
two bovates of land capable of supporting one knight at Skirlington, previously held by 
his father, for five marks for his journey to Jerusalem.124 In addition to making family 
members vulnerable, alienation in this manner excludes the possibility it could be put 
into use. Those who alienated land likely perceived their actions as an undesirable but 
expedient method of obtaining cash.125 However, not every crusader alienated land in a 
manner that left family vulnerable. The more careful arrangement made by Roger de 
Mowbray, leaving before Richard’s force, gave his friend William de Tickhill, and his heirs, 
all his manors in the town of Askham with an advowson for the Church, and all 
appurtenances in exchange for one mark a year for him and his heirs.126 This did not 
outright divest his family, who retained some of the benefits of the land. Nonetheless, 
there is no evidence to suggest that the use was available to crusaders leaving before the 
main force. 
 
The availability of the royal fund, on the other hand, allowed the crusaders who left with 
Richard to balance the need for funds with the protection of family members. This is 
evident by the increased number of charters recording arrangements between family 
members by those who left with Richard. Mortgages between family members did not 
upset dynastic interests to the same extent as those between strangers while crusaders 
still received the credit necessary for their journey.127 It is also clear family members 
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might be trusted to take care of matters at home. John of Penigeston attested with knights 
and other men that Henry de Wlfei gave a moiety to the canons of St. Oswald for his soul, 
and that when he set out for Jerusalem that ‘I [John] put in my place my brother William, 
who is the custodian of my lands and heirs’ (posui in loco meo Willelmum fratrem meum, 
qui est custos terre et heredis mei).128  Family members also supported each other by 
increasing lands available to the crusader for mortgage. Roger of Peytevin, for example, 
granted all his land in Normanton to his brother Hugo for his homage and service, and for 
journeying to Jerusalem in his place.129 Finally, charters to family members could include 
female family members. This is evident in one charter (1189 – 1190) where Roger, son of 
the knight Richard de Touche, gave to his daughter Matilda (married to Roger de Birkyn) 
and her heirs his manor with appurtenances (free men, bonds, wards, relief, escheats and 
all other warranties) at Over Shitlington on the day that he left with King Richard to 
journey against the Holy Land.130 If Matilda, however, died without heirs the land would 
pass to his sister Agnes and her son and heir Henry de Touche to hold imperpetuum. This 
crusader had no concerns about granting land to women without an intervening male 
landholder, and the feoffment is intended to benefit foremost his daughter or sister rather 
than their male heirs. This early example of a reversion clause, if the charter is authentic, 
is a sound substitution for a use because it allowed the feoffor to benefit a third party if 
the first arrangement failed. The use continues to be absent from crusader arrangements 
during the Third Crusade but the availability of a royal fund appears to have reduced the 
need for it. 
 
Long-term impact of the Crusade Movement on English law 
 
Tyerman summarised his chapter on the Third Crusade with the comment that it would 
have a profound impact on England’s future. 131  This is also true of the law. Legal 
principles devoted to crusading arose in direct response to the Third Crusade. The germs 
of the common law, on matters of crusading, were first formed in Normandy. It is evident 
that both English and Norman jurists in the Angevin Empire began to consider the impact 
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of crusading on the law. A collective policy appears to have driven an effort to clarify the 
impact of royal privileges to crusaders. The Norman Summa de Legibus (c. 1236 - 1250), 
a collection of Norman customary laws that survived the loss of Normandy, boasts the 
first title in law devoted to crusading. De Cruce (Dist. 4, c 24) reads: 
 
1. Those who assume the cross have the privilege to defer actions that concern pleas of their property. 
And once they declare their crusader status, they have one year and a day to respond; but if they 
are captured during or on their pilgrimage, the term is extended to seven years unless they either 
return in the meantime or are proven to be dead.132 
 
2. Proof requires the testimony of two witnesses or several men of faith on the pilgrimage that 
returned and swear they saw him either living or dead, or by testimony, or by the letter patents of 
the diocesan bishop or his official.133 
 
The importance of essoin in the common law, as a contribution to crusade jurisprudence 
by secular authority, is evident by the fact De Cruce does not encompass any other 
principle connected to the movement. This tentative addition to crusade jurisprudence 
suggests a conscious effort to limit intrusions on an area of the canon law and its 
privileges that belonged to the pope, while achieving its object to address an area where 
jurists felt the existing law was deficient. It appears the principle was first expressed in 
Norman law but lost its broad title when transplanted into English law. 
 
A legal statement on crusader essoin appears in England during the reign of King John in 
chapter 52 of Magna Carta 1215.134 The chapter allows the king to have respite ‘to the 
common term of crusaders’ (ad communem terminum crucesignatorum), or to essoin 
himself from pleas concerning unlawful disseisin of land unless it had arisen before his 
taking of the cross.135 This was a poignant inclusion since John took the cross in March, 
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prior to sealing the charter in June, and Innocent later considered the impact the charter 
had on John’s ability to fulfil his vow when he annulled in August of the same year.136 
Richard Helmholz attributes the ‘crusader respite’ to ius commune sources and suggests 
reference to a ‘common term’ in Magna Carta reveals early thirteenth-century 
uncertainty about its actual length.137 The matter being better left silent. However, an 
alternative explanation is the term was sufficiently well-known to mean a year and a day, 
as found in the Norman Summa de Legibus, in addition to the principles related to essoin 
that existed before the Third Crusade.138 Helmholz may have overstated the ius commune 
influence on Magna Carta when discussing the origin of the crusader essoin in English 
law. The ‘common term’ appears to be an explicit adaption of the rule in Glanvill 
concerning essoin de esse in peregrinatione, allowing at least a year and a day for a 
pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and chapter 52 reflects juristic efforts to clarify the type of essoin 
available to crusaders in Angevin policy.  
 
The use is conspicuously absent from early thirteenth-century attempts to conceptualise 
secular principles related to crusading. The weight of the evidence does not support what 
has been supposed: that the use had its origins during the Third Crusade. Neither does it 
appear to have developed as a consequence thereof. Even if a trust-like relationship 
existed in an exceptional charter, it does not support the view that the use existed. The 
Third Crusade is flanked by two great legal treatises and neither of them mentions the 
use. Bracton’s De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae (c. 1230s) indicates that the most 
profound impact that the crusade movement had on the common law was procedural in 
nature.139 As in the Norman Summa de Legibus, the focus continued to be on the subject 
of crusade essoin. Bracton provides  
 
If it is a simple pilgrimage [to the Holy Land], the essoinee will be given the term of a year and day. 
If it is a general passage, the plea ought to be put sine die until the essoinee returns and until, because 
of the privilege of crusaders, certain knowledge is had of his death or return, provided that his 
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departure is not anticipated by the summons, in which case let him appoint an attorney or he will 
remain undefended. (Br. iv, pp. 76 - 77).140 
 
After the Third Crusade, it is evident that English jurists had time to assess the impact 
that crusading had on the common law. Elsewhere Bracton observes that the court must 
re-summon a plea put sine die (not to be heard) because of application of the maxim ‘So 
that the plea then be in the same state in which it was when it remained without day 
because the aforesaid set out to the Holy Land, from which he has returned, as is said’ (Br. 
iv, p. 324).141 He also notes the existence of a privilege that compelled defendants to 
answer pleas immediately if the plaintiff is a crusader (Br. iv, p. 377). Furthermore, he 
even entertains the situation that a crusader’s attorneys die while he is on crusade with 
the result the plea remain sine die until his return (Br. iv, p. 87). 
 
In addition to the crusader essoin, Bracton also provides insight into the costs that 
crusading had on family life. On bastardy, he states that the law does not presume a child 
to be a man’s lawful heir if he has been in the Holy Land for a long time (Br. iv, p. 299). 
This touched at the fear crusaders had about the infidelities of their wives during their 
absence. In another example, Bracton cites the case of Henry Boiqueinte who lost a 
tenement because his father did not make a claim (Br. iv, pp. 354 - 355). Henry argued 
that his father returned from crusade without sane memory and did not know how to 
manage his lands. The case was dismissed since the father had taken the habit and Henry 
could not prove insanity. Nonetheless, the narrative of a crusader returning ‘a different 
person’ must have been a plausible concern for family members. Bracton cites two 
situations applicable to the protection of family and property. The first concerns the 
circumstance where a crusader’s father had died during their journey, and it is also 
unclear whether they are alive or dead. The law states that the chief lord will have seisin 
subject to a condition that they restore the land without plea to the crusader if they are 
living (Br. iii, p. 246). The final relevant principle concerns a wife who was ejected by a 
wrongdoer when her husband had gone on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land (Br. iii, p. 116). 
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This situation is an implicit concern in Maitland’s example. The resolution, however, is to 
allow an exception for the case to continue aided by the judge ex officio because she is a 
victim of fraud. On the use, however, Bracton is silent.  
 
The absence of the use in De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae does not dismiss the 
possibility it could be available in the thirteenth century. This was Maitland’s conclusion 
when he cited several cases in Bracton’s Notebook using the expression ad opus.142 One 
case (1224) seems to strengthen the argument that crusaders employed uses.143 Robert 
placed his patrimonial land into the custody of his younger brother Wydon for the use 
(‘ad opus’) of his sons when he went to the Holy Land. Robert does not appear to have 
enfeoffed Wydon. When news of Robert’s death reached England, Wydon refused the 
heir’s request to convey the land. The report of the case ends with a note that the parties 
had reached an agreement that Wydon will hold for his life (tenendam tota vita sua). The 
uncertainty about whether Robert is a crusader or a pilgrim is unimportant. Robert, as a 
landholder, appears to have arranged Wydon to act as custodian of Robert’s lands during 
his absence. Maitland associated this case and other custodial arrangements with the 
obligation of the feoffee to keep property safe.144 He appears to have construed the fact 
narrowly to suggest that Wydon violated his brother’s trust. However, the facts of the 
case suggest the custodial arrangement never approached the nature of the use. The 
compromise reached by the parties shows a complex family dynamic existed. The parties 
acknowledged, despite the doctrine of primogeniture, that Wydon ought to remain on the 
fee in the form of a life interest or a seisin of land that expired after he died. Wydon’s 
resistance might not reflect a fraudulent intention, but be closer to Robert’s will that his 
younger brother continues to reside on the land with his sons. In this light, the parties’ 
compromise is sensible rather than a validation of Wydon’s wrongdoing. The custodial 
role, as this case illustrates, is akin to an attorney charged with the protection of an 
interest rather than an intermediary charged with a transferring legal ownership in the 
nature of a use. 
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The case above is the only evidence adduced in The History of English Law that links the 
use to the crusade movement. It is illustrative of the fact that both crusaders and pilgrims 
to the Holy Land regularly appointed attorneys and custodians to protect legal interests. 
Maitland cites examples from Bracton’s Notebook as uses, unconnected to crusading, 
which appear to reflect the growing complexity of family arrangements rather than use-
like devices.145 For example, one case (1225) concerned a purchase of land by Richard 
from Godfrey with an underlying agreement that Richard would hold the land for five 
years before giving it in marriage portion to Godfrey’s daughter.146 The purchase aspect 
of this transaction, an exchange of consideration in the form of an obligation, 
distinguishes Godfrey from a feoffee of a use whose role is to merely facilitate the transfer 
of land. It is the presence of a condition rather than the principal transaction that may 
have attracted Maitland’s interests. These conditions allowed parties to tailor legal 
arrangements to fit desired outcomes. The evidence suggests the inspiration for 
Maitland’s crusader example is the following passage from De legibus et consuetudinibus 
Angliae: ‘I grant to A. such land of mine for a certain term, as in the case of crusaders, 
provided that if I return, he restore my land to me, and if I die on the journey or do not 
return, the land will remain to A. in fee’ (Br. ii, p. 73).147 This grant with a condition to 
transfer back to the original landholder is distinguishable from a use to transfer property 
to a named beneficiary, as in Maitland’s example, but it does highlight that the common 




Maitland did not have to mention the Third Crusade for a relationship between it and the 
use to become an accepted truth in legal history. The mere allusion to the greatest English 
crusade was sufficient for many trust lawyers. It is arguable general knowledge about 
Richard I and his involvement bolstered belief in a connection. However, Richard may 
also be the reason the use did not develop during the Third Crusade. In dealing with the 
legal issues associated with crusading, the King was an administrator of justice, ‘a lion of 
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the law’, but not a reformer like his father. William Stubbs once commented that 
‘Richard’s reign is in constitutional matters the supplement of his father’s; the 
administrative progress which may be traced in it is to be credited not to himself but to 
his ministers’.148 Maitland makes clear that neither Richard nor John added much to the 
corpus of English law.149 However, Richard was a busy ruler and his engagement with the 
law reflects the need to find solutions to immediate problems. His use of the law was 
blunt. The summary that Gillingham puts forward reflects Richard’s engagement with the 
law: ‘By the time Richard and Philip eventually rode out of Vezelay together at the start 
of their crusade (July 1190), everything that could have been done had been done’.150 The 
measures canvassed in this chapter suggests Richard was far from being a king devoid of 
legal initiative. Nonetheless, the use is not present in either his general crusade measures 
or the protections he granted to individuals. 
 
For the first time in the crusade movement, the Third Crusade furnishes clear evidence 
that English crusaders made legal arrangements in anticipation of crusading. The law 
continued to expect crusaders to raise money through either loans or alienation of 
property. Unsurprisingly, English crusaders utilised the kinds of legal arrangements 
already familiar to the crusading experience. They also used conditions in mortgages to 
secure the interests of family members. However, the availability of subsidies had a 
meaningful impact on the financial stresses associated with crusading. The crusaders 
who left with Richard had access to the royal funds, which allowed them to make legal 
arrangements that considered the interests of wider family members. On the other hand, 
those who left before the King were more likely to alienate land to fund the full cost of 
their adventure. The use did not appear in the private legal arrangements of crusaders. 
Furthermore, the second treatise flanking the Third Crusade is silent about the use. 
Bracton demonstrates that English jurists reflected on the crusades impact on the 
developing common law. His treatise included a detailed treatment of the crusader 
essoin, which appears to be a legal principle refined after the Third Crusade. Nonetheless, 
the practice of crusaders to appoint attorneys and custodians over land appears to be the 
closest English law came to a theory of the use in response to the crusade movement.
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Chapter 6. Use-Like Devices in Cases before the Jewish 
Exchequer between 1198 and 1290  
 
It is possible to draw a very tenuous connection between the use and the Third Crusade. 
Earlier chapters showed that crusaders used credit arrangements as a primary method 
of protecting their interests. Nothing akin to the use arose as part of the law created as 
part of the crusade movement during the twelfth century. However, the burgeoning 
sophistication of twelfth-century legal thinking coupled with the budding common law 
produced a unique jurisprudence of real property in thirteenth-century England. This 
chapter explores whether the use arose as an indirect consequence of the Third Crusade 
rather than a direct result of crusader usage. Richard created a unique legal system in 
1194 that eventually formed the Exchequer of the Jews (Jewish Exchequer). This unique 
branch of the Exchequer lasted less than a century (1198 – 1290) and has a definitive 
end: the expulsion of the Jews from England. However, legal historians have not scoured 
the records of the Jewish Exchequer for evidence of the use or use-like arrangements. 
There are several opportunities for its development in this court. The century-long 
interaction between the fledgling common law system and the then ancient practices of 
Jewish law may offer unique insight into the origin of the use. Furthermore, the records 
of the Jewish Exchequer show this interaction inspired novel dealings in land. It is 
worthwhile, therefore, to examine the evidence in this previously overlooked court to 
determine whether the origin of the use rests in the shared experiences of the English 
Jewish community and the common law. 
 
Historiography: The influence of the Jewish facet of the Common 
Law 
 
The argument that the use could have arisen from Jewish influences on the common law 
is novel. However, the search for such influences is difficult because contemporary 
commentators never explicitly state the Jewish origins of legal principles. Even if such 
ties were recognisable, the prejudice that isolated the Jewish communities from the 
societal fabric of England would have made their articulation undesirable and 
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unpopular. 1  It is unsurprising that whatever interest legal commentators had in the 
‘customs of the Jewry’ disappeared after the expulsion. It did not re-emerge until the 
resettlement of the Jews in England during the mid-seventeenth century, which 
prompted numerous treatises on the subject of their legal status with reference to earlier 
commentaries.2 Pollock and Maitland addressed the subject as follows: 
 
Whether the sojourn of the Jews in England left any permanent marks upon the body of our law is a 
question that we dare not debate, though we may raise it. We can hardly suppose that from the Lex 
ludaica, the Hebrew law which the Jews administered among themselves, anything passed into the 
code of the contemptuous Christian. But that the international Lex ludaismi perished in 1290 without 
leaving any memorial of itself is by no means so certain.3 
 
Despite their cautious approach, the authors identified a few possible areas of influence 
that other academics have explored further to point to a Jewish impact on the common 
law. The thrust of their scholarship has been to prove that England’s Jewish lenders 
influenced commercial law in England.4 
 
A few important works have shed light on the impact the Jews left on the common law. A 
wealth of records means that the Jewish communities of England are the best 
documented in the thirteenth century.5 The printing of primary materials by the Selden 
Society of the Select Pleas, Starrs, etc., Of the Jewish Exchequer, 1220 – 1284, edited by J. M. 
Rigg, and Rigg’s Calendar of the Plea Rolls of the Exchequer of the Jews have assisted 
academics to understand the importance of the hundred-year interaction. Joseph Jacobs, 
The Jews of Angevin England (1893) provides an overview of primary source material that 
relates to England’s Jewish history. Modern studies also owe a debt to the seminal 
achievement of Thomas Madox’s History of the Exchequer (1711) and his research on the 
Jewish Exchequer. Historians have since made significant inroads to show how the Jewish 
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community shaped the law of debt. The prominent Anglo-American legal historian, 
Harold D. Hazeltine, outlined the impact of the Jewish influence on the rapid growth of 
gages on land as a popular device to secure loans during the thirteenth century.6 Shael 
Herman also raises novel ideas that are replete with significant observations about debt 
law.7 Finally, Robin Mundill provides a broader overview of the Jewish community from 
which to contextualise the operation of Jewry law in the thirteenth century.8 Historians 
have an appreciable understanding of the impact of Jewish law on the budding common 
law system because of the efforts of the above mentioned and several other 
commentators in this field.9 This chapter builds on the existing scholarship and argues 
the legal arrangements related to debt law had far-reaching implications for the eventual 
development of uses. 
 
Herman sensibly made clear that research seeking to demonstrate a Jewish connection 
to English law must distinguish between the proper observance of halakhic principles 
and Jewry law, the latter consisting of regulations that a non-Jewish political body applied 
to Jews.10 On the subject of thirteenth-century debt law, he observed: ‘Jewish financial 
practices and customs in England, as elsewhere in Europe, might be only tenuously 
connected to Jewish law, and the term ‘Jewish law’ itself was ambiguous’.11 It is also 
necessary, therefore, for this thesis to make a clear demarcation between the two 
systems. Jewish law (halakha) itself has parallels with Roman law as a complete legal 
system, which is immutable in character but with a long history of interpretation.12 The 
religiosity associated with Jewish law means its study has been traditionally confined to 
rabbinical learning, although the mid-twentieth century manifested renewed secular 
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interest.13 The three fundamental sources of Jewish law available during the thirteenth 
century include the commandments found in the Torah, the Talmud or interpretations of 
the Torah made between the first and sixth centuries, and the responsa or the responses 
of rabbis who interpreted the law. 14  Robin Mundill in England’s Jewish Solution: 
Experiment and Expulsion (1998) notes the Torah circulated widely with little opposition, 
and the papacy ignored responsa despite its disapproval of the Talmudic books.15 The 
persistent problem, similar to that faced by civilians, is that ‘classical and medieval 
rabbinic Judaism must constantly balance the need to remain loyal to the Torah and its 
commandments, with the need to make adaptations and changes that serve the interests 
of the Jewish people and its survival’.16 Nevertheless, the creation of the halakhic codex 
Mishneh Torah (1170 – 1180) by Maimonides, Saladin’s vizier, as a forward-looking code, 
provides valuable insight into the needs of Jewish populations during the thirteenth 
century.17 It is likely the use or similar arrangement would be found within its pages if a 
connection with halakha existed in the thirteenth century.  
 
Elements of the use are more likely to emerge from the English experience with Jewry 
law than through a reception of halakhic principles. Herman indicated that Jewry law 
could either overlap with halakha or be irreconcilable with its principles. 18  R. A. 
Routledge’s collection of thirteenth-century enactments demonstrate the operation of 
Jewry law in England. 19  Jewish communities in England were autonomous in nature, 
capable of regulating their own composition and affairs under the supervision of the 
sheriff, which means the Jewish experience with Jewry law could also be a source for the 
use.20 Furthermore, the prominent place of Jewry law in thirteenth-century law arose out 
of an immediate connection to the Third Crusade. Richard issued a charter of liberties21 
(1190), reiterated by King John in 1201, which granted certain liberties and confirmed 
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Jewish lands, fiefs, pledges, gifts, and purchases made during his father’s reign (cap. i). It 
issued commands regulating disputes between Christians and Jews (cap. ii). It even 
allowed Jews to take oaths on the Torah (cap. iv). The charter presents a telling 
preoccupation with the preservation of Jewish debts and contained chapters: permitting 
succession to debts (cap. iii), selling pledges after holding them for a year and a day (cap. 
v), and enabling heirs in minority to succeed to Jewish debts (cap. vi). Richard issued this 
charter in response to widespread Jewish massacres both on the eve of and during his 
crusade, and it makes clear his command that Jews have a status akin to royal chattels 
(cap. viii). This charter foreshadows the creation of the Jewish Exchequer. 
 
The Crusade influence on the Jewish Exchequer 
 
The Jewish Exchequer and the circumstances of its creation may tenuously link the use 
to the crusade movement. Richard addressed matters pertaining to the status of the Jews 
in England after his release from captivity and settlement of affairs with Phillip.22 The 
Form of Proceeding on the Judicial Visitation (1194) makes clear that those who slew the 
Jews had effectively deprived the king of his revenue. 23  He then set in motion the 
mechanism that would allow the customs of the Jews to impact upon the budding 
common law system. The framework for the Jewish Exchequer rests in the Ordinance of 
the Jews (1194), as recorded by Roger of Howden, which offers a clear picture of the 
registration system instituted to monitor Jewish assets alongside a particular concern 
with their securities and landholding.24 The Ordinance compelled the Jews to take an oath 
and swear the roll contained an accurate record of all their debts, pledges, rents, and 
possessions. Roger states that the Ordinance ordered Jews to make all their contracts in 
‘six or seven places’ before two Christians and two Jews learned in the law, and two 
notaries and clerks. Further, the contracts were kept in chests with three locks and keys 
held by the abovementioned legal experts and clerks. This followed the standard notarial 
practice of chirography, which meant the creditor, lender, and clerk each held a copy of a 
contract.25 The use of chests or archae, however, is a known Jewish method of record 
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keeping that Herman indicates was already nine centuries old.26 He even suggests the 
English regulation of Jewish life in this manner had origins in the Roman law fiscus 
iudaicus.27 It is evident that Richard made effective use of both Jewish legal expertise and 
practice to facilitate the lending activities of his Jews.28  
 
The eventual creation of a Jewish Exchequer in 1198 as a royal apparatus to ensure 
efficient dispute resolution in conjunction with royal control over Jewish contracts is an 
unsurprising development during a century that historians characterise as possessing a 
complex administrative culture.29 Madox introduces the purpose behind the creation of 
the Jewish Exchequer in terms disparaging of royal authority: 
 
The King seemed to be absolute Lord of their Estates and Effects, and of the Persons of them, their 
Wives and Children. Tis true, he let them enjoy their Trade and Acquests: but they seemed to trade 
and acquire for his Profit as well as their own … as they fleeced the Subjects of the Realm, so the King 
fleeced them.30 
 
The judicial function of the Exchequer, therefore, represented the king’s interests to 
follow proceedings that concerned debts owed to his Jews.31 If a Jewish creditor failed to 
record their debt in an official archa, not allowing it to be followed, they forfeited it to the 
king in addition to being fined.32 Nonetheless, it was in the interests of both the Jewish 
creditor and the king to register the debt to ensure its collection without having to prove 
the amount owed in court.33 If an issue arose, the office of justiciarii Iudaeorum, occupied 
by Christians and Jews learned in the law, adjudicated matters pertaining to debt as 
officers of the Exchequer.34 Furthermore, it had broad jurisdiction to regulate Jewish 
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communities, royal interests in the Jews, and all other major litigation between Jews and 
Christians.35 
 
Christopher Tyerman concluded on the Third Crusade’s impact on English society that it 
produced no administrative innovation or novel techniques of government.36 However, 
historians have long connected the crusade movement with the creation of the Jewish 
Exchequer. The third edition of Charles Molly’s De Jure Maritimo et Navali: or, A Treatise 
of Affairs Maritime and of Commerce (1682) suggests the Jewish Exchequer emerged as a 
consequence of the Third Crusade as a prudent alternative for the cash-strapped Richard 
than simply seizing their monies and estates as his father had done.37 It must be noted 
that the Jews appear to have had legal privileges and some ability to regulate themselves 
prior to Richard’s reign.38 Earlier crusaders had made extensive use of Jewish creditors, 
which included arrangements that secured loans against property.39 There may have also 
been precedent for the archae system during this period.40  Richard’s Jewish reforms 
intended to address the problem of anti-Semitic violence that for both religious and 
financial reasons seemed to be at its most pronounced at the outset of a crusade.41 The 
issue of crusaders killing Jews and seizing their property as part of their crusade 
preparations dates back to the First Crusade.42 It is evident the crusade’s fundamental 
message to defend Christendom against heretics had the unintentional effect of fostering 
prejudice towards the Jewish people.43 Richard’s reforms in 1194 further consolidated 
his control over the Jews as his chattels, which he also sought to impose before his 
departure. Both elements suggest that the impetus for reform was internal.  
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Richard’s absence from England suggests that external legal influences may have shaped 
the Jewish Exchequer and its laws. However, it is unlikely that Richard’s time in Sicily 
influenced its creation. Jewish populations in Sicily, with roots in Byzantine and Islamic 
rule, had a different experience from the experiences of Northern European 
communities.44 In England, their immigration and continued existence were connected 
to the Norman rulers who directed their activities towards moneylending.45 The notion 
of ‘the king’s Jews’, therefore, came to carry weight. In Sicily, the Norman conquerors had 
found a large Jewish community with diverse occupations, with a strong reputation for 
medicine rather than moneylending, and did not materially disrupt their pattern of 
existence.46 However, very few sources provide insight into the operation of Jewry law in 
the Norman Kingdom. 47  Norman rulers continued the Moslem practice of collecting 
tallages or gisia from the Jews, which recognised their status as protected peoples within 
the kingdom.48 The incoming Hohenstaufen, after Norman rule in 1194, appear to have 
maintained the Jewish presence predominantly as intellectuals. 49  Furthermore, the 
experience of Jews as money lenders differed significantly from the English situation. 
Shlomo Simonsohn, who extensively canvassed records in his eighteen-volume The Jews 
in Sicily, concluded: ‘no moneylending by Jews is known to have occurred in Sicily during 
the Norman and Hohenstaufen eras’.50 There is evidence to suggest such activity did exist. 
The Constitutions of Melfi (1231), for example, purport to ban usury but make an 
exception for the Jews.51 It reasoned no one can accuse Jews of usury since divine law 
does not prohibit them from collecting debt, and nor are they subject to papal legislation. 
However, Simonsohn suggests the constitution merely represented a creative 
interpretation of the usury canons of the Fourth Lateran Council rather than law 
representative of the situation in Sicily.52 Even if the practice existed in Sicily, therefore, 
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there appears little to merit the development of an apparatus like the Jewish Exchequer 
based on Richard’s Sicilian experience.  
 
Richard’s captivity (Dec. 1192 – 4 Feb. 1194) meant he was more idle in the Empire than 
the time he spent in Sicily while on crusade. 53  The sources, predominantly English, 
provide some insight into the political consequences of Richard’s long period of idleness 
but little detail about his experiences.54 John Gillingham further suggests that the silence 
of German chroniclers reflects both dissatisfaction at Emperor Henry VI’s treatment of 
Richard, and their embarrassment about the misfortunes of the German crusade 
experience.55 Richard’s experience as a prisoner varied from treatment ‘with appropriate 
honours’ to being bound in chains and mistreated at Trifels during the Easter of 1193.56 
The second book of the Scottish Chronicle of Melrose Abbey indicates the Emperor treated 
Richard with respect but its author, sympathetic to the affairs in England, laments the 
misfortune of Richard’s plight from one day being king to another a captive.57 William of 
Newburgh, a source critical of Richard’s treatment, indicates Richard received better 
treatment after he agreed to his ransom in June 1193.58 The suggestion he suffered some 
mistreatment is consistent with the humiliation he endured when he swore homage to 
the Emperor, an event incurring the silent indignation of English commentators. 59 
Nonetheless, there is no evidence to suggest that his time in captivity influenced the 
eventual creation of the Jewish Exchequer. 
 
Later developments in the Empire suggests the Jewish Exchequer was a novel English 
innovation. Robert Chazan indicates a charter issued by Duke Frederick of Austria to the 
Jews in his duchy (1 July 1244) is the earliest legal statement of Jewish moneylending in 
the Empire. 60  Included are chapters outlining ducal protection over the person and 
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movement of Jews, associated fines, and issues related to jurisdiction. The provisions 
related to judicial proceedings and debt, however, contained elements analogous of the 
situation of English Jews. Chapter 28 reads, ‘If a Christian takes his pledge away from a 
Jew by force or exercises violence in the Jew’s home, he shall be severely punished as a 
plunderer of our treasury’. The implication is that the Jews in Austria are the ‘Duke’s 
Jews’. There are several other similarities to Richard’s charter granting liberties to the 
Jews (1190). 61  For example, both charters state that if an action arises between a 
Christian and a Jew, it must have both a Christian and a Jewish witness to proceed. Both 
also have provisions that allow a Jewish creditor to sell pledges if they certify holding it 
for a year and a day. However, Chazan notes that Austria did not introduce a system of 
managing Jewish debts that approached the sophistication of the English Jewish 
Exchequer.62 The laws are further distinguishable. The scheme of the Austrian charter 
only concerns movable property, or things capable of being taken into possession, 
destroyed, or intermingled with the Jews’ own chattels (cap. 6 – cap. 7). The explicit 
mention of bloody and wet clothes further indicates that the Jews could accept all things 
as pledges that did not extend to land (as immovable property). The charter raises 
questions about the dissemination of Jewry law in Austria and a shared experience with 
England. Nevertheless, the Jewry law in the Empire does not appear to have influenced 
the creation of the Jewish Exchequer even if a shared experience is discernible. Evidence 
found in the court Jewish that might suggest the existence of the use or other trust-like 
devices is unique to the English experience. 
 
The creation of the Jewish Exchequer appears to be an English innovation independent 
of Richard’s experiences on the continent. The novelty of the system reflects the 
intersection between Jewry custom in England and the growing complexity of the 
common law. Coupled with the apparent English penchant for bureaucracy, Chazan 
expressed no surprise that an analogy is absent in French records.63 He notes the value 
of the court: ‘If we today possessed nothing more than the plea rolls of the Exchequer of 
the Jews, English Jewry would be far and away the best-documented Jewish community 
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in thirteenth-century Latin Christendom. In fact, there is much more.’64 The evidence 
suggests that the impetus behind the birth of the Jewish Exchequer lies in the inquisition 
into, and consolidation, of the King’s assets after his return to England in September 
1194.65  This connects it, tenuously, to the Third Crusade. Madox suggested previous 
administrative experience with Jewish debts on land, including the subordinate 
exchequer or receipt Scaccarium Aronis (1186 - 1201) set up to manage the debt owed to 
Aaron of Lincoln, provided the model for the creation of the Jewish Exchequer.66 Alice 
Carver Cramer emphasises, however, that the connection between the two is 
presumptive, despite noting its officials would have been aware of its administrative 
processes for managing debts.67 Regardless, the Jewish Exchequer was established as a 
permanent court rather than a temporary receipt. The volume of cases demonstrates its 
importance in the thirteenth century. Its focus on debt law also means the court was at 
the forefront of developments in the common law related to complex arrangements. This 
makes it a candidate to develop or illustrate the existence of principles of law that may 
have shaped the growth of uses during the thirteenth century. 
 
Halakha as the Law of England 
 
The full extent of the influence of Jewish law on English legal history remains unclear and 
the law cognisant in that court adds to the myriad of jurisdictions historians must 
contend with. It is also necessary to explore the reception of halakha into the corpus of 
English law. England’s Jews followed the commands of their religion that obliged them to 
study the Torah, and to honour those who studied it.68 A Jewish Code of Education (early 
thirteenth century) reveals the importance of studying scripture, hagiography, the 
Talmud, and other halakhic sources in England’s Jewish communities (cap. 8).69 Jacobs 
suggests that a reference to French Jews in the seventh chapter indicates it is likely the 
code is of English origin. 70  Jewish families were instructed to send a son to the 
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schoolhouse to study law, alongside Aramaic and Hebrew, for a period of seven years 
(cap. 1 – 3). Schoolhouses played a prominent role in all Jewish communities. 71 
Communities paid for the upkeep of the school, its teachers72, and the students (cap. 13 – 
14). Jacobs concludes, whatever its origins, the frequent use of Hebrew evident in English 
legal sources strongly indicates that the Jewry utilised the scheme of education stated in 
the Code. 73  Chazan notes Jewish leaders often used their legal education to benefit 
Christian rulers despite the dominant role of halakha being the regulation of domestic 
and religious life. 74  The value assigned to legal education suggests that prominent 
moneylenders, as well as the Rabbis who heard their debt pleas, had a sophisticated grasp 
of halakhic principles at their fingertips. The common place of Jewish women in English 
credit arrangements also suggests the community encouraged daughters of prominent 
families to receive an education in halakha, although the law did not command it.75  
 
The Mishneh Torah exerted an authoritative influence on the development of Jewish law 
in England throughout the thirteenth century. Rabbi Moses of London included reference 
to Maimonides’ teachings in his discussion of Passover services (prior to 1200), which 
suggests the code had penetrated England late in the twelfth century.76 The fact the code 
had almost uncontested authority in Jewish communities throughout Europe also means 
it is a useful starting point for a comparative analysis of Jewry law in England.77 Similar 
to the civil law, however, the Mishneh Torah would only be a persuasive expression of the 
customs of the Jewry. The Exchequer would not permit halakha to conflict with the 
common law.78 Nonetheless, the Mishneh Torah contains legal principles that include a 
private law trust-like institution found in the book of Nashim or laws pertaining to 
women. The situation has parallels with the doctrine of coverture that placed a wife and 
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her property under the control of her husband. 79  Husbands of Jewish women had 
privileged rights to a) the fruits of her labour b) ownerless objects she discovers c) benefit 
from the profits of her property during her lifetime d) a right to inherit her property that 
supersedes all other interests.80 However, the inclusion of a formal marriage contract 
(ketubah), one of the three positive commandments, is a feature of Jewish marriage law 
that allowed wives to avoid some of the burdens of marriage. 81 Ishut 11:6 permits a 
woman to make stipulations to protect property in contract, either binding immediately 
or requiring formalisation, if made after nisu'in (final stages of marriage), 82  which 
removes her husband’s legal privilege to her property except for his right of inheritance.83 
This allowed Jewish women greater economic and legal independence to enforce 
propriety rights than English women in coverture.84 
 
Jewish law introduced a trust-like device to circumvent the limitation expressed in Ishut 
11:6 that a woman could not stipulate against her husband’s privilege to inherit her 
property. Maimonides’s reflection on Talmudic literature led him to include the principle 
in Ishut 21:9, which reads: 
 
When a woman signs over all of her property to another person - regardless of whether or not that 
person is a relative - before she marries, even when there is a provision that if she is divorced or if 
she becomes a widow, this present is nullified … her husband is not entitled to benefit from the 
income of this property. And if she dies in his lifetime, he does not inherit it. [The rationale is] that 
she gave this property away before she married. When she dies during her husband’s lifetime, the 
recipient of the present acquires full title to it. 
 
Maimonides even states in Zechiyah uMattanah, in Sefer Kinyan on acquisitions, that a 
wife was ‘merely attempting to circumvent the laws of inheritance. She assigned her 
property to the other person solely so that her husband would not inherit it. Implicit in 
the agreement was that if she needed it at any time, it would be returned to her’ (6:12). 
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Alina Semo Kofsky termed the arrangement above as ‘shetar pisis’ and notes it is a 
controversial inclusion in the Mishneh Torah because common Talmudist opinion 
recognised it to be fraudulent in nature since women often kept such arrangements secret 
from their husbands. 85  The author illustrates juristic reluctance to recognise the 
instrument by quoting Mar Samuel of Nehardea (169 – 257 AD), who stated: ‘I formally 
expound and teach that if a shetar pisis were presented me, I would tear it up and destroy 
it’.86 Rabbinical opposition to this trust-like device reduces the likelihood that the English 
Jewry incorporated the principle into their customs. 
 
Kofsky likened the shetar pisis to a trust throughout her article by describing the third 
party as holding legal title for a wife as a trustee, and defined it as a species of trust.87 
However, even if the English Jewry formally recognised shetar pisis in their communities, 
this element of Jewish family law did not inspire trust-like devices to circumvent 
coverture. The first case brought by a feme covert to assert a claim to separate property 
held in trust occurred in the sixteenth century.88 Nonetheless, its approximation to the 
use is tantalising close. The shetar pisis is better regarded as possessing characteristics 
of a gift with condition in the traditional sense: as a delivery of property from a donor to 
a donee. The arrangement agrees with the principle in Zechiyah uMattanah, 3:9 that: 
‘Whenever a person gives a gift on the condition that it be returned, the gift is valid’. 
Maimonides viewed the arrangement as a species of gift, which he made clear by referring 
to it as a gift and by treating it under acquisitions. He also includes circumstances that 
outline when the gift is perfected: If the wife consents to a transfer of ownership or she 
dies while the donee is in possession (Ishut, 21:9; Zechiyah uMattanah, 6:12). The 
absence of a third-party interest, other than the donor or donee, further distinguishes it 
from a use-like structure. It appears one reason why the gift perfects on death without 
the mention of other parties is because Jewish law favours direct transmission of 
property between a donor and donee inter vivos, and consequently, did not develop 
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testamentary rules that emphasised the legal title of third-party beneficiaries. 89  The 
association Kofsky made between the trust and shetar pisis is prima facie unusual 
because halakha appears to know nothing approaching the trust concept and modern 
Jewish cases prefer to treat like arrangements under the head of contract.90 The shetar 
pisis is not found in the records of the Jewish Exchequer, nor did the common law exercise 
jurisdiction over Jewish family law, but it is evident that other aspects of Jewry law and 
halakhic principles could shape future development of the use. 
 
Early Evidence (1200 – 1250) 
 
The association made between the use and the legal practices of the Jewish Exchequer 
connect it to developments in debt law during the thirteenth century. The Jewish 
community was uniquely poised to influence this area of law because the king restricted 
their principal source of wealth to money lending rather than landholding.91 It was an 
uneasy arrangement, as Judith Shapiro notes, ‘at no time during their two-century 
presence in England were the Jews perceived as more than a necessary evil: a source of 
capital. The Jews, welcomed as moneylenders, were despised as creditors’.92 The Jewish 
community appeared to be aware of their dilemma. A discussion about usury (1204) 
reveals that English Jews took pains to justify the practice of usury despite reproach from 
European communities that argued the prohibitions against it in Deut. 23. 20 also applied 
to their Christian brothers. 93  Regardless, the king extended his protection to the 
community as a whole because their money lending was a significant source of wealth.94 
The unique confluence of a Jewish monopoly over usury coupled with the comparatively 
incomplete debt jurisprudence in English law led to the dissemination of principles of the 
former into the latter. 95  It incorporated a form of debt contract called the shetar, 
commonly referred to in records as a starr, which allowed a Jewish lender to seek relief 
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for the amount owed in both money and other property. 96  The flexibility of this 
arrangement, called the Jewish gage, may have become the foundation of the modern 
mortgage arrangement. 97  Jewish debt law, however, also introduced ingredients in 
English law with implications for the later development of uses. 
 
From an early period, the complexity of debt law created an environment conducive to 
the development of the use as a tool to protect interests beyond those of the owner of the 
property or their heirs. The Liberate Rolls (1204) record that Benedict, a Jew of Norwich, 
let the land he held in pledge from Jocelin de Lodnes to Walter de Ravingham.98 However, 
King John ordered Benedict, under the supervision of the Warden of the Jews, to deliver 
the land to Thomas de Camera to hold until Jocelin’s heirs were freed of their debt. The 
King’s reasons are not apparent and the editor notes this is one of the few charters John 
directed to a Jew.99 It illustrates the situation where Jocelin’s heirs, as ultimate owners, 
could enforce a writ of novel disseisin against Thomas if he refused to accept their 
interest as owners of the land after the satisfaction of the debt. The circumstances of their 
enforcement, however, does not derive from a beneficial interest. Instead, the intention 
behind the transaction is to benefit the third parties, Benedict and Thomas, not Jocelin 
nor his heirs whose land is encumbered with the gage. This transaction does not 
approach the use at this early date but illustrates that the law juggled multiple interests, 
and accepted parties who are not the ultimate owner could have an enforceable interest 
against land.  
 
The presence of competing interests on land from creditors, debtors, heirs, and other 
parties often leads to attempts to circumvent the law through trust-like instruments. In 
the early twelfth century, however, the evidence indicates that the most common method 
to defeat the interests of creditors is to simply grant the land to another party. The grant 
of pledged land to the Church in frankalmoign appears to be frequently used by debtors 
in their attempts to defeat their creditor’s interests, which resulted in judicial inquiries 
about priority of interests. A case brought by the Abbot of Girewaus (1218) asked 
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whether land belonging to Wigan de Hereford was put in frankalmoign to his monastery 
before being given in gage to a Jew.100 A rule appears to have emerged, as discussed in a 
case (1220) brought by Isaac of Norwich against the Prior of Royston, which held a grant 
in frankalmoign could not free land of its existing charges.101 This rule appears to have 
general applicability. Isaac of Norwich defended a suit in 1220 brought by a widow 
named Mathilda to recover dower property by claiming he had received the pledge prior 
to her engagement and it had been enrolled in the Jewish Exchequer.102 The evidence 
further suggests the rule developed to dissuade third parties from being complicit to such 
arrangements. Nevertheless, its effect could be harsh on bona fide grantees. The complex 
case (1220) brought by Dionisia de Bereford against the abbot of Bordele to enforce a 
writ of novel disseisin, concerned allegations her brother had disseised her of property 
and later granted it in frankalmoign to the monastery at Bordele before his death.103 The 
justices held the grant to be illegal and queried what damages the monks ought to pay for 
their trespass against her estate. These cases illustrate the growing sophistication of the 
law to look beyond possession. 
 
The absence of uses during this early period is highlighted in one case (1218) brought by 
a creditor named Chera, a Jewess, against Helto Fauciliun for 80 marks. 104  Fauciliun 
argued the land he inherited could not be subject to the gage because his father had 
received it by gift (not in the donative sense, but referring to a feoffment) from his 
grandfather with the condition ‘not to grant, sell, or give it in gage’. Fauciliun wished to 
avoid the gage with an argument that his father was not entitled to pledge the land 
contrary to the condition. His argument, however, does not suggest he had an interest 
approaching beneficial ownership despite the implication that he should have inherited 
it unfettered. The court does not discuss the effect of the gift on the gage or whether 
Fauciliun could enforce its condition against Chera because the chirograph allowed him 
to satisfy the debt from other lands. Nonetheless, this case illustrates by implication that 
grandparents may occasionally wish to benefit descendants and make provision to do so. 
This may appear to be a use. However, the grant imposed restrictive conditions on the 
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father rather than an active duty to transfer the land to the grandson as the ultimate legal 
owner. Fauciliun’s father was the intended beneficiary of the land and it descended to 
Fauciliun through the operation of law. If the use had been available, the argument would 
have been framed as a grant to the father with the positive condition he grant it to the 
younger Fauciliun. The father’s possession to be transitory rather than intergenerational. 
Furthermore, a later mandate (1220) where the King took all lands held by Fauciliun into 
his hands to satisfy the debts owed to Chera indicates his argument failed.105 These early 
gifts with conditions, however, approach the nature of a use by considering the benefit of 
parties’ other than the feoffee.  
 
Early judgments also addressed issues of grants intended to defeat creditors’ interests 
with reference to the priority of legal rights. In one case (1244), Hugh, son of Hugh, 
alleged that Belia of Hungerford and her son-in-law Vivant caused him to be unlawfully 
distrained for a debt with the result of his lands being taken into the hands of the king.106 
The Jewish creditors denied the existence of a writ of distraint but admitted receiving 
payment for a debt from Hugh’s father. They produced a charter that Hugh, the father, 
gave land in gage for 18 marks with the stipulation that the younger Hugh is unable to 
contravene the gage by any gift. However, Hugh argued that he is not bound to answer 
the debt because he was enfeoffed in the land before it had been given in gage. Again, the 
argument turned on the issue of priority with the implication that Hugh’s father had no 
right to pledge the land. The evidence also illustrates that the justices of the Jews were 
sympathetic to the loss a third party suffered when discovering a Jewish gage had 
priority. The case (1244) of Elias against Geoffrey, abbot of Wardon suggests that debtors 
ought to warrant the next purchasers about hidden encumbrances.107 The cases available 
to us, however, suggest that no use-like arrangements ever came before the Jewish 
Exchequer during the first half of the century. Instead, feoffors used restrictive conditions 
to control the devolution of land.  
 
There is a passage in De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae that suggests the common law 
would have been reluctant to enforce a use even if it took the form of conditional 
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feoffment. Further, it is evidence to suggest the controversial shetar pisis, if ever 
practised in England, would not have been received into usage outside of the Jewish 
community. Bracton contemplates the scenario where a husband makes a gift to a 
stranger on the condition that he transfer it to the wife during the husband’s lifetime or 
after death. Such gifts, Bracton says, are invalid as they are an attempt to circumvent the 
rule that no gift is to pass between husband and wife. (Br. ii, p. 54). He reasons that such 
gifts are a fraud and even the act of giving it to a third party should be treated as if the gift 
was made directly. However, there is an arrangement that looks like a use on its face: 
 
The contrary, however, was held, erroneously and by mistake of the court, and, so to speak, by 
counsel of the court, [in the case] of Godfrey of Crowecombe, who gave land to Robert of Mucegros 
so that after the death of Godfrey the same Robert might give it to Godfrey's wife (Br. ii, p. 98). 
 
Bracton is at pains to emphasise its enforcement is anomalous and he does not record the 
case in his notebook. His opposition suggests the utility of the use had not penetrated the 
legal conscience. Furthermore, that the law should prohibit any arrangement that tried 
to circumvent the law. On the other hand, the case suggests that the courts occasionally 
enforced use-like arrangements. 
 
The exceptional nature of the above-mentioned case does not, by itself, support an 
argument that people made uses. This singular instance of enforcement of a use-like 
arrangement appears to be an anomaly, and there is no evidence of a sustained practice 
of this kind in the early twelfth century. Such a development would have had to overcome 
the weight of Bracton’s authority. Instead, this case is demonstrative of the growing 
expectation that the law ought to accommodate the wishes of those who held land.108 It 
does not appear coincidental that the demand for greater flexibility followed the decline 
in the number of landholders who became knights and an increase in the number who 
became lawyers instead.109 The case mentioned in Bracton appears to be a successful 
attempt to circumvent the operation of law. Joseph Biancalana notes grants designed to 
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control succession had become more common by the 1220s.110 The growing power to 
control the fortunes of land was an important step towards the eventual development of 
the use. Maitland commented that: ‘But that men were within an ace of obtaining such a 
power [to control succession] in the middle of the thirteenth century is memorable; it will 
help to explain those devisable 'uses' which appear in the next century’. 111  The 
interpretation of multi-party interest in the Jewish Exchequer meant that the court heard 
a greater frequency of cases with devices describable as use-like in nature. 
 
Elements associated with uses found in the Jewish Exchequer 
 
The evidence suggests that legal institutions reminiscent of the use were confined to the 
latter part of the thirteenth century. There are three arrangements present within the 
case law that signal certain practices in the Jewish Exchequer could have contributed to 
the future development of uses. The practice of safekeeping property by third parties, use 
of fictional attorneys, and the transfer of property to other parties to circumvent the law 
all have qualities associated with trust-like instruments. The records suggest that these 
arrangements were the innovation of Jewish creditors rather than debtors seeking to 
avoid debts. Several factors may influence the weight of the evidence. First, the plea rolls 
for the Jewish Exchequer become more abundant after 1244.112 Second, parties often 
create trust-like devices in secret arrangements, which makes their function and the 
intention of the parties difficult to discern. For example, Jacobs cites an example from the 
Pipe Rolls (1202 – 1204) that states ‘Muriel the Jewess owes £100 that she may have for 
her husband Isaac, the Jew of Oxford, as has been spoken between them’. 113  Jacobs 
comments that ‘what is spoken between them’ suggests their marriage was a business 
partnership and this arrangement was an assignment of debt, which required the king to 
be compensated.114 It is plausible, as the editor suggests, that the grant was designed to 
avoid paying the king. A trust-like device could have been utilised in the above scenario 
but there is no evidence to support its existence. It is imprudent to argue for the existence 
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of a legal instrument beyond what the evidence can tell us, but the matters heard by the 




There is an irresistible temptation to conclude the records of the Jewish Exchequer show 
a direct transmission of halakhic principles into England when discussing the laws 
related to the safekeeping of chattels. She'elah uFikkadon, in the book of Sefer Mishpatim, 
outlines numerous principles analogous to safekeeping in England. It is a significant 
inclusion because the rule in She'elah uFikkadon 5:1 recognises that the grantor could 
designate entrusted money to be given to the poor or the redemption of captives, and 
those groups could claim against the custodian. The potential to associate this rule with 
the use is clear. It is reminiscent of longstanding Roman law rules that allowed a person 
to designate money for the release of captives by fideicommissa.115 The Roman charitable 
principle was later expressed in the sixteententh-century Reformatio Legum 
Ecclesiasticarum (1552) (Canon 27.9) and later repeated in the preamble of the Statute 
of Charitable Uses 1601 (43 Eliz 1., c 4).116  The latter remains the starting point for 
modern charitable trusts. 117  The records of the Jewish Exchequer, however, bear no 
evidence that suggests English law adopted the rule in She'elah uFikkadon 5:1 to develop 
a trust-like arrangement. Instead, the cases follow the broader tenor of the principles in 
She'elah uFikkadon that concerns circumstances where property has been despoiled or 
lost, and arrangements where the grantor desires the return of a chattel from its 
custodian. The cases suggest this or an analogous principle became a regular practice by 
the late 1260s in response to the Second Barons’ War. The baronial hostility towards the 
Jews during this time reflects the continuation of attitudes to their money lending 
activities that led to the Petition of Barons (1258).118 
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Several cases concern the transfer of chattels to others for safekeeping. A typical case of 
this kind is illustrated by an action (1268) brought by Hugh Wychard and Matilda, against 
a Jew, Isaac, touching a plea of detinue.119 Isaac alleged he delivered, by the hand of his 
wife Avygotta, chattels worth 15 marks to Hugh and Matilda for safekeeping, but they 
unlawfully detained them to his loss of £40. Hugh and Matilda denied ever receiving the 
property. Another example (1270) is Isaac of Northampton who entrusted clothes valued 
at £12 and 60 solidates of gold for safekeeping to William and Cecilia Le Brode that they 
refused to deliver to him.120 A custodian keeping an object for personal use is contrary to 
the purpose for which it has been entrusted. Further, the person who delivers them for 
safekeeping must be their owner.121 However, Jewish law also contained rules relating to 
stolen and lost property that had been entrusted. She'elah uFikkadon 7:8 reads: ‘When a 
person entrusts money to a householder, whether it is bound or not, the custodian may 
not use it. Therefore, if it became lost or stolen, he is not responsible for it’. The rule is 
reiterated for professional custodians that reasonable steps must be taken to protect 
property including in the event it is stolen, but otherwise ‘if it is lost due to forces beyond 
his control - e.g., they were taken by armed thieves - he is not liable’ (7:6). It is through 
these rules that the Jewish influence on English law appears to shine through. 
 
Jewish law imposed greater responsibility on parties who received payment or might be 
expected to professionally keep it safe. The circumstances behind the loss of chattels was 
material to the law in both halakha and English law. The case of Moses and Gamliel of 
Oxford against Nicholas of Waddington (1268) included a defence raised by Gamaliel that 
he lost the starr and chattels held by him in safekeeping because the property was stolen 
while the Earl of Gloucester occupied London during the Second Barons’ War (1266).122 
However, an analogous case (1267) between Lovekin, a cook, against Isaac (and his wife 
Slema) illustrates when a custodian might be held responsible.123 Isaac alleged that he 
delivered the chattels to Lovekin for safekeeping at his peril (a warranty which means 
Lovekin would be liable if he lost them), to which Lovekin acknowledged he received the 
goods but not at his peril. Further, he said that armed thieves robbed him of the property. 
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It appears that Isaac argued that even if the property was stolen that Lovekin should have 
a greater degree of responsibility. Since Lovekin is likely to be a shop keep who took 
money, his liability could be determined under the rule in She'elah uFikkadon 7:6. 
However, no explicit reference to Jewish law is made. The fact that there was a body of 
law related to safekeeping in the court Jewish might suggest that the matter at least 
touched on halakhic principles and its rules for lost or stolen property. However, the 
relationship remains of the circumstantial sort.  
 
Notwithstanding the question of the Jewishness of the practice of safekeeping, it appears 
the practice surrounding its principles introduced elements associated with trust-like 
devices. As also alluded to in Mechirah 22:9, the rules of safekeeping operable in England 
allowed a grantor to designate property to a third party. For example, a case (1270) 
reads: 
 
William de la Leyhe offered himself on the fourth day against John Le Irreys touching a plea, that he 
returns to him 6 marks that he delivered to him for safekeeping in equal hand to the use of Abraham 
of Berkhamsted, which moneys he should have paid the said Jew and did not.124 
 
The obligation stated here is that John entrusted property to William with instruction to 
deliver it Abraham, but William failed to act as instructed. Furthermore, William 
acknowledged he received the property into his custody to deliver to Abraham. In 
another case (1266), Aaron of Kingston brought suit for the return of two bowls of mazer-
wood worth 20s. against John Harding who unlawfully detained them. 125  Harding 
acknowledged he received the bowls but says that ‘by token concerted’ (ciphos per 
intersigna) with Aaron, that he delivered them to John Alfred. Alfred stated he pledged 
the bowls to Aaron for 4s., and that Alfred received a token from Aaron ‘by placing his 
hand in the fold of his tunic’ (quod posuit manum suam in sinu suo). It is by that token that 
Harding delivered the bowls. It unclear whether Alfred had paid the amount of 3s. and 2d. 
adjudged owed to Aaron, but Harding was quit of the suit. The token and the ceremony, 
however, suggested that safekeeping may have included oaths or elements of good faith 
to carry out the instructions of the grantor. What is absent from these cases is a clear 
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indicator that the designated party could enforce the arrangement against the custodian 
of the property for not keeping the property safe or making delivery. These arrangements 
appear to be use-like on their face but the common law did not extend principles related 
to safekeeping to land. The instruments appear to bear a passing similarity only but show 
the law closely following the intention of the parties. 
 
Fictitious Attorneys – transfer of legal ownership 
  
A characteristic of a use is that the feoffee acquires legal title to land only to grant it to 
another party. There is analogy with the many cases involving attorneys in the Jewish 
Exchequer, which make clear the fictional character of their appointments. F. H. Lawson 
noted this in his analysis of assignment of debt. The author argued the purpose behind 
such arrangements is to evade the rule that assignment requires the king’s license. Jewish 
assignors retained nominal ownership while the assignee, acting as an attorney, 
benefitted from the transaction.126 This created a problematic situation: to enforce a debt 
the assignee must sue in the name of the assignor.127 An early example of this practice is 
contained in the starr (1268) of Gamaliel of Oxford who sold an outstanding debt of £120 
to Baldwin for £60, half of the amount owed but more than the principal loan (£37 10s), 
with the remaining interest to be paid over four years.128 This allowed Baldwin to have 
power to acquit, receive, grant, sell, and compound the debt, and take seisin of lands and 
chattels in the name of the said Jew. The charter also included guarantees that the debt is 
good in law and protections for Baldwin against possible legal actions. It is clear both the 
Jewish creditor and Baldwin benefited from the arrangement despite the latter party 
being called an attorney. The nominal role of the Jewish creditor is evidenced in the 
condition that although he retained power to acquit the debt, he could not do so without 
the consent of Baldwin.  
 
The Jewish Exchequer allowed feoffors to pursue objects with arrangements designed to 
circumvent the law. A starr (1268) suggests the power stems from the lost Assize of Jews 
(mid-thirteenth century) coupled with customs that allowed a Christian to buy and 
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receive an assigned right to collect the principal and interest of debt with the power to 
‘make acquittance, release, sale, grant, distraint, levy, or seisin, according to the Custom 
of Jewry’.129 Further, it contains a provision that although the Jew is bound to pursue the 
debt in the courts, the Christian will cover all their expenses. It is notable that the power 
to appoint an attorney to receive a debt appears contrary to Jewish law in the opinion of 
Maimonides (Sheluchin veShuttafin, 3:1). Furthermore, England’s Jewry law appear to 
have departed from the rule in Numbers 18:28 that a non-Jew may never be appointed as 
an agent for any mission whatsoever.130 Nonetheless, it appears the principles relating to 
fictitious attorneys emerged from the unique practice of England’s Jewry. Lawson notes 
their use allowed Jews to avoid the rule against usury (Deut. 23. 20) and charge each 
other interest on debts through a third-party Christian facilitating the arrangement.131 
The case law also suggested that the Jewish Exchequer accepted the fictitious nature of 
these appointments. For example, the case (1270) of Alard de Firingham against 
Waleramm for disseisin concerned a debt of 20 marks, bought by Alard from the Jews 
Cresse and Cok, which Baldwin de Wayford owed to them.132  The charter reads that 
‘[Alard] as nuncius of the said Jews had seisin of the said Baldwin’s lands and tenements 
by writ of the king’. The term nuncius, or messenger, also appears to signify appointment 
to act. 133  The records suggest, however, that the law gave effect to these kinds of 
arrangements no matter their terminology. Whatever the nature of the office, it is clear 
the appointment meant that the attorney steps into the shoes of the Jewish creditor to 
enjoy legal ownership of the property. The effective transmission of legal title to another 
party to pursue an alternative purpose is a characteristic approaching the qualities of a 
use. 
 
By stepping into the shoes of a Jewish creditor, the attorney effectively acquired the legal 
position of a Jew. Routledge suggests Jews held land sui generis in the capacity of the 
king’s chattels.134 However, by the mid-thirteenth century, the Assize of Jews restricted 
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their ability to own land outright.135 A Jew could only have a possessory interest in land 
or ‘Jewry Seisin’. The case (1272) of Robert de Houston against Hugh de Vienne, 
concerning writ of novel disseisin, indicates that the existence of a king’s writ of Jewry 
seisin was the method by which a Jew or their agent could enforce a legal interest against 
land ‘according to the custom of Jewry’. 136  The writ also imparted on the Christian 
attorney the limitations imposed on Jews who had seisin of a debtor’s land. The case 
(1272) brought by Roger Syfrewast and Adam de Stratton (his guardian) against Stephen 
Cheyndut and John de Hertord concerned the debt sold by Hagin and Cok to Henry de 
Burghill, who subsequently sold it to Adam.137 The case states that before selling it, Henry 
had felled wood contrary to the Assize of Jews, which stated that no Jew nor his attorney 
may lawfully waste, sell or impair the houses, woods, or gardens or like appurtenances of 
a manor. Several complaints arose because seised Christians ignored the limitations. The 
case (1272) of Henry de Kingesfolde against Henry Tregoz concerned Tregoz who had 
seisin of Kingsfolde’s manor in ‘the name of a Jew’ but ‘sold timber, and issues of the 
houses, garden, herbage etc. receiving £28’.138 The imposition of limitations, however, 
demonstrated that a fictional attorney enjoyed the same incidence of legal title to the 
property as a Jewish creditor. Recognition of fictional attorneys do not approach the 
nature of uses but show how far the common law was prepared to bend to accommodate 
the intentions of both Jews and Christians.  
 
Transfers to avoid the operation of the law 
 
An association between the use and unenforceable trust-like devices to avoid the 
operation of law is a problematic starting point to found a theory of the use in English 
law. In England, Jews who converted to Christianity forfeited their property to the king, 
which Jacobs notes in his attempt to reconstruct the Assize of Jewry.139 The records of the 
Jewish Exchequer reveal that converted Jews attempted to avoid the harshness of this 
rule by placing their property in the hands of another before their conversion. In the case 
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(1268) of Jospin against Lumbard, both sons of Solomon of Marlborough, Lumbard’s 
daughter-in-law Joiette converted to Christianity while holding a debt.140 Jospin accused 
Lumbard of replacing Joiette’s name on a chirograph for a debt with his own, which had 
the effect of depriving the king of the debt by reason of her conversion. Jospin bound all 
his possessions to the king regarding the truth of the statement. The proximity of the 
family relationships is an important factor that led to this case being heard by the Jewish 
Exchequer. It is likely a secret arrangement existed where Lumbard agreed to take on the 
debt to prevent the forfeiture that would have deprived his son and daughter-in-law of 
the asset. Lumbard assumed the risk because he was acting in his family’s interest and 
the interest of his household. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the person who discovered 
the attempt to circumvent the law is a close family member. The proximity of Jospin to 
the parties, as a brother, means he is privy to intimate family information. The decision 
to place his possessions into the hands of the king strengthens the veracity of his 
allegations. Jospin’s motivations are unclear and could range from an attempt to win royal 
favour or a grudge against his brother. 
 
This case makes clear the object of the arrangement in Lumbard’s case was to defeat the 
rule of forfeiture. The chirograph would simply show an assignment of the debt to 
Lumbard. A feature of the law related to assignments is that the assignor did not have to 
obtain consent from the affected party.141 The debtor, Hugh Lovel who owed 32 marks to 
Joiette does not appear party to the secret arrangement. He did not receive a benefit from 
the assignment and still owes 32 marks, which suggests he is an innocent party. Further, 
he would not have received a benefit from depriving the king of his debt nor is his 
relationship to Lombard or Jospin such to risk breaking the law. Jospin also summoned 
Hugh as a witness. Unfortunately, the nature of the arrangement between Lumbard and 
Joiette is uncertain. Several factors are plain. Joiette would have had to agree to assign 
the debt. It is also unlikely she would have assigned it or took the risk of violating the law 
without some kind of material benefit. The fact that Jospin does not allege that Lumbard 
bought the debt suggests the intention was to simply assign it by grant. A sale would have 
brought unwanted attention to the circumstances of the arrangement. The probable 
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situation is that Joiette would have continued to receive profits from the debt as a 
‘beneficiary’ of the secret arrangement even though legal ownership vested in Lumbard. 
However, there is no way to know for certain. The secret nature of such arrangements 
makes their assessment problematic. It has the hallmarks of an unenforceable trust 
arrangement to pursue an illegal object since there is a clear transfer of legal ownership 
to a party not intended to be the ultimate beneficiary. In this case, Joiette and her husband 
are the presumed beneficiaries. Nonetheless, the idea of an unenforceable use or trust 
means Joiette would have to confess that she and Lumbard conspired to violate the law if 
she wanted to bring an action to claim back the property. The law did not enforce 
fraudulent arrangements and, consequently, this case does not support an argument that 
uses existed in English law.  
 
Edward I took a more proactive approach than his father to quashing this practice. Most 
of the cases that occurred under this head happened during his reign. The King’s claim 
(1277) against Aaron Crespin concerned a moiety of land with appurtenances in London 
that had formerly belonged to an allegedly converted Jew named Melkana.142 The case 
states the King would quit his claim if the still-living Melkana could prove she had never 
converted. It is clear the onus is on Aaron to prove no conversion had occurred rather 
than the fact he had been granted the moiety. In this case, several witnesses attested that 
there was no conversion, and allowed Aaron to hold the land in peace. Nonetheless, the 
issue concerned whether Melkana had converted, not that an assignment had occurred, 
which shows the primary concern is whether the arrangement existed to defeat the 
interests of the king. Edward acted to quell the practice of fraudulent assignments by 
offering converts more favourable terms in 1280 to seizure of half their property.143 He 
vigorously pursued forfeited property and brought legal actions against Christians who 
were liable in debt to a converted Jew.144 Secret arrangements of this kind, to achieve 
illegal devices, do not offer a foundation for the recognition of uses in English law. Instead, 
it shows that people were making extra-legal arrangements that approached the 
character of the use in the thirteenth century. 
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Edward I’s reign marked a turning point for Jewish history in England. It is a change 
documented in the practices of the Exchequer of the Jews until the expulsion. The period 
of Jewish influence on legal history, at least for the medieval period, ended abruptly in 
1290 when the Jews ceased to be a valuable source of income for the King.145 Edward’s 
religiosity guided his attitudes towards the Jews in England and conversion occupied an 
important part of his Jewish policy. 146  The records of the Jewish Exchequer suggest 
Edward adopted a significantly tougher stance than his father. The change in royal 
tolerance of the Jewish community is evident in the statute of Jewry (1275), which 
outlawed usury and placed significant restrictions on the person and movement of Jews. 
Edward even arrested the entire Jewry of England for instances of coin clipping, an act 
devaluing coin by reducing its weight, and later hanged offenders. 147  Lawson notes 
Edward exercised the royal prerogative to assign debt at will more frequently than his 
father.148 Furthermore, the use of third-party attorneys that Henry had tolerated during 
his reign disappear entirely from the records. Edward’s policy appears to have focussed 
on removing the legal arrangements that the Jews had exploited and the punishment of 
their evasive practices. 149  Nonetheless, both the expulsion and definitive end to the 
Jewish Exchequer raise doubt whether its recognition of trust-like devices left an 




The evidence suggests that the use did not develop out of the century-long practices of 
the Jewish Exchequer. However, legal historians have never raised the possibility. If 
evidence of uses is within the court’s records, the use would have at least a tangential 
relationship to the crusade movement. There are several elements applicable to the court 
that favoured the development of novel legal instruments. First, it was created to respond 
to the legal issues that Richard I encountered during the preparation of his crusade 
activities. There appears to be no continental template to model the court and, therefore, 
its practices were a product of English innovation. Second, the court presented an 
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opportunity for England to receive legal principles from the sophisticated Jewish 
experience with the law and legal systems. The neglect of the records in the Jewish 
Exchequer means evidence of the use’s creation may have gone unnoticed. Finally, the 
primary subject of the court concerns private law obligations related to debt. The early 
thirteenth-century records show that the law had engaged with the idea that multiple 
parties could have a legal interest in land, and questions about the priority of those 
interests. These legal issues suggest the common law had become sufficiently 
sophisticated to develop a lawful conception of uses. It was worth considering whether 
novel interpretations of common law principles applicable to England’s Jewry furnished 
a theory of uses. 
 
Jewish influence on credit law in England is a celebrated part of legal history. The pattern 
of tolerance for as long as it benefitted royal interests and the Church compared to the 
later restrictions imposed by Edward is a compelling narrative.150 It is engrained in the 
history of the Jews in medieval England that the justification for their expulsion is the 
continued practice of usury.151 Nevertheless, their influence on this area of law persisted. 
Judith Shapiro comments: ‘Even while Edward was divesting himself of his Jewish 
moneylenders, he made their legacy permanent. A small but significant principle of 
Jewish Law, wherein personal debt superseded rights in real property, had become the 
law of the land’.152 She notes the success of Jewish law at regulating the contact between 
Jews and Christians.153 The records suggest, however, the possible influence of Jewish law 
on the development of the use occurs in a much briefer period between 1250 and 1272. 
While the principles related to safekeeping appear to have some analogies in halakha, the 
use of attorneys and the attempts by converts to circumvent the law appear to be unique 
responses by the Jewry to English law. Furthermore, Lawson concludes that ‘the customs 
of the Jewry were unlikely forgotten despite the Court Jewish falling into disuse at the 
end of the thirteenth century and its impact traced to mortgages and the writ of elegit’ 
offers a general caveat: there is no clear principle of law or writ that connects the customs 
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of Jewry to the use.154 Its legacy is principles that approached trust-like devices, which 
could survive only as far as the common law permitted.
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Chapter 7. Evidence for the Existence of the Use between 
1271 and 1307 
 
In the figure of Edward I, historians have both crusader and lawmaker. As a lawmaker, 
the nineteenth-century legal historian Edward Jenks discussed at length how King 
Edward earned the title ‘the English Justinian’ in tribute to his role as a legislator, and the 
extensive number of statutes passed during his reign.1 It is a title bestowed on him that 
reflects the role of statute as a vehicle for legal change through parliament rather than 
the courts. 2  In contrast, Edward’s role in the history of the crusades is somewhat 
forgettable since a truce shortly into his campaign limited his crusading activity to 
skirmishes.3 The idea of future crusades, however, never left Edward’s mind, and had a 
discernible impact on his later policies. Nonetheless, in the figure of Edward I we find the 
best opportunity for the use to take shape in English law in response to the crusade 
movement. His reign sees the rise of Chancery as an important administrative body.4 It is 
worth considering its function and its potential relationship with the Ninth Crusade 
(1270 – 1272) to examine whether the crusade inspired the creation of uses in Chancery. 
Research into the law-making practices of the Ninth Crusade benefits from three legal 
treatises and the development of Chancery rolls. The ample supply of evidence paints a 
clearer picture of the English legal response to the crusade, from both royal and 
individual sources, than any earlier expedition. Furthermore, there is an abundance of 
evidence that could show the use developed later as a reflection of crusading activities. It 
is worth considering, however, that there may be no evidence that connects the use to the 
crusade movement. Nonetheless, Edward’s reign is recognised as a watershed period in 
the history of English law because of the advances in legislative practices to clarify the 
operation of the common law.5 It is necessary to examine whether the developments 
associated with his reign furnishes evidence for the existence of the use in either the late 
thirteenth or fourteenth centuries. 
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Chancery and the development of the Use 
 
Chancery, the traditional home of the use, is a reasonable starting point to search for 
evidence of the use. This apparatus had undergone a significant transformation 
throughout the thirteenth century. Michael Prestwich comments that ‘Chancery used 3 to 
4 pounds of wax a week for sealing documents it produced in the 1220s and 1230s, 
whereas by the late 1260s over 30 pounds was needed’.6 Thomas Madox indicated this 
reflected its diversification away from the affairs of the Exchequer.7 In addition to its 
growth, Thomas Haskett outlines another reason to explore its potential role in the 
development of uses: 
 
The medieval English Court of Chancery is not a well-known institution … Paradoxically, this neglect 
derives in part from the volume of the court’s record - too much rather than too little. In addition, 
the documentation is too unlike other major legal records. A misunderstanding has arisen from 
preconceptions of jurisprudence, personnel, and process. These have produced the faulty syllogism 
that because it is Chancery it must be doing what Chancery does, and the benchmark for what 
Chancery does is the court of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.8 
 
The dearth of modern commentary devoted to the subject suggests the same 
misunderstandings persist today. Such neglect means it is possible that the use could 
have been overlooked in its record.  
 
Haskett also argued it is necessary to reassess the long-accepted truth that medieval 
Chancery exercised an equitable jurisdiction.9 This challenges the narrative in William 
Holdsworth’s multi-volume A History of English Law (1903 – 1966), which details how 
Chancery developed during Edward’s reign to supplement defects in the common law.10 
There is some merit to the view. However, the complaint raised in The Mirror of Justices 
(1300) that ‘it is an abuse that nowadays right is longer delayed in the king’s courts than 
elsewhere’ suggests that its supplemental character reflects procedural rather than 
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jurisprudential issues. 11  The author’s complaint also reflects the foreseeable 
consequence of the ascendancy of royal courts over local courts during Edward’s reign.12 
The Mirror of Justices highlights Chancery’s administrative character when it states that 
the Chancellor is in charge of issuing writs, and in doing so, he does not ‘sell or delay or 
deny remedial writ to anyone’.13 Chancery does not have the power to declare justice (ius 
dicere) because that is something conferred by the king’s authority on the justices of the 
Eyre and the king’s courts.14 The traditional view of Chancery as a court of conscience or 
equity reflects its function in the sixteenth rather than the thirteenth century. 15  A 
reassessment of this kind has a profound impact on our understanding of the use and its 
association with the corrective power of Chancery. S. W. Devine believed that the 
Chancellor’s awareness of classical equitable norms led to his jurisdiction over the use 
and the subsequent choice to conceptualise the instrument in civil law rather than 
common law terms. 16  A reassessment of the nature of Chancery is a fundamental 
challenge to this belief. 
 
Haskett concluded that ‘chancery was a responsive, quick, inexpensive, and desirable 
avenue of recourse for those who felt that they had been wronged in ways that no other 
jurisdiction could remedy. Is this equity? No, not in the sense generally given to that term 
in most studies of English law’. 17  It may now be comfortably asserted that the law 
operating in medieval Chancery was the common law. Fleta even states that the 
Chancellor is a person with ‘wide experience of the laws of customs of English’ (qui in 
legibus et consuetudinibus anglicanis noticiam habeant pleniorum) (Fl. 2.13). It is, 
therefore, also necessary to challenge the notion that the early Chancellor had no 
knowledge of the common law. Spence commented that the eventual appointment of 
common lawyers in the late fourteenth century reflects a concern: ‘It seems to have been 
considered by some that the extraordinary jurisdiction might, if left in the hands of 
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persons not versed in the common law, be converted to the destruction of the law’.18 The 
evidence, however, suggests Chancellors were versed in the common law. Richard Fitz 
Nigel’s Dialogus de Scaccario, the author holding numerous ecclesiastical posts in 
addition to his service as a royal justice,19 comments on the interrelationship between 
the Exchequer and king’s court, and the prominent position held by the Chancellor to 
oversee the function of the former in the twelfth century.20 His career and commentary 
highlight the intertwined nature of royal apparatus and ecclesiastical offices. There is also 
little difficulty illustrating that Chancery routinely dealt with matters touching the 
common law in the late thirteenth century. The first charter of the Calendar of Close Rolls 
(1272), for example, includes the Chancellor instructing the Sheriff of York to bring about 
the king’s peace, and the second instructs the king’s escheator to assign dower.21 The 
evidence does not appear to support an argument that the medieval Chancellor, even as 
an ecclesiastic, had no knowledge about the function of his office or officers. 
 
Several nineteenth-century treatments about the function of medieval Chancery provide 
descriptions about its procedure that divorce its practice from its later equitable 
jurisdiction. Spence stated that the equitable function of Chancery emerged out of its 
jurisdiction over recognizances, a party undertaking before the chancellor that 
something is either true or they will observe a condition, which the author associates with 
the obligation that the parties will do right.22 D. M. Kerley’s A Historical Sketch of the 
Equitable Jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery (1890) outlined the function of medieval 
Chancery in the following passage: 
 
The answers tell us moreover that the custom of calling a respondent to show cause, which had 
prevailed in the previous reign [Edward I] in regard to recognizances, was sometimes adopted in 
considering remitted petitions, but the more general course, as yet, appears to have been to issue a 
commission to find the facts by inquisition returnable into the Chancery, a plan always adopted in 
the case of escheats and forfeitures.23  
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It is important to note, however, that the above passage does not reflect the tenor of 
Kerley’s work, which focuses on Chancery’s development as a court of equity to 
supplement the rigour of the common law.24 Spence also followed his contemporary John 
Campbell. Campbell suggested it is thanks to the efforts of Robert Burnell that Chancery 
had full jurisdiction to decide cases on ‘wardship of infants, partition, dower, rent-
charges, tithes, and goods of felons, and occasionally trespass’.25 Spence and Campbell go 
too far in their assessment of Chancery’s jurisdiction, but their observations about 
recognizances furnish a good starting-point for the kind of reassessment advocated by 
Haskett. These nineteenth-century descriptions about the operation of Chancery are 
more helpful than modern accounts that simply suggest the use developed out of ‘English 
rules of equity or fairness to overcome the strict application of the common law by the 
ordinary Courts’.26 
 
In addition to its jurisdiction to inquire into affairs touching the interests of the king, 
Chancery’s control over private legal matters, such as the use, stemmed from powers to 
wield writs in a manner akin to arbitration rather than an inherent equitable 
jurisdiction.27 Its foremost weapon was a power to inquire into the nature of fact. Haskett 
comments the power of inquisition reflects early judicial activity.28 However, Maitland’s 
reflection that Chancery was not a court of justice appears to be a more accurate 
assessment.29 Its utility in the law is illustrated in the following memorandum (8 June 
1273): 
 
The abbot of Stanleye, co. Warwick, and Henry Broud came into chancery, and granted that inquiry 
shall be made by twelve lawful men to be elected for this purpose with the assent of the abbot and 
Henry, whether or not Henry’s father and grandfather and great-grandfather had the reasonable 
estover that Henry claims to have in the abbot’s woods in Stanleye, which estover his grandfather 
and great-grandfather Avere wont to have there, as it is said, concerning which a plea was moved 
between them in the king’s court; and if it be found by their verdict that Henry’s ancestors were wont 
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to have such estover, the abbot grants that he will thereupon come to the king’s court and will make 
to Henry all the security that the king’s court shall provide thereupon.30 
 
The purpose of the inquisition in this situation is to determine the veracity of facts that 
lie behind a plea being heard at a court of law. The parties brought the matter to chancery 
to avoid potential costs and delay associated with legal action. Both agreed to be bound 
by the result which, as in modern arbitration, had the effect of settling their dispute before 
it reached a court of law. The outcomes reached by the parties were flexible, but in this 
example the parties agreed, if the estover (an allowance out of the land) existed, to reduce 
the court’s role to overseeing enforcement rather than making a judgement. The writ 
issued out of Chancery reflects what the parties want to achieve in court at a greater cost. 
Such inquests from Chancery determined the legal dispute because its findings would 
inform any continuation of the plea before the courts. On 11 June,31 the parties nominated 
the twelve men who would make the inquiry. Their findings are not included in the 
record. 
 
In the above example, it is unclear whether the parties agreed among themselves to come 
to Chancery or whether the impetus behind their decision came from judicial 
recommendation, as may be occasioned in modern courts. Nevertheless, there are 
numerous instances in the record that show parties were utilising Chancery’s power to 
inquire into facts to enrol their agreements. On 6 February 1273, for example, William 
Giffard came into Chancery to enrol that he released houses pursuant to an agreement 
made in the king’s court with Cok Hagyn, probably the Jewish Exchequer, who owed him 
seventy marks.32 It is recorded, ‘afterwards Peter de Qurtefeld, attorney of William, came 
and acknowledged that he had received 21 marks that were in arrear of the said 70 marks, 
and acquitted the Jew thereof’.33 The benefit of this arrangement is a record that both 
parties are able to invoke the enrolment in case of disagreement between them without 
having to go back to the royal court. The following illustrates the formula frequently used: 
‘John Isenberd acknowledges [in Chancery] that he owes to John de Hereford 20s; to be 
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levied, in default of payment, of his lands and chattels in co. Southampton. Given by the 
hand of W. de Merton, the chancellor’. 34  Crusaders preparing to leave on the Ninth 
Crusade also used Chancery in this manner. William de Valencia and Thomas de Clare 
enrolled an agreement that William had paid Thomas 600 marks while they were in the 
Holy Land, and that part of the monies owed ought to be satisfied out of debts owed to 
Thomas for land.35  In addition to the enrolment of agreements, Chancery’s power of 
inquiry could extend to discovering the existence of competing third party claims to 
litigation already being heard before the courts.36 The legal consequences of Chancery’s 
power of inquest make it an attractive alternative as arbitrator to disputes or potential 
disputes rather than the costly litigation complained about in The Mirror of Justices.  
 
The exercise of a power of inquiry and its association as a cheaper and speedier avenue 
of justice appears to follow from the increase in Chancery business around 1260. In 1258, 
a charter records a petition by the burgesses of the lesser commune of Oxford to the king, 
as the fountain of justice, to inquire into the actions of their magnates and the many 
wrongs related to tallages and perversions against the king’s justice.37 The complaints are 
couched in language that shows petition to the king as a speedier course of justice. An 
example includes Walter de Middleton, divested of his possessions by the mayor’s bailiffs, 
who ‘prays for mercy and aid from the king, seeing that unless he obtains it speedily, he 
will be destroyed, slain, and brought to naught’. Matters that touched on the misconduct 
of officials were part of the business of Chancery, but the complaint regarding its issue of 
writs of attaint by The Mirror of Justices suggests that inquiries both criminal38 and civil 
occupied a significant part of its attention.39 Nonetheless, its reputation as an avenue of 
cheap and speedy justice continued into the fourteenth century. A charter (1309) 
describes how Thomas de la Corderye claimed his brother’s messuage as next heir and 
made: 
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a fine to have an inquisition as to his right because he could not come to the king’s court to obtain a 
writ, or to send another on account of his poverty, which inquisition being made on the Wednesday 
next following, and nobody else claiming any right, seisin was delivered to the said Thomas…40 
 
The outcome of this example shows a quicker resolution than what could be achieved 
in court if there was no legal dispute. It is necessary, therefore, to examine evidence 
for the existence of uses considering its administrative function rather than 
misconceived notions about equity jurisdiction in the medieval period. Furthermore, 
if the use is found in Chancery, the evidence suggests its origins would rest within 
common law principles rather than notions of conscience.  
 
The Ninth Crusade 
 
Chancery played a significant role in the interaction between the law and the Ninth 
Crusade. This crusade has never been connected to the use despite being England’s 
second-largest expedition to the Holy Land. This might be surprising since neat parallels 
might be drawn between the figures of Edward I and Richard I who both took the cross 
as princes and fulfilled their crusade vow, unlike their respective fathers.41 Christopher 
Tyerman’s treatment of the Ninth Crusade in England and the Crusades, 1095 -1588 is 
much briefer than his chapter devoted to the Third Crusade but he opines that Edward 
fits a Ricardian model.42 Like Richard’s campaign, the ninth expedition ended without 
achieving its aim, capturing Jerusalem, when Edward made peace with Sultan Baibars (d. 
1277) to return to England and succeed his father.43  The comparison generally ends 
there. The small size of Edward’s force limited his military actions to raiding, which meant 
that ‘despite his enthusiasm, Edward had contributed almost nothing towards a political, 
military, or diplomatic settlement favourable to the Christians of Outremer’.44 For this 
reason, Edward plays a significantly smaller role in crusade historiography than 
Richard.45 Prestwich devoted a chapter to the crusade in his biography of Edward. He 
concluded that although the Prince failed to make an impact in the east, Edward had 
                                                          
40 Cal. Inq. Misc. v. 2, no. 47. 
41 Tyerman, England and the Crusades, p. 111. 
42 Tyerman, p. 124. 
43 Falk, Franks and Saracens, p. 194. 
44 Tyerman, England and the Crusades, p. 125. 




earned the status of crusader.46 The absence of a noteworthy achievement appears to be 
the reason why no attempt has been made to attribute the use to Edward’s expedition. 
 
Whatever reputation Edward enjoyed as a crusader during his lifetime did not follow him 
in the minds of historians. George Templeman, reflecting on historiography prior to the 
mid-twentieth century, makes no mention of Edward’s crusade achievements in the list 
of accomplishments that historians hold up as evidence of the king’s historical 
importance.47 David Santiuste notes that popular knowledge about Edward’s military 
triumphs in modern times focusses on his role in the Scottish wars as ‘the Hammer of the 
Scots’, which is the name inscribed on his tomb.48 However, the Ninth Crusade is, prima 
facie, a more likely period than the Third Crusade for a relationship between the use and 
the crusade movement to be found in the preparations of crusaders. Tyerman justifies a 
focus on crusade preparation in his statement that ‘[although] ephemeral in its 
consequence, the Lord Edward’s crusade nonetheless had demanded considerable 
administrative efforts’. 49  The same thoughts are echoed contemporaneously by 
Prestwich in his biography. 50  Furthermore, the scale of preparation by the royal 
apparatus means it is the most documented crusade event in thirteenth-century 
crusading.51 Simon Lloyd, publishing in the same year as Tyerman and Prestwich, is an 
authoritative account of England during the Ninth Crusade. His research led him to 
observe: 
 
A comprehensive study of the relationship between the English common law regarding the crusader 
is still wanting, but evidence indicates that the crown and the royal courts responded positively to 
the needs and privileges of crusaders, upheld ecclesiastical protections, and reacted favourably to 
the representations of bishops and others on behalf of individual crusaders.52 
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The present chapter will take steps towards a greater understanding of that relationship, 
but Lloyd’s analysis of the Ninth Crusade and the law furnishes an admirable starting 
point for future scholarship. 
 
The canon law privileges applicable to crusaders on the Ninth Crusade were the same 
protections granted to crusaders at the Fourth Lateran Council. The mandate issued 25 
April 1263 states that indulgences for sins shall be granted to French crusaders and those 
who fund others in their place.53 It includes a general statement that those crusaders 
should enjoy the legal privileges usually enjoyed by crusaders.54 The pope appears to be 
making an appeal to an understood aspect of crusade legal tradition. The exact same 
formula (5 October 1263) is later used for England and other kingdoms. 55  It is 
unsurprising, therefore, that the bull issued on 23 October 1263 is a restatement of the 
privileges, indulgence, and immunities granted by Innocent III.56 For example, it includes 
familiar restrictions on usury and a command for secular authority to control Jewish 
lending. Furthermore, ecclesiastical protection for both crusaders and their families is 
made clear. 57  As in Maitland’s example, knights remained the focus of ecclesiastical 
recruitment efforts.58 The crusaders on the ninth expedition also benefitted from papal 
subsidies raised from both clerical taxation59 and the redemption of crusader vows.60 The 
evidence suggests the canon law never furnished the use in response to the crusade 
movement. The Liber Sextus Decretalium (1294), issued by Boniface VIII, indicates the 
canon law continued to limit the fideicommissum as a kind of legacy and never extended 
it as a trust-like device to form part of crusader privileges.61 However, it is in the secular 
response to crusading rather than the canon law that Maitland’s example seems to rest. 
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The context where the use might be found as part of the crusade movement remains the 
same. Lloyd observes crusaders faced the same kind of temporal challenges as their 
predecessors, which included the need to settle affairs and instituting safeguards before 
their departure. 62  For example, he states many crusaders continued the practice of 
satisfying debts to prevent aggrieved creditors from upsetting their affairs at home.63 The 
complexity of crusader legal arrangements before departure continued to depend on 
their socioeconomic position.64 The author comments, however, that ‘land hunger’ during 
the thirteenth century changed the nature of the primary legal methods that crusaders 
utilised to raise cash. Prestwich comments that the prosperity of the late thirteenth 
century led to the development of high farming practices, and consequently, the practice 
of placing estates into the hands of managers to cultivate land. 65  These conditions 
allowed crusaders the opportunity to attain more favourable terms for their transactions 
than the disastrous economic conditions reported in the First Crusade. 66  The least 
complex method remained the outright sale of land, as decided by Hebert de Boyvill,67 
which yielded significantly better revenue in a market more favourable to sellers than in 
the twelfth century.68  Robert Charles took the usual step of alienating all his land in 
exchange for certain letters patent.69 However, the logical result of increased demand for 
land led to shorter supply and a consequent reluctance to alienate. 70  The stronger 
bargaining power, Lloyd observes, allowed crusaders to move away from the traditional 
mortgage arrangements and instead pledge their land in vifgage as a species of 
usufructury pledge that allowed the lender to enjoy the fruits of the land to satisfy their 
debt.71 Crusaders, for example, John Lovel72, also utilised lease arrangements for a certain 
term to raise money.73 Therefore, the economic conditions during this period hardened 
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the crusaders’ resolve to mitigate the extent that their activities impinged on the financial 
well-being of their families. 
 
The economic situation of the late thirteenth century left its mark on legal preparations 
made on the Ninth Crusade, which distinguishes this event from the first and third 
expeditions canvassed in earlier chapters. It is foremost, a crusade characterised by the 
law of obligations. Leaders preferred to form contracts with the men who served them. 
The rationale behind creating contractual obligations is that it gave a leader greater 
control over his forces than relying solely on bonds of fealty. 74  Lloyd indicates the 
creation of obligations is a prominent reason why it is one of the most documented 
crusades.75 He comments ‘to see a crusading force systematically organised by contract, 
we have to wait until 1270’.76 Tyerman, on the other hand, downplays the novelty of 
contractual bonds when he suggests the organisation of armies in this manner was 
characteristic of the thirteenth century.77 Prestwich agrees with Lloyd, stating that ‘there 
is, however, no earlier evidence for the use of contracts in the way Edward used them in 
1270’.78 Tyerman indicates that Edward, as a prince, had to rely on contract because he 
could not rely on bonds of fealty as he might have done if he were king.79 Regardless, both 
authors tentatively suggest that Edward innovated the use of obligations based on the 
example set by Louis IX, who had paid the Prince 70,000 livres tournois at Paris in 1269.80 
Edward followed this example to subsidise the costs of the crusaders in his service and 
subcontracting appears to be one of the purposes that Louis intended the money be put.81 
The use of contracts would be expected to inform the character of legal protections 
available for crusaders. It is necessary, therefore to examine how Edward’s lordship 
affected the legal protections available to crusaders and whether there is evidence that 
the royal apparatus introduced uses to make the prospect of crusading more appealing. 
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Lloyd concluded that crusaders preferred to place their lands and other legal interests 
into the custody of family or friends. 82  He offers the example of Hugh de Neville to 
illustrate the breadth of appointments. Hugh appointed attorneys to act in litigation and 
to protect his lands, and the nominated his mother and brother as custodians to farm out 
his lands.83  Lloyd further canvasses a range of other ways crusaders protected their 
property without mention of the use.84 Furthermore, crusaders took advantage of the 
wider community to ensure their wishes were followed: 
 
Godfrey [le Marbrer] was starting for the Holy Land [on crusade], having called together the 
neighbours, he caused to come Simon Everard of Worcester, son of his brother, and acknowledged 
him as his heir if he died on the journey; he did so die, and after his death the said Simon entered the 
house as his nephew and heir.85 
 
An extra layer of protection afforded by community involvement demonstrated an 
awareness that the law alone did not guarantee the integrity of their estates. The 
involvement of the community added an extra layer of support during their absence. In 
comparison, an inquisition (1256) determined that Walter le Galays, a younger son of 
Arnold le Galays, had entered on his father’s land and ejected his eldest son Robert while 
he was on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land.86 Walter’s trespass was only discovered because 
of his later felony and escheat. Lloyd also indicated women remained vulnerable figures 
and could be left destitute if the crusader failed to assign dower.87 However, crusaders 
appear to have no concerns about enfeoffing female heirs. For example, William de 
Wheteden enfeoffed one third of the manor at Wheddon Cross to his daughter, Avice, 
before he left for the Holy Land. Robert de Wheteden, also holding a third, recognised that 
she should hold it all in exchange for an annual rent. Avice performed homage for the 
entire land.88 Nonetheless, thirteenth-century crusaders do not appear to have made uses 
as private law arrangements. 
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Chancery and the organisation of the Ninth Crusade 
 
The Ninth Crusade, boasting the involvement of an English prince, was the last crusade 
to attract significant numbers from England.89 If the use had a relationship to the crusade 
movement, as the accepted truth suggests, then the ninth Jerusalem expedition presents 
the last occasion to find it. Edward, unlike Richard I, could not advance any innovation in 
the common law because as a prince, he could not issue ordinances or introduce novel 
legal ideas in England without the authority of his father. Therefore, the records indicate 
Henry III, likely acting with the counsel of his son, decided the legal landscape of the Ninth 
Crusade. The King also had precedent to draw on. Tyerman comments that ‘prior to 1250, 
Henry’s behaviour had been conventional - providing individual crusaders with funds, 
licences to mortgage property, and royal protection, generally supporting papal directive, 
and taking an interest in the affairs of the Holy Land’.90 The presence of the use in English 
law in response to the Ninth Crusade would turn on whether Henry relied on 
conventional legal principles related to crusading or did he introduce the use as a novel 
arrangement.  
 
Development of rolls to record the business of Chancery, including that found in the 
Calendar of Patent Rolls and Close Rolls series, provide insight into how Henry’s court 
responded to the Ninth Crusade and the laws utilised to facilitate it. Maitland notes the 
value of these records when he comments, ‘the historian of law and constitution has no 
longer to complain of a dearth of authentic materials; soon he is overwhelmed by them’.91 
The sheer volume of these records, as Maitland alludes, requires the legal historian to 
undertake a monumental effort to find information relevant to their subject. Letters 
patent concern matters of law that the king wished to be known to all his subjects. The 
Close Rolls series collect charters addressed to private individuals. The latter might be 
likened to papal rescripts found in the canon law as the intention of their promulgation 
is to address a single matter. 92  The Calendar of Inquisitions post mortem concern a 
collection of charters documented outside of the rolls series on inquisitions into the 
extent of individual estates by the king’s escheators, which was the office responsible for 
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taking land into the king’s hand if the deceased died without an heir or otherwise 
descended to the king through the operation of law (escheat). These sources supplement 
the treatises and cases that furnish historians with an insight into English law. 
 
It is unsurprising that the Patent Rolls do not paint the elderly Henry as a reluctant 
crusader, but instead depict him as a king eager to fulfil his vow. He achieved a happy 
medium by supporting his heir to go on his behalf without risking the security of his realm 
by leaving himself.93 Whatever his true intentions, the letters patent demonstrate to his 
subjects that Edward enjoyed the full support of both Henry and the law. Henry’s 
attention first turned to family interests on the continent. Two charters dated 18 and 20 
November 1269 granted his son-in-law John II, Duke of Brittany, certain legal privileges 
to manage John’s estates. The King granted John licence to appoint attorneys, with the 
power to nominate other attorneys on his behalf. Furthermore, John was permitted to 
instruct his executors that, in the event of his death, they could hold his lands for two 
years and receive its issues to administer his will (pay his debts) save for the dowry of 
his daughter. 94  A charter issued five days later illustrates Prince Edward may have 
exercised little control over the law during the Ninth Crusade. 95  Henry prevents the 
Prince from alienating land in Gascony to Gailliard de Solio, but allowed him to let out a 
farm for four years, as well as other rents and issues in Gascony and Oleron, either jointly 
or in parcels, subject to Louis IX’s approval. The organisation of this crusade was entirely 
the purview of the king, although it is evident Henry protected the integrity of his son’s 
private legal arrangements.96 Henry made concurrent arrangements, also beginning in 
November, to collect the tenth on the ecclesiastical holdings in dioceses permitted by the 
pope.97 The evidence indicates the keeper of the king’s wardrobe at Westminster, akin to 
a treasurer, had collected the majority of the tenth into the royal revenue between 
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January and February.98 The use does not appear in the rolls during the initial stages of 
crusade preparation.  
 
The next order of business concerned writs of simple protection cum clausula volumus 
issued in favour of crusaders. Common lawyers know this writ as providing protection 
issued by Chancery to everyone in the king’s service either overseas or in Scotland.99 Such 
a writ was issued, for example, in favour of those who accompanied Edward on 30 
November 1269 to help him manage his lands in Gascony as part of his preparations.100 
The logic behind simple protection was that ‘the Crown would keep an eye on a man’s 
lands and people, and any violation of the king’s protection was treated with some 
seriousness’.101 It is apparent, however, that anybody leaving the realm might apply for 
protection, including women and ecclesiastics.102 The evidence also indicates that grants 
of privilege followed an ad hoc pattern either issued in single instances103 or collectively. 
A charter issued 3 March 1270 reads ‘Protection with clause volumus, for four years from 
Easter, for Henry de Alemannia, the king’s nephew, who has taken the cross and is going 
with the king and Edward his son beyond the seas in aid of the Holy Land. The like for the 
following -’. 104  The charter extends the protection to sixteen other crusaders. Henry 
extended the same protection to a further 81 crusaders (16 July)105 and 42 crusaders (12 
January – 10 February 1271)106 together. Lloyd calculated 243 such grants.107 Most of the 
charters simply state ‘protection with clause volumus’, but a charter issued to Thomas le 
Norreys explicitly includes ‘his men, lands, and possessions’ as subject to royal 
protection.108 The writ of simple protection cum clausula volumus appears to fulfil the 
purpose of protecting crusader families and property without the need for a use or 
similar private arrangement.  
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The King also granted licences to crusaders that allowed them the privilege to make 
certain arrangements, which is the nearest that the crusade movement comes to 
developing uses. Henry drew on the same model of privileges that he granted to family 
members on the continent and later extended them to English crusaders. The King 
granted licence to crusaders, such as in the case of Edward’s close friend Earl Thomas de 
Clare, to appoint certain person attorneys with the power to appoint others to their office 
to protect a crusaders’ legal interests.109 The attorney had recourse to Chancery to prove 
their office if anybody doubted their authority.110 It is apparent in the Patent Rolls that 
Henry adopted a consistent approach to crusader privileges. For example, the privileges 
granted to Robert Tiptoft replicate privileges earlier granted to John II of Brittany: 
 
Inspeximus and confirmation of letters patent of Edward the king’s son, dated at Westminster 12 
July, 54 Henry III, granting to Robert de Tybetot, who is going with him to the Holy Land that if he 
die before his return, his executors or other assigns shall have the power of providing for the keeping 
and marriage of his heirs and the keeping of his lands without impediment or challenge.111 
 
In another example, ‘Walter de Wyginton who holds in chief and is going to the Holy Land 
with Edward the king’s son, to lease or pledge all his lands for four years from the time of 
his setting out’ is consistent with the licence Henry earlier granted to Edward himself.112 
Tyerman’s comment that Henry had been conventional in his grants of protection and 
licences to crusaders prior to 1250 extends to the Ninth Crusade.113 The advantage with 
letters patent granting protection or license is the clear evidentiary record of the 
crusaders status that can be enforced against anyone who intruded on their interests. The 
Close Rolls, on the other hand, touch matters such as the release of money from the 
Exchequer to Edward and its apportionment.114 However, he also occasionally granted 
licence to crusaders in closed form to appoint attorneys in the manner outlined above.115 
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The pattern of administration apparent in the Patent Rolls reveals a systematic 
organisation of the Ninth Crusade that does not include the secular privilege to grant uses.  
 
In addition to the Rolls series, the use ought to appear in all or at least one of three late 
thirteenth-century common law treatises, Fleta, Britton, or The Mirror of Justices, if it 
developed in connection to the Ninth Crusade. The authors of these treatises are 
unknown.116  Nonetheless, the only legal principle their anonymous authors explicitly 
connect to the crusade movement is the crusader essoin (see Fl. 6.8). It remained the most 
important aspect of crusade jurisprudence in secular law. Britton states that the common 
law recognised the crusader essoin as the foremost species of essoin (Brit. 6.7.3). The 
author states that a person must always be allowed to enroll an essoin if they are in the 
service of God or the king (Brit. 6.6.3). In the case of crusaders, the essoin is only effective 
if they have set out on a general passage before the receipt of a summons. The inclusion 
of ‘before’ indicates the law wished to address the kind of abuses noted by Brundage, such 
as taking the cross to avoid lawsuits.117 The complaint made in The Mirror of Justices 
suggests its inclusion did not successfully prevent frequent abuses. 118  Further 
qualifications to the enrolment of essoin are also included in this text that Britton or Fleta 
do not mention.119 The exclusion of pleas related to dower, novel disseisin, and darrein 
presentment harmonised the crusader essoin with that available for other persons in the 
king’s service.120 The Mirror of Justices also makes clear that jurists expected that future 
English crusades in the fourteenth century would have drawn upon the same legal 
tradition.121 It also states the ‘obvious’ rule: that a person could not essoin themselves.122 
Therefore, the evidence shows crusaders frequently appointed attorneys to manage legal 
affairs in their absence.123 To do so, crusaders had to first receive a dedimus potestatem 
from Chancery.124  
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An explanation for the absence of the use as part of the legal concept of crusading on the 
eve of the Ninth Crusade appears to be straightforward. Britton provides the following 
outline of the legal preparations that crusaders made before leaving England:  
 
In the essoin beyond the Grecian sea in a general pilgrimage, it must be observed whether there has 
been within the year a general passage of any Christian king, or other person sent by the Pope with 
a great host of Christians; for then this essoin is allowable, and the plea will stand over without day, 
out of favour for the pilgrims of God, on account of the privilege of those who have taken the cross, 
until the return or death of the pilgrim. There are some however who obtain our letters patent of 
protection to be in force for one, two, or three years, and who nevertheless by virtue of our letters 
patent do also make general- attorneys; and such persons do well and wisely. For no great lord or 
knight of our realm ought to travel forth of it without our licence, since by that means the kingdom 
might be left destitute of able persons; and such letters ought to be presently shown in full county 
or hundred court, or at public places (Brit. 6.7.3). 
 
The chapter reveals that thirteenth-century English law already had in place 
sophisticated mechanisms to protect crusader property during their absence. This 
passage can be cross-referenced with the letters patent issued out of Chancery as an 
accurate account of crusader preparations and the common law. It seems probable the 
author had reflected on those sources. The systematic approach to the organisation of the 
Ninth Crusade, as evident in the above passage, seems to have left no room for the use as 
a legal instrument associated with the venture. 
 
The legal aftermath of the Ninth Crusade 
 
An expectation that uses might be found in legal arrangements after the Ninth Crusade 
reflects the important long-term consequences of this expedition on the law and legal 
organisation. Tyerman discusses the impact of this crusade in the following terms: 
 
The nature of the arrangements for the 1270 crusade, although following the precedents of the 
previous century, had implications for the future. Based on national lay and ecclesiastical taxation, a 
centralised command structure, and an army raised in the first instance by magnates, who were 
themselves retained by the commander through written contract who retained their own troops in 
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the same way, the 1270 crusade conformed to a model which came to dominate English military 
organisation over the next 200 years.125 
 
The model of organisation, however, appears to explain why the use is absent after the 
Ninth Crusade. It is apparent that the most prominent legal issue after the crusade was 
the ongoing collection of taxation. Henry desired that the collection proceeded with ‘all 
speed as the quality of the business of the cross requires’.126 There were a number of 
disputes surrounding its collection on ecclesiastical villeinage127 and lands in Kent held 
in gavelkind.128 The Patent Rolls show Edward continued to deal with collection issues 
four years later.129 Nonetheless, issues of this kind were an anticipated part of crusading 
as the slow collection of money through taxation was used to pay back money borrowed 
from merchant societies.130 Otherwise, the legal issues that arose in the aftermath of the 
Ninth Crusade are undramatic. The evidence suggests they mostly concerned errors 
committed by royal officials. For example, Edward had to pardon one crusader for 
robberies he allegedly committed in England while he was with the King in the Holy 
Land. 131  On another occasion (1276), Fulk complained that his father Robert Le 
Estraunge enfeoffed him before going on crusade but the escheator took the land into the 
king’s hand anyway. 132  Lloyd comments that the risk associated with misadventure 
through royal administration led some crusaders to pay monies to the Exchequer to 
ensure non-interference with their land during their absence.133 The use would not have 
been an effective remedy to the mistakes of officials and may have even compounded 
errors. 
 
The absence of significant legal intrusions against crusader property may reflect the 
stability of English society. It is a feature of the early years of Edward’s reign that the King 
faced no major political disruption.134 The relative success of his crusade experience and 
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its organisation meant Edward took the cross again and began collecting the tenth 
granted to him by the general council.135 However, the legal calm following the Ninth 
Crusade can be contrasted with the instability that followed the Anglo-French War (1294 
– 1298). The immediate cause of the war was the unplanned result of a rivalry between 
sailors in Gascony and England, which dashed Edward’s hopes for another crusade.136 
From the outset, and unlike his other campaigns, Edward faced political opposition to his 
demands for men and money.137 In the end, it was a costly war and Edward had nothing 
to show for it except the resentment of his subjects.138 The procedure outlined in Brit. 
6.7.3 above, including protection clausum volumus, applied to this war. English knights 
benefited from an essoin de servitio regis beyond the sea which, like the crusader essoin, 
was warranted in Chancery (Brit. 6.8). They also appointed attorneys to protect their 
legal interests.139 The Patent Rolls show that Edward granted the same kind of licences 
found in the crusade. For example: 
 
Grant to Hugh Bardolf, going to Gascony on the king’s service, that, if he should die in the king’s 
service, and leave his heir within age, the executors of his will shall, during the minority of his heir, 
hold land of his to the yearly value of 300 marks, for the discharge of his debts and the execution of 
his will.140 
 
This letters patent also use the same formula of privileges that Henry III granted to John 
II and Robert Tiptoft.  
 
The use is also absent from English preparations during the Anglo-French War. Prestwich 
described the situation during and after the Anglo-French war as a crime wave.141 The 
social unrest reflected the internal turmoil and hardships caused by war, taxation, 
weather events, and crop failure that had not existed in the prosperous early years of 
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Edward’s reign.142 Patent Rolls in 1298 record many trespasses against those who had 
protection clausum volumus while they were absent in France. In one instance, Master 
Arnold de Lupi de Tillio left for Gascony on 10 May 1296 in the King’s service with 
protection clausum volumus for an indeterminate period.143 Later a commission of oyer 
and terminer, dated 30 May 1306, is formed to investigate allegations that ‘different 
malefactors’ entered Arnold’s houses at Suthcrek and Marsham in Norfolk, and stole his 
property.144 His prolonged absence proved to be an irresistible temptation to would-be 
trespassers. Other inquests appear in the Patent Rolls that detail violations of royal 
protection. The Patent Roll reveals these incidents of trespass are mostly crimes of 
opportunity occasionally coupled with violence against the household. William de 
Bereford and Robert de Retford were commanded to investigate persons who for four 
days and nights besieged, with ‘covered horse’, the manor at Cloulyg in Suffolk belonging 
to Earl Henry de Lacy during his absence in Gascony.145 The malefactors ‘broke his houses 
there, carried away his goods, cut down his trees in his wood there, and carried them 
away’. Theft of crops such as corn also occurred during the owners’ absence overseas. 
The prevalent illegal hunting of game animals, such as rabbits and deer, was also inflicted 
on those under royal protection. 146  It is arguable that whatever legal arrangements 
landholders made, including uses, would have been ineffective to guard against this 
criminal activity. Nonetheless, the evidence shows no departure from protections that 
had previously proved effective. The socio-political stability or instability of the different 
periods in Edward’s reign did not affect the decision of policy-makers to utilise tested 
legal mechanisms. 
 
There is no evidence to suggest that the eventual creation of uses drew upon the Ninth 
Crusade or from England’s overall crusade experience. The Fall of Acre in 1291 and the 
demise of Christian holdings in the Levant had the effect of dulling interest in crusading 
during the first-half of the fourteenth century.147 Aziz Atiya describes the crusade led by 
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Peter of Cyprus as the ‘high-water mark in this history of the Levantine crusade in later 
medieval times’.148 Cyprus itself had remained a stronghold for Christian influence in the 
Holy Land. Peter used it as a base to capture the city of Adalia in 1361 and other coastal 
settlements.149 Inspired by his success, Peter toured European courts to muster support 
for a fresh crusade.150  The Cypriot king achieved only a small measure of success in 
England. Knighton’s Chronicle (1337 – 1396) states Peter was received warmly when he 
came to England to ask Edward III and his lords to help reclaim the Kingdom of 
Jerusalem.151 The more detailed description found in Chronicon Anonymi Cantuariensis, 
its author primarily concerned with the events of the Hundred Years War and diplomacy, 
states that Edward granted Peter men, money, horses, supplies, and a ship.152 However, 
Tyerman suggests Edward baulked at the idea and had no impetus to become a crusader 
himself since England no longer had any political investment in the east.153 Nevertheless, 
Peter did secure contracts with the young Earl of Hereford and other English knights to 
fight in his expedition.154 He offered them wages and the opportunity for plunder.155 The 
evidence suggests that there was no departure from the models of organisation used 
during the Ninth Crusade or Anglo-French war. The English crusaders who set out in 
1364 also received licence to nominate attorneys for that year.156 They also received 
protection clausum volumus during their absence.157 Nevertheless, there is no evidence 
that connects the development of uses in England with this fourteenth-century 
expedition. It is clear that the accepted truth that the use has some connection with the 
crusade movement ought to be put to rest. 
 
Paramountcy of intention in the Common Law 
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Edward’s activities as a lawmaker rather than crusader appears to have provided the 
catalyst for the later development of uses in English law. One of his first initiatives was 
the introduction of laws concerning gifts with a condition. Theodore F. T. Plucknett 
described the Second Statute of Westminster 1285 (13 Edw. I) as an ‘epoch-making’ 
statute.158 The first chapter De donis conditionalibus (13 Edw. I, c 1) created estates in 
land, which dramatically altered the twelfth-century rule that an estate remained in 
free marriage until the third heir entered.159 It makes clear the purpose of the statute 
was to address an ongoing concern about the nature of conditional feoffments.160 De 
donis introduced the following rule: 
 
Concerning tenements which are often given on condition, when one gives his land to a man and his 
wife and to the heirs begotten of that man and woman, with an express condition added that if the 
man and woman die without heir begotten of that man and woman the land thus given shall revert 
to the donor or his heir … even though the condition is not expressed. 
 
Therefore, the common law recognised the above condition as implicit in all gifts of 
this nature. This statute made it possible to create entails, a limitation on inheritance, 
to ensure the land returned to the donor if a condition failed. Its introduction, however, 
appears to be a reaction to changing attitudes in the common law. 
 
The common law policy to give effect to the intention of donors is visible in the 
practices of the Jewish Exchequer and its recognition of trust-like devices. However, 
such devices survived only as far as the common law permitted, and the court Jewish 
was doomed. Merchant societies, developed as a papal initiative against the 
Hohenstaufen and others (1254 – 1302), had supplied the Ninth Crusade with a quick 
source of capital that Henry repaid by taxation. 161  These societies, assisted by 
legislation, supplanted the traditional crusade role of Jewish lenders as the primary 
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supplier of ready capital. 162  The loss of comparative advantage underlies their 
eventual expulsion.163 The common law disinterest in the affairs of Jews after their 
expulsion is evident in the treatise written during Edward’s reign. Fleta’s single 
reference to the Jews concerns the debts owed by the deceased to a Jew coming into 
the king’s hand. (Fl. 2.57). This suggests the treatise was written not long before or 
immediately after the expulsion. The other two treatises merely contain anachronistic 
references, which suggest they had been written sometime after the expulsion. Britton 
refers to Jews to illustrate prohibited persons who cannot be seised of land (Brit. 
1.16.3). Its reference to coin-clipping without reference to Jews supports a later date 
for this text (Brit. 1.5.1). Again, The Mirror of Justices only refers to Jews in the context 
of disqualified persons, which is indicative of its fourteenth-century origins.164 These 
treatises suggest that the tenuous link that trust-like concepts had to the Third Crusade 
were severed sometime after the Jewish Exchequer ceased being a special receipt in 
1290. 
 
Memory of the Jewish Exchequer, however, must have persisted in the common law 
through the natural cross-pollination that resulted from the interconnected 
relationship between the administrative branch and judicial branch of the king’s 
court.165 The same mobility enjoyed by other judicial offices in the thirteenth century 
is apparent for the justices of the Jews. The reason for their appointment rested with 
the whim of the king. 166  Sometimes familial connections with certain courts are 
apparent. William Briton (Brito), possibly the descendant of a naturalised Jew from 
Brittany167, was appointed iusticiari Iudaeorum (1234) and afterward served in the 
court of Durham, held a shrievalty under Hubert de Burgh, and became an itinerant 
justice. 168  Ranulf Briton (Brito), his brother, also sat on the Exchequer under the 
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patronage of de Burgh. 169  When these ties were present, however, they were not 
overwhelming.170 Justices of the Jews are recorded to have served on the Exchequer, 
King’s Bench, and Common Pleas in addition to having roles as justices’ itinerant 
without any apparent conceptual difficulty in performing their offices.171 Madox’s list 
of barons who served on the exchequer demonstrates a similar range. Roger Le 
Brabazon, for example, also served on the King’s Bench.172 The evidence that Brabazon 
was ‘admitted to all the king’s courts, councils, and parliaments as often as he might 
choose to be present’ during Edward II’s reign illustrates the flexibility of judicial office 
and the opportunity for the exchange of ideas between courts.173 William de Carleton 
and Peter of Leicester, as the final iusticiari Iudaeorum and afterward counted amongst 
the regular barons of the Exchequer, would have remembered their former offices.174 
William de Carleton had an eminent career in the exchequer, which reached its height 
when Edward created the title Chief Baron of the Exchequer in 1303 in 
acknowledgment of his long service.175 His position suggests he exerted the strongest 
influence on the survival of any legal principles unique to that receipt into the common 
law. 
 
The expectation that court officials could move where needed appears to have been an 
inherent part of their education. William de Middleton, a renowned judge after learning 
the law as a record clerk176, served first as a clerk in the Jewish Exchequer (1265) and 
later had responsibility for keeping writs and the collection of tallage. He then became 
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the custodian of writs in the King’s Bench (1276) before his appointment as a baron of 
the Exchequer (1286). 177  The author of The Mirror of Justices identified an issue 
associated with the broad nature of this method of appointment as it allowed justices and 
barons to apply their learning and experience from other appointments to whatever 
court of law they happened to preside over. The author complains, ‘it is an abuse that the 
officers of the Exchequer have jurisdiction in matters other than debts due to the king 
and his fees and franchises, without original writ from the chancery under white wax.’178 
The nuisance complained about follows from the uncertainty created by the inherent 
mobility of judicial office. Knowledge of the common law equipped medieval judges with 
sufficient ability to preside over any royal court. The Mirror of Justices indicates the 
defining characteristic of a judge is the nature of their commission rather than the court 
they presided over.179 Therefore, the mobility of judges is a feature of the medieval legal 
system that indicates the common law had ample opportunity to receive legal principles 
derived from the Jewish Exchequer’s peculiar jurisdiction despite silence from the 
treatises. The evolution of trust-like devices in the Jewish Exchequer, therefore, may have 
reflected common law attitudes that the law ought to accommodate the lawful wishes of 
donors. 
 
The evidence suggests that some trust-like concepts of the Jewish Exchequer survived. 
Britton discusses principles related to safekeeping under the head of obligation: 
 
It is clothed by a material thing, when anything is lent and borrowed, to be restored on a certain day; 
and by such loans the debtors are bound to restore to the creditors the things borrowed in as good 
or better condition than they received them, or else their value, unless by accident of fire, water, 
robbery, or larceny, they have lost them; for against such accidents no one ought to answer for things 
lost, unless they happened by his own fault or negligence (Brit. 29.3.3).  
 
The survival of these principles is unsurprising since Bracton had earlier established 
them as part of the common law.180 It is unclear to what extent halakha influenced the 
common law but the fact both jurisdictions agree on fundamental principles suggests the 
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opportunity for a transmission of ideas. The rules related to professionals, absent in both 
Bracton and Britton, may have been a result of Jewish ingenuity. Nonetheless, the practice 
of the Jewish Exchequer, as it was relevant to contemporary needs, survived the 
expulsion because of the interconnectivity of the royal courts. On the other hand, the use 
of fictitious attorneys was deliberately forgotten. This practice had been condemned in 
the past and curtailed by restrictions on Jewish transactions.181 The complaint in The 
Mirror of Justices appears to reflect on this earlier practice: ‘It is an abuse that those of the 
exchequer and others receive attorneys and recognizances without original writ from the 
chancery, whereas no one can do this who has not jurisdiction’.182 The Jewish Exchequer 
appears to have overstepped its jurisdiction to give effect to fictitious attorney 
arrangements.  
 
The growth of trust-like devices appears to reflect the growing paramountcy given to the 
intentions of the donor prior to the Statute of Westminster. This common law policy is 
apparent in De donis conditionalibus: 
 
After issue begotten and born between them, to whom the lands were given under such condition, 
heretofore such feoffees had power to alien the land so given, and to disherit their issue of the land, 
contrary to the minds of the givers, and contrary to the form expressed in the gift. 
 
The intendment of this passage is to give effect to the intention of the donor to benefit a 
third-party heir rather than the feoffee. Edward Coke best describes the common law 
policy behind the statute in the Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England that 
‘for disherisons, and breaking the express will and the intention of the donor are wrongs 
which this Act doth remedy’.183 Therefore, the feoffor has legal recourse if the condition 
is violated. This resonates with the use because its key characteristic is that the feoffee 
must carry out the instructions of the feoffor.184  The missing ingredient, however, is 
whether a third-party beneficiary, who is not the heir, had a cause of action to demand 
seisin against a feoffee who violated the condition. Plucknett suggests the common law 
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courts did not find an effective remedy for this issue.185 However, the policy to give effect 
to the intentions of feoffors was not contrary to the tenor of the common law. The latitude 
that the common law was prepared to treat gifts was stated as early as Bracton, which 
provides ‘modus (limitations on a gift) and condition are of many kinds, [for] we must 
always adhere to that upon which the parties have agreed, though contrary to what the 
law would provide, if it is not to the prejudice of others’ (Br. ii, p. 67). It appears that the 
practice in the Jewish Exchequer was the expansion of this common law policy. 
 
Chancery also engaged with the common law principles related to conditional feoffments. 
In 1273, it issued an order to restore the manor at Toppingho to Margery, widow of John 
le Ferrun, after an inquisition found the escheator was wrong to take it into the king’s 
hand.186  In 1272, Baldwin Filliol, a tenant-in-chief, demised the manor to John in an 
indenture, a contract for service, for 24 years. It provided: ‘If the conditions and pacts in 
the indenture should be observed on Baldwin’s part, the charter should be restored to 
him [Baldwin] at the end of the term’. However, John ‘restored the charter and released 
all his right and claim in the manor by reason of the charter’ before the expiration of the 
term. Baldwin then granted the manor to Margery for the unexpired remainder. The 
inquisition found John did not die seised of the manor as the original escheator believed 
and restored it to Margery ‘saving the rights of the king in wardship etc’. The escheator 
acted under a misunderstanding of the common law. He treated the gift as when Baldwin 
transferred livery of the manor to John. However, a fee is in suspense until the condition 
of services had been met (Br. ii, p. 144; Brit. 2.5.15). The original transaction between 
John and Baldwin was a gift with a condition because the charter was issued in triplicate 
and a neutral party held one copy according to the form of conditional grants prescribed 
by the common law (Brit. 2.8.2). John held the fee for a term of years and Baldwin could 
have proven the gift in court. He is saved from doing so, however, by Chancery’s power 
to remedy the mistakes of officials.  
 
Chancery reached the result above by reflecting on common law principles. However, it 
did not recognise that a use could have existed behind the arrangement. The following 
rule is important: ‘The donor never ceases to possess until the donee begins to possess, 
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for one having begun the other ceases’ (Br. ii, p. 130). John wished to avoid the situation 
where the diminished title of his wife to occupy the land would foreseeably result in her 
ejectment from the manor after his death. The solution was that legal title passed from 
John to Baldwin, and then from Baldwin to Margery. It appears the transfer was not 
originally planned. John initiated the transfer to Baldwin, likely in apprehension of death, 
because 23 years remained on the original 24-year indenture to prevent the implication 
that he died seised of the manor. This appears, and it did occur, to be an undesirable result 
for all involved. Nonetheless, this hidden arrangement approaches the nature of a use 
since Baldwin is a transitory holder and Margery is the final beneficiary. John could not 
transfer the land directly to Margery because the conditional nature of his feoffment 
meant he had imperfect ownership. He needed Baldwin’s intervention to complete his 
wishes during his lifetime since he could not devise the manor in a will contrary to the 
common law. Furthermore, it is unlikely that John would have quit the manor unless 
Baldwin agreed to a condition to transfer it to Margery afterward. This transaction is 
tantalising evidence to suggest that parties made uses during the thirteenth century. It 
was completed, however, before the matter went before Chancery, and there is no 
evidence to suggest Margery could have enforced the agreement between John and 
Baldwin. Instead, it appears Chancery considered that Baldwin assumed full legal title 




The coincidence of Edward as both crusader and a lawmaker seems to be the only 
element that ties the use to the Ninth Crusade. There is no further evidence that would 
otherwise suggest a connection. The abundance of legal sources paint a clear picture of 
the law and its function during the Ninth Crusade without indicating that English 
crusaders made uses. Instead, the combination of ecclesiastical privilege and protection 
clausum volumus furnished legal protection for families and land to accomplish what 
Maitland ascribed to the use. Britton shows that the common law used the crusade 
experience as a model for military organisation, replicated in the Anglo-French war, 
which relied on royal protection and the appointment of attorneys. It did not, however, 
develop a theory of the use. Even as royal protection failed, the law did not furnish the 
use as a response. Royal licences, supplementing the canon law privileges of the crusader, 
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were the only source of protection for knights. The ninth and tenth expeditions were the 
final opportunity to uncover evidence supporting Maitland example. The design of the 
crusader privileges and the royal protections show that medieval law was responsive to 
the predictably natural concern that arises from a prolonged absence from home. It is 
necessary to conclude, at this stage, that it is time to put the accepted truth to rest.  
 
The absence of evidence to support the accepted truth about a crusade connection shows 
the need for a stronger argument to supplant the common narrative. It is Edward’s role 
as lawmaker rather than crusader that appears to have inspired the development of the 
use in English law. The view of English legal history through the lens of the crusade 
movement, a known catalyst for the creation of legal arrangements, shows a growing 
trend in the common law to give effect to the intentions of feoffors. However, recent 
research showing that legal historians have misunderstood the nature of medieval 
Chancery indicates that the law the Chancellor applied in his decision-making was the 
common law. Britton includes the procedure Chancery applied in its systematic 
organisation of the Ninth Crusade in his treatise. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that 
the Second Statute of Westminster was an important milestone in the eventual 
development of uses. Its development appears to be a positive legislative reaction 
towards the growth of a policy in the common law to give effect to the intention behind 
the agreement. De donis conditionalibus imposed implicit conditions onto feoffments to 
protect the interests of feoffors and their heirs. It is unclear how far the practice of the 
Jewish Exchequer and the trust-like concepts canvassed in the previous chapter informed 
this policy. Nevertheless, it is unreasonable to suggest that memory of lex Iudaismi simply 
disappeared from the common law with the expulsion. The evidence suggests its practice 
reflects growing flexibility in the common law to give effect to the donor’s intentions 
before legislative expression enobled the policy as part of English law. It is necessary, 
therefore, to consider what effect the growth of this common law policy had on the origin 
of uses in order to supplant the accepted truth that the legal instrument has a relationship 
to the crusade movement.
Chapter 8. Fourteenth-Century Origins to the Use in the 
Common Law 
 
Historians have long based their research on a definition of the use that equates the 
instrument with trust and trust-like concepts. This approach depends on challenged 
notions about the practice of equity in the medieval period. The implication drawn in this 
chapter is that the search for the origin of the use has suffered from three centuries of 
misdirection. This thesis puts forward a new definition of the use as a gift or feoffment 
with a condition to definitively put to rest the idea that the use has some connection to 
the crusade movement. It is also a direct challenge to the established view that uses, like 
trusts, were a product of conscience and incompatible with the common law. This 
definition draws upon sixteenth-century commentary about how the Statute of Uses 
transformed the common law use into the trust in equity. Previous chapters have outlined 
how the common law sought to give effect to the intentions of landholders to deal with 
their land. The use grew out of this policy. This thesis has purposefully adopted a narrow 
definition, a feoffor grants land to a feoffee to convey to another, to furnish a precise 
starting-point to define what a use is and to explore where its origins may lie. It is a 
surprise that legal historians have ignored the common law as a source. In addition to 
being a known jurisdiction, the common law recognised and enforced legal arrangements 
analogous to but more complex than the use without conceptual difficulty. By analogy to 
other common law feoffments, it is also possible to identify the legal principles that 
governed the operation of uses. This chapter takes a novel approach to argue one of the 
most enduring mysteries in legal history: the origin of the use. 
 
Uses: A Gift with a Condition 
 
The thesis puts forward the idea that the use developed as a species of gift with a 
condition. It is necessary to point out that conceptualising the use as a species of gift 
does not import the donative character of modern gifts. The classification of the use as 
a common law gift with a condition would make sense to medieval jurists.1 Britton 
comments: ‘Gift is a more general term than feoffment; for gift applies to all things 
movable and immovable, and feoffment is only of soil, whereof a person, being 
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wrongfully ejected, may recover seisin’ (Brit. 2.3.1). The text also outlines the effect of 
a condition. The gift is ‘absolute at the beginning’, there is livery of seisin, which is 
‘afterwards restrained by this clause: the [feoffee] shall [only have power] to alien the 
gift to a certain person’ (Brit. 2.3.9). Therefore, the condition acts to fetter the 
incidences of full legal ownership of the land by requiring the feoffee to perform an 
additional obligation. In the case of a feoffment of use, the effect of the condition is that 
the feoffee’s ownership is never realised nor intended by the parties. Britton indicates 
a feoffment, like other species of gifts and obligation, must be clothed in five incidents: 
some material thing capable of being granted, words of agreement, a charter in writing 
either absolute or conditional, delivery, and a unity of will (ad idem) (Brit. 2.8.1). The 
five incidents are also included in Fleta (Fl. 3.7). It follows that a feoffment can only be 
made if the feoffor is of a sound and disposing mind.2  From a starting point that 
conceptualises the use as a common law feoffment, it is possible to furnish a basic 
definition of the use: ‘A use is a private feoffment of land to a feoffee or feoffees on a 
condition to transfer it to some other named person’. It might be added ‘to avoid 
restrictions on devises (testamentary grants of land)’, which defines the instrument in 
agreement with early modern commentary. 
 
A definition that associates the use with the common law builds upon Haskett’s 
conclusion that ‘the hard work to find this equity before the sixteenth century has been 
misplaced’.3 The same appears to be true of the use. It is curious that several sixteenth-
century authorities seem to have been ignored by modern historians. Foremost is 
Henry Swinburne’s A Brief Treatise of Testaments and Last Wills (1590), a civilian, 
whose treatment of devises included the following description on uses: 
 
there was also sometimes used and practised, of devising lands, tenements, and hereditaments by 
wills to certain uses, intents and trusts, which wills or testaments of lands, tenements and 
hereditaments were for the time accompted and take for good. But this custom was reformed in 
many things…4  
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The reform to the custom that is mentioned refers to the Statute of Uses (1536), which 
aimed to protect heirs and address uncertainties surrounding other legal rights that 
fifteenth-century uses caused.5 Swinburne, born in 1551, practised in the ecclesiastical 
courts from the age of sixteen, and held various judicial postings in addition to his role 
as an advocate.6 The statute was within living memory when he practised law, and it 
is likely he appreciated the nature of uses and the effect of the statute while writing 
the treatise that later English courts routinely cited for testamentary issues.7 A notable 
aspect of Swinburne’s work is that he treats the use under the following head: certain 
cases approved by custom, wherein it is lawful to devise lands, tenements, or 
hereditaments. This indicates he conceptualised the use alongside other customary 
exceptions to the common law that allowed devises of land. Namely, Gavelkind, a 
customary division of lands amongst all heirs, and land held in Burgage tenure 
divisible by will. 8  These customary usages are particular customs, pertaining to a 
specific locality, while uses appear in Swinburne’s treatment as a general custom 
available throughout England.9 The common law did permit customary exceptions to 
its rules.  
 
Another authoritative work that appears to have been ignored is Edward Coke’s The 
First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England: Or a Commentary on Littleton 
(1628).10 The commentary concerns an opinion that Thomas Littleton put forward in 
his Tenures (1481) that discusses whether a release by a feoffee to the feoffor is valid 
if the latter continues to occupy the land after the feoffment (sect. 462).11 He first 
canvassed the possibility it would be invalid because there is no privity between the 
parties in the absence of a lease. However, he adds two reasons why the release is valid. 
The first is that the feoffer then may occupy the land at the will of the feoffee, and this 
creates privity between the parties (sect. 463). Littleton opines that the law presumes 
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a privity in the arrangement because only a release to the feoffer and their heirs would 
be valid (sect. 463).12 Nonetheless, the arguments Littleton canvassed demonstrate 
that issues involving uses, prior to the Statute of Uses, could be resolved according to 
principles of common law and without a special reference to equity. On this part of 
Littleton’s commentary, Coke comments: ‘Lands and tenements conveyed upon 
confidences, uses, and trusts are to be ruled and decided … by the judges of the law: 
for that it appears by this and the next section, they are within the intendment and 
construction of the laws of the realm’.13  Coke states the Statute of Uses rendered 
Littleton’s opinion on the issue moot, but he notes ‘that uses were at the common 
law’.14 On the effect of the Statute, he states that judges construed it ‘against the letter’ 
according to principles of equity. The result is that remedy could only be sought in 
Chancery.15 Neither Swinburne nor Coke, or Littleton for that matter, connect the use 
to equity. Swinburne comments that the Statute of Uses reformed uses while Coke, 
with greater hindsight, can say that the effect of the statute was to bring uses into the 
equitable jurisdiction of Chancery as trusts. 
 
One plausible explanation for the apparent oversight by legal historians is the careless 
imposition of equity onto the use by subsequent editors of their work. John D. M. 
Derrett, Swinburne’s biographer, opined that ‘editions after his last are defaced with 
innumerable misprints and errors in citation’.16 This is observable when comparing 
accounts of the use in later editions of A Brief Treatise of Testaments and Last Wills. For 
example, a seventh edition published in 1793 removes references to customary law 
and replaces it with an explanation that is entirely the editor’s invention: 
 
The usual way in former days to dispose lands which men had by purchase was be feoffments in 
trusts; and they directed by their last wills, how those feoffees should dispose the estates; and 
because a trust was properly under the jurisdiction of a court of equity: That court would compel 
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the feoffee to execute the trust, the case he should refuse to do it at the request of the persons for 
whom he was entrusted.17 
 
The editor of the fifth edition in 1728 similarly inserts ‘before this statute was made 
[Statute of Uses] … [there] was no remedy against [a feoffee] for a breach of trust, but 
only in Chancery’.18 Once more the editor is treating the use as a creature of equity. The 
fourth edition published in 1677 faithfully reproduces Swinburne’s account without 
correction. 19  Coke’s work received a similar treatment. Charles Butler, for example, 
included a note next to Coke’s writings on the use that the cestui que trust was a feudal 
idea grafted onto Roman jurisprudence despite his source saying nothing of the kind.20 
These later editions continue to colour how historians treat description of uses with 
reference to equity. For example, David Johnston states Francis Bacon indicated in his 
Reading upon the Statute of Uses that the civil law principles influenced the mind of the 
chancellor. 21  However, this description appears to apply only to the later phases of 
development, when, as Bacon notes, uses found ‘remedy in conscience’ when the common 
law could not enforce them.22 In fact, Bacon limited his observation to the comment that 
the fidecommissum resembled the use.23 
 
Precursory devices and the development of Common law policy 
 
The association between the use and equity means that other sources, namely the 
common law, have been ignored. However, the assertion that the use is a product of the 
common law is prima facie rebutted by the longstanding rule that there could be no 
devise of land prior to the Statute of Wills (32 Hen. 8, c. 1). Bacon states that uses ‘could 
never obtain any manner of remedy at the common law’, but at the same time they were 
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instruments capable of devising land. 24  Bacon observed the contradiction effectively 
allowed feoffors to devise land contrary to the longstanding common law rule. 25 
Swinburne seems to have avoided this apparent contradiction in the common law by 
suggesting that uses were a general customary exception. The common law, however, 
encompasses all general customs, which suggests the use never violated the rule against 
devises. The common law was prepared to enforce all manner of conditions attached to 
gifts and feoffments since the thirteenth century. Bracton states ‘condition are of many 
kinds, [for] we must always adhere to that upon which the parties have agreed, though 
contrary to what the law would provide, if it is not to the prejudice of others’ (Br. ii, p. 67). 
The latitude in which the common law was prepared to treat gifts provided ample 
opportunity for the use to develop in English law. On the other hand, this also means there 
is opportunity to confound uses with similar devices. The most common being custodial 
relationships.26 Brit. 1.23.11 makes clear that custodial guardianships, such as a lord over 
a ward or a parson over a church, do not divest their charges of the land. In the case of 
wardship, the ward is seised in common with their lord. The continued seisin means the 
ward has an action against a guardian to account for their office in a manner that 
resembles a bailiff rather than a feoffee.27 
 
The common law was familiar with two conditional devices to control the descent of land 
that were precursors of the use. The first is the reversion. Reversions are defined by 
Bracton as a condition, tacit or express, imposed on a feoffment of land given in 
maritagium (marriage portion) that states the land will revert to the feoffor if the feoffee 
has no descendants (Br. ii, p. 81). The device proved popular during the thirteenth 
century as a method to control the descent of real property and to prevent escheat. In 
Bracton’s time, the reversion had developed to encompass other kinds of feoffment.28 Its 
effectiveness is illustrated in an inquisition (1273) that orders the escheator to deliver 
lands at Waledon to William Lovel, coming into the king’s hand after the death of his son, 
because William enfeoffed his son upon condition that the land would revert if he died 
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without an heir.29 By the end of the thirteenth century, the reversion allowed feoffors to 
make flexible grants of land to create life interests. (Fl. 3.12). Britton states that a reversion 
can be attached to a gift that becomes operative if the donee makes an alienation contrary 
to the intention of the donor (Brit. 1.6.1). Furthermore, reversions never contradicted the 
common law rule against devises. The court in one case (1339) concerning competing 
claims to land between a man’s wife and his executors, where the latter argued they had 
been enfeoffed on his deathbed to sell and deal with land for the good of his soul, 
observed: ‘A man would have no small difficulty in devising a reversion, and making that 
devise maintainable in law, particularly in this case, in which the devise was made to sell 
and deal therewith for the good of the soul’.30 Nonetheless, it is apparent that despite this 
limitation that a reversion could be used to make arrangements that were testamentary 
in nature. For example, an enrolment (1348) records that the brothers Henry and William 
de Causton bound themselves to William Daunvers, making an enfeoffment to him as 
security, which included a reversion condition that Henry would secure five chaplains to 
sing for Daunvers’ soul if he died in the meantime.31 
 
The second conditional device is the remainder which, when annexed to a feoffment, 
allowed a person to control how their land descended after their death and the death of 
others. 32  Remainders came into common usage at the beginning of the fourteenth 
century, not mentioned in either Britton or Fleta, and allowed feoffors a considerable 
degree of flexibility to control land. Multiple remainders could determine the fortunes of 
land through multiple generations. A licence (1328) granted to Robert, son of Robert de 
Haustede, allowed him to enfeoff Henry de Wodhouse of his land on condition that the 
feoffee granted it to his mother for life, with a remainder to his father, with remainder in 
fee tail to his daughter and son-in-law, and with an ultimate remainder to himself in fee 
simple.33 The ultimate remainder effectively ensured that the property was not lost to 
Robert during his lifetime. This example also illustrates how a remainder could facilitate 
a grant of land to relatives on the ascending and descending line. Furthermore, the 
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remainder could also delay an heir from entering an estate. For example, an inquisition 
(1359) into the estate of John de Glydesburgh states he bequeathed tenements, according 
to the custom of London (burgage tenure), to his brother with a remainder in fee tail to 
three bastard daughters and an ultimate remainder to his next heir.34 Remainders could 
also ensure that heirs did receive their inheritance. The grant to a spouse that includes a 
life interest may impose a condition that they cannot grant it to anybody except their 
lawful heir, with a remainder over to the heir once the spouse is deceased. 35  Both 
instruments, the reversion and the remainder, were a consequence of a policy in the 
common law to give effect to the intention of donors and the conditions imposed on 
feoffments notwithstanding the rule against devises. 
 
The growing popularity of conditional devices to control the fortune of land at the turn of 
the fourteenth century favours Bacon’s argument that uses emerged sometime before 
Richard II’s reign.36 Several legal historians already support this view. Charles Donahue 
Jr. made a brazen comment, unsupported by evidence, that: 
 
The most important thing that happened in the fourteenth century with regard to the land law was 
the development of the feoffment to uses, the ancestor of the modern trust. The origins of the use lie 
before the fourteenth century, but there is little doubt that the practice of making feoffments to uses 
increased substantially in the fourteenth century. Just how substantially is difficult to determine.37 
 
Donahue Jr. appears to subscribe to an insular view of the use and he builds on what that 
school accepts. Namely that Anthony D. Hargreaves uncovered the earliest known 
example of the use in a case in 1409 where the Chancellor ordered re-conveyance of land, 
that was the subject of a feoffment with an oral condition to re-enfeoff the original feoffer, 
which the feoffee refused to perform. 38  The decision was made in favour of a living 
feoffor. The conclusion that uses flowed from the expansion of conditional grants 
recognised by the common law also adopts an insular approach. However, it is also 
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necessary to build on what Joseph Biancalana has already acknowledged: ‘The traditional 
view that the common law courts did not recognize uses is a little too simple’. 39  In 
addition to the rolls series, there are a small number of cases that suggest the common 
law recognised and enforced uses. 
 
Legal nature of the Uses in England 
 
Legal historians have found evidence of the existence of uses throughout the fourteenth 
century. However, the frequency in which uses appear in the record is informed by their 
definition. Biancalana, the most recent authority to advance a fourteenth-century origin, 
criticised J. M. W. Bean’s definition that encompassed custodial arrangements using the 
expression ad opus because they lacked the essential ingredient of uses: transfer of legal 
title to the feoffee.40  However, Biancalana’s definition, identified in this thesis as too 
broad, appears to be coloured by Bean’s research. Biancalana argued that ‘isolated 
instances of feoffments to uses appear as early as the 1320s. Uses became more frequent, 
though not very numerous, in the 1330s and 1340s’. 41  He cites, as an example, an 
inquisition (1326) that records Robert de Pynkenye enfeoffed his daughter Alice of rent 
and another for life, which was now held by his heir William de Pynkenye.42 It is unclear 
why Biancalana thought this arrangement approached the nature of a use since the 
creation of life interests, or term of life, were not novel to the fourteenth century nor the 
common law. It is arguable that the conditional nature of life interests led to the 
association with the use. Their explicit mention in Bracton as conditional gifts indicates 
that feoffors could create life interests over land in the mid-thirteenth century. The 
condition being that after the expiry of the life interest, the land reverts back to the feoffor 
or their heir (Br. ii, p. 106). The form of this conditional device did not change when 
Britton treated life interests under the head of reversions (Brit. 1.6.1). Both passages 
accurately described the law applicable to Robert de Pynkenye and the reversion back to 
his heir. Biancalana cites several other life interests as evidence of uses being practiced 
in the early fourteenth century.43 The confusion appears to stem from Bean’s observation 
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that uses could ‘comprise several different types of settlements’, including life interests, 
which Biancalana references with approval. 44  It illustrates that the identification of 
arrangements as uses ought to be done with care if they are to be distinguished from 
other species of gift with a condition.  
 
Legal historians have posited examples of arrangements made by people going overseas 
as uses. 45  John Barton, Robert Palmer, Bean, Biancalana all identified one legal 
arrangement as a use that fits the definition adopted in this thesis.46  Proceedings in 
Council (1375) record how John le Hastings, Earl of Pembroke, had licence in 1369 to 
make a feoffment of certain castles, counties, and lordships, and discretion to alienate or 
demise all other lands.47 Before he went to Gascony to fight in the Hundred Years War, 
Hastings enfeoffed certain persons and instructed them to carry out the instructions in a 
schedule. The feoffees brought the schedule to the council at Westminster, ‘which was 
before the council opened, and there viewed and understood’ on 5 May 1372. It instructed 
them to pay his debts if his executors had insufficient chattels to satisfy them and 
afterward enfeoff named persons of his estate. If he had no heir, Hastings instructed his 
feoffees to enfeoff Sir William Beauchamp of his estate on condition that he bears his arms 
and that he and his heirs will bear his name.48 Beauchamp agreed to the condition before 
the council on this date. Hastings had enfeoffed his feoffees with the purpose of carrying 
out testamentary instructions and enfeoff a third party. Furthermore, it must be observed 
that Hastings fits the model of a knight about to leave to fight in the Hundred Years War. 
It is a situation analogous to the example posed by Maitland of a crusader who creates a 
use as part of his legal preparations to protect his family and property during his absence. 
Legal historians have vindicated Maitland’s instinct that knights made uses before going 
overseas to fight. The precursor to licences issued to knights during the Hundred Years 
War are found during the Ninth Crusade as discussed in the previous chapter.49 However, 
those licences granted powers to attorneys and executors as personal representatives 
without being enfeoffed before the crusader departed. 
                                                          
44 Bean, The Decline of English Feudalism, p. 118; Biancalana, Itinera Fiduciae, p. 113. 
45 Biancalana, Itinera Fiduciae, p. 112; Palmer, English Law in the Age of the Black Death, p. 118. 
46 Barton, The Law Quarterly Review, p. 568; Bean, The Decline of English Feudalism, p. 164; Biancalana, p. 112; 
Palmer, p. 129. 
47 CCR (1374 - 1377), pp. 286 – 288. See R. I. Jack, ‘Hastings, John le’, ODNB, vol. 25, pp. 767 – 768.  
48 See P. Coss, ‘Beauchamp, William’, ODNB, vol. 8, p. 604.  




The licence granted in this arrangement was necessary for Hastings to leave for France, 
but does not suggest a person needed legal privileged to make a use (Brit. 6.7.3). Instead, 
the licence allows his feoffees to enfeoff Beauchamp to continue the Hastings family name 
if there is no lawful heir. Feoffors practiced this succession strategy throughout the 
fourteenth century. Edmund Deyncurt received licence in 1314 to enfeoff whomever he 
wished of all his lands on condition that they bear his surname and arms to preserve his 
memory since his daughter Isabella was his heir apparent.50 This privileged arrangement 
is reminiscent of and equivalent to civil law adoption. The common law never recognised 
adoption as an institution.51 Nonetheless, the evidence indicates a limited practice did 
exist. The use outlined above is not a privileged arrangement but a private law instrument 
supported by royal licence. This conferred evidentiary advantages that allowed royal 
authority to act with certainty. This worked to Hastings advantage. In 1375, the king 
ordered the escheator not meddle with Hasting’s lands in Bergeveny because he held 
none there. Hastings had enfeoffed his feoffees, who held the land, with instructions to 
give it to John and Anne for their lives.52 Licences also supported the enforcement of other 
uses. This is evident in a licence (1374) granted to John de Mohun and his wife Joan to 
enfeoff Simon, bishop of London, and others to his land.53 It records that the king also 
granted licence by other letters patent for Joan to instruct the feoffees to grant the land 
to any secular person that Joan ‘should wish to name’. The law obligated feoffees to either 
carry out a feoffor’s instructions or obtain a licence from the king to quit the feoffment. 
In the case above, one of the feoffees released his right to his co-feoffees without licence, 
which consequentially required the remaining feoffees to pay the king half a mark for a 
trespass. The trespass is the consequence of not adhering to the condition of their 
feoffment. 
 
The evidentiary advantages of obtaining a licence meant feoffors sought them before 
making a use. Simon de Burgh and Joan, joint owners of land, enfeoffed two chaplains of 
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certain manors with instructions to enfeoff parts of their land to certain third parties.54 
However, there were other methods available to protect the integrity of uses. The most 
popular means of protection was an enrolment of the feoffment in Chancery. In 1375, a 
charter recorded Thomas de Ponynges gave instructions in his will to both his executors 
and his feoffees to carry out his estate with the latter to perform his will (pay debts) and 
afterward enfeoff a designated person. 55  The following year, the king ordered the 
escheator to release the lands taken into his hands after Thomas’ death to allow the 
feoffees to carry out the instructions of the schedule that had been enrolled and 
witnessed in Chancery.56 This use and the testamentary instructions contained in the 
schedule could be enforced against would-be intruders. This also applied to knights off to 
fight in the Hundred Years War. Sir William de Molyns, who is going to France to fight in 
1367, enrolled an indenture that enfeoffs four feoffees of his lands under the condition 
that the feoffees made arrangements for his and his ancestors’ souls, enfeoff his heir 
Richard with a remainder to other children, enfeoff his next heir in default, or, on failure 
of any heirs, dispose them at their discretion. 57  The condition continues: If William 
returns it would be lawful for him to re-enter the lands ‘at his will’. In 1372, Sir Ralph 
Basset made a similar indenture in Chancery before he left for Gascony, which contained 
instructions to his feoffees that they should enfeoff his wife if he died.58 The evidence 
supports Biancalana’s observation that most uses appear towards the end of Edward III’s 
reign, as Bacon had noted in his Reading, but the above charters do not illustrate the legal 
principles that governed uses. 
 
Conceptualising the Use  
 
The striking feature about the history of the use in England is that another species of gift 
with a condition dominated the record. A landholder could make a feoffment with a 
condition, referred to here as an enfeoff re-enfeoff condition, which compels the feoffee 
to re-enfeoff the feoffor as joint owner of the land with a third party. The object of the 
condition is to resettle the land by changing its legal condition. Barton poignantly noted 
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this species of feoffment appears throughout the fourteenth century and uses, in 
comparison, occur very rarely even when accounting for the possibility of an incomplete 
record.59 A plausible explanation for this trend is that the enfeoff re-enfeoff arrangement, 
itself a product of more complicated legal reasoning, provided a more effective 
mechanism to protect family or property. Barton observed: ‘In settlements by feoffment 
and re-feoffment, it was normal practice to attach to the estate of the feoffee a condition 
entitling the feoffor to re-enter if the property was not re-conveyed, and such conditions 
could easily be adapted to settlements to uses’.60 This idea can be taken further. It is 
possible to draw a picture, by analogy to enfeoff re-enfeoff feoffments, about how the 
common law conceptualised and enforced uses. This approach is contrary to the 
argument that uses developed out of enfeoff re-enfeoff arrangement.61 Nevertheless, the 
evidence suggests both arrangements, as a species of common law feoffment, developed 
out of the same policy considerations and served a similar function. 
 
The policy to give effect to the intention of feoffors making enfeoff re-enfeoff 
arrangementsis first found in thirteenth-century licences. In 1278, Edward I granted 
licence to John de Criel ‘to enfeoff Walter de Sturton, king’s yeoman of the manor of 
Estwelles, co. Kent, which he holds in chief, for the latter to re-enfeoff the said John and 
Eleanor his wife (as joint owners), in fee tail, with remainder to the right heirs of John’.62 
An important feature of the enfeoff re-enfeoff condition is the creation of joint ownership. 
Bean conflated this function with the purpose of uses.63 The use is distinguished from the 
enfeoff re-enfeoff condition arrangement because its object is to benefit a third party 
rather than resettle the fee. However, it is evident that the changes in the common law to 
accommodate both species of feoffments occurred during the first half of the fourteenth 
century. The impact of this policy on the common law is illustrated in a case heard in 
1346. William Derby brought an action against the Dean of Warwick that concerned land 
held jointly.64 The court noted the law had only recently been settled. Joint ownership 
created a divisible title in land, which meant a joint owner could not be disseised at law 
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because of the act of a co-owner. This followed from the reasoning that if a joint owner 
disseised the other who brought an action against them, and title could not be divided, 
the absurd position would arise that the concerned parties would be both plaintiffs and 
defendants. Formerly there was no such division of ownership. 
 
The origins of the enfeoff re-enfeoff condition are clearer than the use. At the beginning 
of the century, the courts had already settled fundamental principles about the effect of 
joint ownership in land. The feoffors were the primary beneficiaries of the arrangement. 
In 1304, the court heard a case concerning a deceased feoffor who had jointly enfeoffed 
his widow, son, and daughter during his lifetime.65 The widow remarried but her new 
husband alienated the land held jointly by her and her children to Coupe of Canterbury. 
The widow and children sought a writ of novel disseisin against Coupe after the new 
husband died. It was argued, successfully, that a feme covert could not be disseised and 
the widow’s action failed. However, Hengham gave the following judgement in favour of 
the children: 
 
Suppose that three men are joint-feoffees of land, and that Sir Elias my companion disseise all three, 
and that two of them make releases and acquittances to Sir Elias while he is in seisin. Do you not 
think that the third shall recover his purparty against Sir Elias? Certainly, he shall be Novel Disseisin. 
 
This case indicates that the common law had settled the idea of joint and severable title 
in land to allow any joint owner to enforce their legal right to the land by the beginning 
of the century. The estate planning potential of the enfeoff re-enfeoff arrangement was 
clear from the outset of its invention. Its primary purpose was to benefit the feoffor and 
his descendants. 66  However, the condition was occasionally designed to benefit the 
feoffee. In 1302, a case concerned an arrangement where a father did not permit a man 
to marry his daughter unless he enfeoffed her of his land. 67  The parties reached an 
agreement that the man would enfeoff the father, and then the father would enfeoff his 
daughter. The father was seised for fifteen days and afterward enfeoffed his daughter and 
the man jointly. During the fifteen days, the father let the pasture and carried off the 
beasts he found there. Furthermore, the court held that the joint enfeoffment gave the 
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daughter a right in the land beyond the rules of coverture. This case is exceptional but 
illustrates the flexibility of the arrangement.  
 
Recognizances in Chancery, intended to prevent legal disputes between parties, appear 
to have been important to the enforcement of all species of conditional feoffment, which 
includes uses. Concerning the enfeoff re-enfeoff condition, the feoffor and feoffee could 
acquire a recognizance prior to livery of seisin that outlines the intentions of the parties 
and the condition to be performed. Upon performance, the recognizance is cancelled and 
the feoffee is quit of their legal obligation. The arrangement made by Thomas de 
Faucomberge is a model example: 
 
Thomas should enfeoff certain particular persons of all lands which he holds in fee and heritage, so 
that they might again enfeoff the said Thomas and Constance his wife under a particular form; and 
because the said Constance after in November 42 Edward III, appearing in person in chancery, 
acknowledged that the condition was fulfilled, the king ordered the chancellor that this recognizance 
should be cancelled, wherefore it is cancelled.68 
 
This procedure implies that because Thomas does not name the feoffees, whoever they 
might be, there is clear intention behind the feoffment that the feoffees are only 
intermediary landholders. The existence of a recognizance allowed either party to compel 
performance in a court of law.69 Its absence would have made proving non-performance 
more difficult. Chancery was not the only forum where an undertaking of this nature 
could be performed. It could also be achieved by a fine before the common law courts.70 
However, the frequent recognizances issued out of Chancery suggest that people 
preferred the expedient processes it had developed and tended to avoid the courts of law. 
 
The enforcement of enfeoff re-enfeoff feoffments in the common law courts is illustrative 
of how the common law principles could easily accommodate the use. The courts could 
compel the feoffee to perform either during the life of the feoffor or after death. 
Enforcement during the lifetime of the feoffor was straight-forward. For example, a 
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feoffor made a feoffment with a condition stated verbally on livery of seisin that the 
feoffee will re-enfeoff the feoffor and his wife jointly. The feoffee refused its performance 
once seised.71 The court held that the feoffor could oust the feoffee without it being a 
disseisin because of the intentions of the parties. Before discussing the enforcement of a 
condition made by a deceased feoffor, it is necessary to appreciate what a completed 
enfeoff re-enfeoff feoffment could achieve for joint owners. First, it allowed the joint 
owner to avoid the consequences of escheat. This is illustrated in several orders issued 
out of Chancery that command the escheator not to molest the lands belonging to William 
de Roos, because he was jointly enfeoffed with his wife Margery, even though he died 
without an heir and the land ought to have escheated. 72  Second, it could avoid the 
consequences of civil death, a loss of legal rights, which resulted from a felony and the 
forfeiture. A wife, as joint owner of the land, could compel the escheator to return land 
that had been taken into his hand because of her husband’s felony.73 The fundamental 
feature that allowed these conditional feoffments to stand in favour of a joint owner is 
that they were made in good faith and without fraud.  
 
The enforcement of an incomplete enfeoff re-enfeoff condition depended on the good 
faith of the parties. The Royal courts heard the following case where the condition failed. 
Robert, Lord of Clifford, obtained licence to enfeoff certain chaplains of his lands in 
plenary seisin to re-enfeoff to him and his male heirs in the future.74 Robert died before 
he could be re-enfeoffed and the land was taken into the king’s hands. The chaplains 
argued that it was at their pleasure when to re-enfeoff the heir since they still enjoyed the 
king’s licence. However, the court held that failure to re-enfeoff Robert meant the 
condition failed and the feoffee’s continued seisin disinherited the heir. The reason for 
the decision was issued, the court acknowledges, with the advice of King’s Council. It 
favours the wardship rights of the king. Furthermore, there is an implication that the 
chaplains were not acting in good faith. The uncertainty of the decision is apparent in the 
statement that ‘through the King’s seizure the heir will have the fee simple, and the 
chaplains, who have no title to their own use, can release, and then the right of everyone 
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will be saved’. A later case with analogous facts had a different result. In 1358, Sir Robert 
de Manners enfeoffed vicar John de Wyrksall to his land with instruction that he enfeoff 
Robert, his wife Alina, and his heirs.75 Robert died fifteen days later but John enfeoffed 
Alina with a remainder to Robert’s heirs. However, the escheator took the land into his 
hand under the mistaken impression Robert died seised of the estate. Edward III allowed 
Alina to keep the land, even though the King lost wardship of Robert’s heirs because the 
grant to John was ‘made in good faith and not as a fraud’. The feoffment has the effect of 
avoiding the incidences of wardship, which is an outcome that the courts acknowledge as 
approaching a fraud. This charter indicates the length of time between a feoffment and 
the possible fraudulent activity is considered a relevant factor. The King’s apparent 
knowledge of Robert’s good faith may have reflected his position as a trusted favourite.76 
Nonetheless, the common law enforced the intentions of the parties, even against their 
lord (Fl. 1.11.11), provided there is no implication of fraud. This principle can be 
discerned in the enforcement of uses. 
 
Enforcement in the Common Law 
 
The analogies drawn between uses and enfeoff re-enfeoff arrangements, recognising both 
as common law gifts with a condition, are persuasive since there is a commonality of legal 
principles. They developed alongside each other as a product of the same policy to give 
effect to the intentions of mentally sound donors (see Fl. 1.11.8). The paramountcy that 
the common law gave to the intention of feoffors is illustrated by the rule that a feoffee 
must ‘perform it [a condition] anew’ if the feoffor refused to accept its performance.77 In 
some cases, a use could devise land from a family permanently. In 1377, Thomas de 
Fynchale instructed that certain lands in Solihull are to remain in the hands of his feoffees 
and sold within two years of his death and ‘the purchase money to be paid to Sarah his 
wife, for the use of his children, and for masses for his soul’.78 The primary legal limitation 
is that the feoffor must make their intentions known to the feoffee. For example, a 
variation of the condition can only occur if the feoffor intimated they accepted later 
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performance or waived the condition.79 Another principle is that the feoffor must make 
the condition plain in their feoffment because failure to notify a feoffee of a condition 
voided it. This rule is outlined in a case (1340) where the defendant satisfied the first 
condition but the plaintiff argued that another existed.80 The court held the defendant 
had no notice of the second condition, which meant he acquired good title. There was one 
legal principle that fundamentally affected the operation of uses as an instrument with 
the effect of devising land: Both seisin and the condition must be made during the lifetime 
of the feoffor.81 The effect of this principle is illustrated in an inquisition (1390) into the 
affairs of John Atherson, which reveals he made a feoffment in 1370 on condition that the 
feoffees followed his will, who took seisin of the land, which he would later declare to 
them. 82  The feoffees could not perform the condition because Atherson died before 
making his wishes known. John’s land was taken into the hand of the king. Incidentally, 
this charter concerned tenements in Calais and is evidence that the common law, at least 
concerning feoffments, applied to that Pale.  
 
On the question of enforcement of uses, the danger associated with it as a tool to devise 
land is plain: legal intervention is necessary if the feoffee refuses to follow the condition. 
The petition (1329) to the King’s council brought by Henry, son and heir of John Harclay, 
illustrates the issue: 
 
John de Harcla being in extremis on Tuesday after St. Martin 16 Edward II about the hour of vespers 
made a charter to Andrew de Harcla and died in the night following about cockcrow seised of 18 
bovates of land in Slegil, so that the said Andrew by pretext of the said charter had no seisin thereof 
in the lifetime of the said John. The charter was made on condition that the said Andrew, having had 
seisin, should enfeoff Henry son and heir of the said John of the said 18 acres in a certain form as to 
which the jurors are ignorant. The said Andrew immediately after the death of the said John intruded 
himself into the said land and held it until by his forfeiture it was taken into the hand of King Edward 
II.83 
 
                                                          
79 Y. B. Hil. no. 32 (20 Edw. III, pt. 1). 
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82 Cal. Inq. Misc, v 5., no. 303. 
83 Cal. Inq. Misc. v. 2, no. 1072. See H. Summerson, ‘Harclay, Andrew’, ODNB, vol. 25, pp. 115 – 117; M. 
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In the above case, Henry is arguing Andrew Harclay disseised him of his lawful 
inheritance when his uncle violated the condition of the grant and kept the property. It 
could be expected that John could trust Andrew to convey the property because of their 
familial relationship (brothers). However, the issue only became known because Andrew 
forfeited the land and it came into the hands of the escheator. The petition does not 
expressly state the outcome since Chancery was in the process of cataloguing the land 
that belonged to John, but it had been seized into the king’s hand because of Andrew’s 
forfeiture. His dishonesty played a key role in determining whether the use was valid. 
 
The charter is inherently problematic. Andrew, as its antagonist, was hung, drawn, and 
quartered for treason after the treaty Edward II empowered him to make with Robert the 
Bruce contained a term that he would not come to the King’s aid if the Scots invaded 
England and left his lands in peace.84 The depth of Edward’s personal animosity led him 
to degrade Andrew in death and strip him of his honours.85 It served Edward’s purpose 
to have Andrew cast in the role of the villain, and evidence of a dishonourable betrayal of 
his brother and kin further speaks to his treasonous inclinations. It appears that Henry 
Harclay adopted a pragmatic approach in this petition to ensure the family patrimony 
remained intact. Later he would petition Edward III to pardon his deceased uncle.86 The 
hostility is reflected in the confused legal narrative of the petition. On one hand, it appears 
that Andrew did receive seisin of the land and refused to perform the condition. However, 
it is also imputed that Andrew simply intruded on the land to disseise Henry. It is clear, 
however, legal justification existed to ensure Henry should receive the land either as a 
natural right as John’s heir or as the object of the compact made between his father and 
uncle. The underlying question, however, is whether John Harclay made a use in the early 
fourteenth century. It is likely that he did. The legal narrative in this charter at least had 
to be plausible regardless of the hostility towards Andrew, and there is nothing in this 
charter to suggest the original feoffment with a condition as a deathbed grant is unusual 
or illegal on its face. The attack on its validity does not attack its form but the fact livery 
of seisin did not occur during John’s lifetime. The charter suggests the feoffment failed 
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because it was made on a deathbed rather than the arrangement itself was illegal. 
Furthermore, there is no implication that this charter was illegal because it was made 
without a licence. Despite this clear confusion, the underlying policy concern is the 
apparent dishonesty of the Andrew.  
 
The dishonesty element in Andrew’s charter, notwithstanding Edward’s hostility, plays a 
key role in the enforcement of other uses. An early example of a use appears in the third 
volume of the Calendar of inquisitions miscellaneous, which demonstrates the law 
generally sought to enforce uses. The full text of the inquisition (1359) reads: 
 
John de Eglysfeld deceased on Monday after St. Patrick in March 26 Edward III (1352), long before 
his death enfeoffed by his charter Roger de Kirkeoswald and John Broun, chaplains, of all his lands 
in co. Cumberland, viz., in Castelkayrok, Gamilesby, Grenhowe, Langholm, Cryngildyk, Hedresford, 
Crokedayk, Eglisfeld, and Kirkebampton, held of divers lords and of the yearly value of 2s., excepting 
lands in Glassonby, which he held of the king in chief, and 8s. of rent in Kirkebampton whereof he 
died seised. The said chaplains continued their seisin for two years and afterwards enfeoffed Joan 
daughter of the said John de Eglysfeld of those lands, who continued her seisin until they were taken 
into the king’s hand by the escheator. These feoffments were made in good faith and not 
fraudulently.87 
  
The original charter appears to have been a grant to the chaplains with the condition that 
they would enfeoff John’s daughter. She does not appear to be his natural heir. It appears 
the original feoffments was made as part of his estate planning activities in 1349 – 1350, 
probably with reflection on the earlier death of his famous brother Robert de Eglysfeld, 
which included separate arrangements for his son and daughter-in-law (also named Joan, 
as was John’s daughter).88 The hallmarks of a use are present. First, the feoffor enfeoffs 
land to a feoffee or feoffees, who hold the land for a period, and afterward convey it to a 
designated party, in this case, a close relation. Second, both seisin and the condition, if it 
is stated in the charter, was made during the lifetime of the feoffor. These two features 
also appear in the use made by John Harclay. Finally, the reassurance that John made the 
feoffment without fraud carries the implication that the law recognised uses could 
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support fraudulent purposes. The explicit mention of good faith means the law, as in the 
case of enfeoff re-enfeoff conditions, must be certain that a feoffor made a use with honest 
intentions if the feoffor did not have a licence to make the arrangement or enrolled it in 
Chancery. 
 
The common law policy to give effect to the intentions of the feoffor was restrained, 
explicitly in De donis conditionalibus, by the overarching principle in common law 
jurisprudence that land should descend to the lawful heir.89 It did not yield to human 
sentiment even if landholders believed the welfare of the family would not be preserved 
by their heir.90 The evidence suggests that landholders, as in the case of John de Hothom, 
put pressure on their heir to ensure provision for their other children.91 Nonetheless, the 
competition between the wishes of feoffors and the doctrine of primogeniture is one area 
where notions of equity may have affected the frequency of uses. Some notion of equity 
may have existed in the practice of fourteenth-century common law courts. Chief Justice 
Stonore presiding over a case in 1343 made a distinction between the common law and 
equity because the latter justified an Audita Querela action.92 However, the notions of 
equity did not favour the enforcement of uses against the interests of heirs. If equitable 
considerations informed the law related to uses, it is likely the natural right of the heir to 
succeed to their ancestor ought to prevail over the interests of strangers, and the law did 
not presume a feoffor intended to disinherit them. This overarching principle informed 
all forms of gift with a condition. The legal rights of the heir prevailed over the legal 
interests of the feoffees, which is evident in the controversy concerning the enfeoff re-
enfeoff arrangement made by the Lord of Clifford discussed above.93 The expectation that 
land would descend to heirs appears to explain why uses seldom appear in the record 
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The conclusion that a use is a species of feoffment with a condition invokes the principle 
behind Occam’s razor that the simpler of two arguments is the more likely explanation. 
There is no modern school of thought that connects the use to the common law. However, 
it is a stronger alternative to an association with equity that has confused the nature of 
uses by linking it to the trust. The association appears to be a lingering consequence of 
the Roman law school of thought, which ignored the common law as a source despite 
authoritative early modern commentary on the subject. The present thesis has adopted a 
narrow definition of the use as an enfeoffment to a feoffee to transfer land to a third party. 
It is a definition incompatible with Palmer’s approach to the question of the origin of the 
use, which excludes ‘grants to feoffees merely to grant to a third party to accomplish an 
end that the common law would have otherwise scrutinized too carefully. Such grants 
were sociologically but not legally significant’.94 It is unclear why the author reached the 
conclusion that such arrangements were not legally significant. However, the narrow 
definition avoids the problem that is inherent with classifying the use as a gift with a 
condition. Gifts with a condition encompasses a large swathe of legal arrangements such 
as reversions, remainders, life interests, enfeoff re-enfeoff conditions, and uses. A broad 
definition of the use as an independent instrument has led historians to categorise other 
conditional devices as uses. The narrower approach that the use is a species of gift with a 
condition meant it sat alongside other conditional devices that operated with similar 
rules and achieved similar purposes. It is now possible to conclude that the origin of the 
use lies in the expansion of a common law policy in the late thirteenth century to give 
effect to the intention of donors. The use and several other conditional devices were the 
product of this policy. 
 
Historians have noticed most uses are found in the later part of the fourteenth century. 
In some cases, the events of the Hundred Years War inspired their creation. Maitland was 
correct to assert that knights fighting abroad would value the use as a device to protect 
family and property. The role of the licence issued to knights travelling to France, 
however, is distinguishable from the privileges granted to crusaders. Its purpose was to 
provide royal protection to a generally available private law instrument rather than 
confer unique legal rights. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to suggest that the king used royal 
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licence to encourage participation in the Hundred Years War. The mechanism of royal 
protection was valuable to enforcement. A sensible feoffor enrolled their use, and other 
species of feoffment, in Chancery whenever possible. Since this process left little doubt 
about the legal position of the parties, it prevented disputes reaching court. Nonetheless, 
the use appears infrequently in the records of Chancery. The enfeoff re-enfeoff condition, 
a more complex device than the use, was the preferred device to resettle land and control 
its fortunes. It could achieve the objects associated with the use, such as avoiding feudal 
incidences or the operation of law. Another advantage it had over the use, namely as a 
form of devise, is that the feoffor supervised the transaction. Nevertheless, their shared 
origin as common law feoffments means the use’s legal principles are discernible by 
analogy to the enfeoff re-enfeoff condition. The foremost rule appears to be that the 
feoffor must make the use during their lifetime and without imputation of fraud to be a 
valid feoffment.
Chapter 9. Conclusion 
 
The idea that the use is in some way connected to the crusade movement continues to be 
a popular belief despite the alternative arguments proposed by legal historians. There is 
even a slight public interest in disproving the connection. The most recent public 
comment on the origin of the use is an editorial appearing in the Melbourne newspaper, 
The Age, in August 2017: ‘Discretionary trusts originated as far back as Norman England, 
after William the Conqueror invaded in 1066. We don’t really know the origins [of the 
trust], although some speculate that Crusaders established trusts so their lands could be 
managed in their absence’. 1  The author here is paraphrasing the example from The 
History of English Law and similarly fails to identify a particular crusade. Moreover, it 
leaves the reader with the impression that there is at least an arguable relationship 
between the use and the crusade movement. Accepted truths of this kind have a negative 
impact on the study of history. Nonetheless, there is also doubt underlying the editorial’s 
historical summary. Such doubts inspired this thesis to explore whether there is evidence 
to support the assumed connection between the use and the crusade movement. In doing 
so, it canvassed major instances of English involvement in crusades from the eleventh to 
the fourteenth century. The conclusion reached by this thesis is that there is no evidence 
to support a belief that crusaders were the first to make uses. It is hoped that incorrect 
beliefs about the use and the crusade movement will eventually be dispelled from the 
popular imagination of academics, lawyers, students, and even the wider public. This 
thesis has taken the first step towards this aim. 
 
The tone of the thesis has been to disprove long-standing ideas about the use and the 
Crusades. However, the crusade movement was a valuable lens through which to examine 
three hundred years of legal development to find evidence of the use. It offered a valuable 
middle ground between the expansionist and insular view of the origin of uses since the 
crusades are subject to both secular and spiritual influences. The primary source of 
crusade jurisprudence is the canon law, which favours an expansive view of the use’s 
origins. Maitland, however, adduced his example to support the idea it had Germanic 
origins. His approach lends itself to an insular view of the use. The thesis has touched 
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upon both to explore its subject. The crusade lens also benefits from Maitland’s instinct 
about when uses are most likely to appear in the sources. Crusaders made their legal 
arrangements under extraneous circumstances. The threat to their families and 
properties was an ever-present concern and they responded by making complex legal 
arrangements designed to minimise the impact of their crusading activities. The law, both 
canon and secular, also responded to their concerns in novel ways through privileges and 
other forms of protection. Therefore, the preparatory phase of the Crusades created an 
environment conducive to the development of novel ideas such as uses. Despite this 
circumstance, however, the evidence does not support a conclusion that the origin of the 
use rests in the crusade movement. The existing legal framework behind the crusades did 
not necessitate its creation.  
 
The ongoing attraction of the crusade example is that it offers an explanation for the 
unknown. No alternative argument has proven sufficiently authoritative to supplant 
Maitland’s example. This thesis has responded to the current gap in knowledge by 
proposing a strong counter-argument to modern beliefs that the use was a proto-
equitable device. It also built on recent research that suggests that the law recognised in 
medieval Chancery was not equity. The thesis argued that the origins of the use rest in 
the common law feoffment with a condition. It defined a use as a legal arrangement 
characterised by a feoffor who granted legal title in land to a feoffee with the intention 
that the feoffee will grant it to a designated third party. The simplicity of the definition is 
deceptive. The thesis canvassed the records of the Exchequer of the Jews, a court 
tenuously connected to the crusade movement, which had several legal relationships 
describable as trust-like in nature that fell short of satisfying the definition of the use 
advanced in this thesis. However, a classification of the use as a species of gift with a 
condition suffers from inherent uncertainties, namely, that uses operated alongside 
numerous other gifts such as the enfeoff re-enfeoff arrangement. This presents many 
opportunities to confuse other feoffments with the use, but it is hoped that identifying 
this issue will allow legal historians to guard against such confusion in the future. No 
historical catalyst is necessary for a person to plan their estate by making a gift with a 
condition except an apprehension of their mortality. Therefore, the myths created to 
bridge the inherent uncertainty of the use as a species of gift with a condition appears to 
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be the reason that the origin of the use, as a common law instrument, has been shrouded 




Maitland’s ongoing authority as a legal historian is the reason why his example has 
become an accepted truth. It is a testament to his ability that, over a century later, his 
work continues to be the starting point for any discussion on medieval law in England. 
This thesis is a response to something he merely said in passing. The accepted truth of 
his example is an anomaly. More equity lecturers subscribe to the common belief that a 
connection exists between the use and the crusades than what Maitland had intended to 
argue. It is a curious coincidence that he argued for the Germanic origin of the use as a 
reaction to an accepted truth in his time that the use was a product of the Roman law. 
Modern scholarship has since moved past both nineteenth-century schools of thought. 
The expansionist view, propounded by Richard Helmholz and others, was valuable to this 
thesis, encouraging a holistic approach to its subject, which is necessary to examine 
whether the use had its origins as part of a canon law reaction to crusading. On the other 
hand, the conclusion reached in this thesis that the use is a product of the common law 
rests comfortably with the insular view propounded by J. M. W. Bean and others that limit 
their analysis to English sources. In common, however, is that neither furnished a 
satisfactory argument to displace the popular association built around Maitland’s 
authority. Legal historians have contributed to the uncertainty surrounding uses by 
producing varying definitions of the use that are either too broad or conflate the 
instrument with modern trusts, or both. Furthermore, a wider appreciation of chronicles 
and non-legal literature that describe how people engaged with the law would have 
allowed legal historians to set aside misguided notions about the use and the crusades 
that attracted meagre English participation.  
 
Maitland’s invocation of the crusade movement added a layer of popularity to his example 
that allowed it to become an accepted truth in modern times. The Crusades, as a history, 
was popular when Maitland wrote and continues to be popular today. However, 
popularity is no substitute for evidence. Modern belief that uses originate in English law 
during the First Crusade is unusual since ‘one of the most striking features of the First 
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Crusade was its self-consciously French character’.2 Nonetheless, its French character is 
not a barrier to development on the continent. The absence of evidence, on the other 
hand, is a formidable obstacle. There was no typical crusader on this expedition, but 
alienation of property and mortgage arrangements dominated crusader legal 
preparations. The latter allowed crusaders to include terms that considered the welfare 
of family members. This thesis concluded that there is no evidence to support the idea 
that the use developed during the First Crusade. A crusade historian may have reached 
this conclusion earlier if they considered the subject. The sporadic instances of English 
involvement, due to the absence of a significant force led by William II, does not justify 
the use’s creation nor is there evidence that the few crusaders who left England utilised 
the instrument. The same rationale is applicable to the Second Crusade. Nonetheless, this 
thesis canvassed the profound consequences of the First Crusade as a template for the 
creation of a jurisprudential notion of crusading and crusader privileges in the twelfth 
century. The canon law responded to crusader concerns about the welfare of their family 
and property in the form of papal privileges. Papal protection fulfilled the function that 
Maitland ascribed to the use without the need for its development in the canon law. The 
evidence suggests that the canon law, the primary source of law for the crusade 
movement, did not develop uses during the twelfth century.  
 
The Third Crusade, unlike the First and Second Crusades, attracted significant English 
participation. Maitland may not have believed that the use developed in response to the 
crusade movement, but he did believe that it had been available long before the Third 
Crusade. The twelfth century was prima facie amenable to the development of the use in 
the wake of law reform and political interest in the Levant. Further, there was ample 
opportunity for the crusade movement to shape the budding common law. It is a surprise, 
therefore, that Glanvill written on the eve of the Third Crusade betrays no influence. 
There is a reasonable expectation that Ranulf de Glanvill, if he was its author, would have 
made some reference to a relationship between crusading and the use because of his 
familial background and experience with Henry’s various crusade vows. But the use does 
not appear in the treatise. Nevertheless, the other ingredients of Maitland’s example are 
present in Glanvill. Since the Second Crusade, recruiters couched the tenor of crusade 
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propaganda in terms that made clear knights were the desired participants. 
Consequently, most crusaders on the third expedition, as Maitland had envisioned, held 
land in military fee. Knights were the people most likely to make uses since they wielded 
greater control than their predecessors over the fortunes of their land. However, the use 
did not exist to modify the operation of law with regard to descent nor the legal position 
of close female relatives. The silence in Glanvill about any legal principle related to 
crusading, including essoin, indicate that the secular law did not introduce novel laws to 
facilitate crusading until later. The evidence suggests that the use did not form part of the 
common law on the eve of the Third Crusade. 
 
The legendary involvement of Richard I, England’s rex crucesignatus, in the Third Crusade 
may have enhanced the attractiveness of the accepted truth about uses. Far from being a 
negligent king, Richard introduced a series of regulations that addressed logistical issues 
associated with crusading and to manage the interests of crusaders. He also issued orders 
to sheriffs and bailiffs in both England and Normandy that charged them with the 
protection of legal interests. Nonetheless, the King did not introduce the use into English 
law. The object of his measures appears to be a secular attempt to bolster the crusader 
privileges already available under the canon law. English crusaders did not include the 
use in their private law arrangements. Their arrangements reflect the arrangements 
made by earlier crusaders on the continent despite sophisticated advancements in legal 
thinking during the twelfth century. Private legal arrangements made by crusaders on 
the Third Crusade followed the familiar pattern of credit raised on a mortgage with 
collateral terms designed to protect the interests of family. The introduction of subsidies 
was the most significant development in crusading. It demonstrably alleviated the 
financial pressure on crusaders allowing them to make more prudent preparations that 
protected the interests of their families. Nevertheless, the interaction between secular 
law and the crusade movement did not produce the use during the Third Crusade. The 
third expedition did, however, inspire a response from the common law. It clarified the 
availability of a special crusader essoin and several other principles related to crusading. 
However, Bracton is silent on the use. The conclusion reached in this thesis is that the use 





This thesis has advanced alternative arguments about the origin of the use in English law. 
It examined whether there is evidence to suggest that the use developed out of the 
practices of the Exchequer of the Jews. The court’s crusade connection is the 
circumstances of its creation. Richard I established the court after his return from 
captivity to facilitate Jewish lending activities and the collection of tallage that helped 
fund the Third Crusade. The court was a forum unique to English law, and it had no 
counterpart on the continent. It created legal principles unique to the English legal 
experience. The common law applied to the Jews, or Jewry law, did not draw on halakha 
to create a theory of the use. However, there were a few devices that had qualities 
associated with trust-like devices. In the first half of the thirteenth century, the Jewish 
Exchequer heard complex cases involving multiple interests to land and their priority. 
Bracton cites an anomalous case that suggests that feoffors made illegal use-like 
instruments but the common law rejected a theory of uses in the early thirteenth 
century. 3  Nevertheless, legal arrangements became increasingly complex to facilitate 
Jewish lending practices. Henry III also adopted a tolerant policy towards the lending 
behaviours of his Jews. The latitude given to Jewish credit arrangements enabled the 
court to enforce instruments that were trust-like in nature but fell short of a theory of the 
use. It is probable that there was a reception of its principles to shape common law rules 
related to safe-keeping, but its principles never extended to land. Henry also tolerated the 
practice of Christians having Jewry seisin of land under the guise of fictitious attorneys. 
Edward I quashed this trust-like relationship before it developed further. Moreover, the 
continued utilisation of unenforceable attempts to avoid the operation of law does not 
support the idea that uses were lawful in the thirteenth century. 
 
The Ninth Crusade was the final opportunity for the use to develop as a direct response 
to the events of a crusade. Chancery was the dominant forum for the secular response to 
this crusade. Previous legal historians have associated the eventual recognition of uses in 
Chancery with its jurisdiction as a court of equity.4 Haskett and others have since shown, 
however, that Chancery was not a court of conscience until the sixteenth century.5 The 
law that the forum applied to the Ninth Crusade was the common law. Its rolls record 
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how Henry III, in support of his son, granted crusaders protection clausum volumus to 
protect their families and properties in their absence. The licences occasionally granted 
to crusaders also allowed their attorneys to work with their executors to pay their debts 
out of their lands without being enfeoffed as a feoffee. Britton attests that practices in 
Chancery did shape the common law when it includes the systematic organisation of the 
Ninth Crusade as illustrative of the law of England (Brit. 6.7.3). The rolls reveal few legal 
issues arose as result of the Ninth Crusade. Royal protection would prove ineffective to 
safeguard the interests of knights during the Anglo-French War (1294 – 1298), but the 
use would have also been ineffective to remedy the incidences of lawlessness found in 
Chancery records. However, Edward’s activities as lawmaker and the passage of De donis 
conditionalibus was the catalyst for the eventual creation of uses. The statute is a 
legislative reaction to a developing common law policy to give effect to the intentions of 
feoffors to control their land. Moreover, it is hoped that a conclusion that ends with the 
Ninth and Tenth Crusades is sufficient to dispel notions that the use is connected to the 
Crusades. 
 
The novel argument that the use is a species of feoffment with a condition offers a simple 
solution to the origins of a legal instrument obscured by many mythologies for a very long 
time. It radically departs from the idea that because the common law did not recognise 
trusts that there also existed no basis for the enforcement of uses. Nonetheless, a common 
law origin of the use as a feoffment with a condition agrees with descriptions of the 
instrument provided by early modern English jurists such as Swinburne and Coke. It also 
avoids the associations with equity that later editors added to their works. Confusion 
with the trust instrument also underlies modern ideas that there is a connection between 
the use and the crusade movement. The Age goes further than most to confound the use 
with a ‘discretionary trust’.6 A discretionary trust is a classification given to an express 
trust that allows the trustee to nominate a beneficiary or the size of their benefit.7 Modern 
conflation of the use with equity appears to be a lingering consequence of the Roman law 
school of thought. The evidence suggests, however, that the use developed alongside 
other kinds of conditional gifts at the beginning of the fourteenth century. It formed part 
of the common law as a private law arrangement, and not a privileged instrument with 
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limited availability. However, the fact uses are a simple instrument surrounded by more 
complex instruments have obscured their origins. Feoffments with a enfeoff re-enfeoff 
condition, growing out of the same common law policy to give effect to donor’s intentions, 
eclipsed the use in the fourteenth century as the preferred estate management device. 
Nonetheless, their shared legal principles indicate the common law had no conceptual 
difficulty with the enforcement of uses provided that feoffors made a use during their 
lifetime, in good faith, and without any imputation of fraud. It is hoped that the argument 
advanced in this thesis has provided a foundation for a re-assessment of modern 
understandings of the use in medieval law. 
 
Further Avenues of Research 
 
This thesis has not yet closed the chapter on the history of uses. A conclusion that the use 
began life as a common law feoffment with a condition does not explain why uses did not 
come into general practice until the 1370s, and later eclipsed the popularity of enfeoff re-
enfeoff conditions. Nonetheless, this thesis hopes to have furnished a starting point to 
explore their place in legal history before the Statute of Uses. The editor of Select Cases in 
Chancery provides a helpful guide for future research into the history of the use: 
 
Whatever may have been the cause of this [people making uses], it is not until the reign of Richard 
II, when the Court of Chancery was in full swing, that feoffments to uses became general. In these 
printed cases we find numerous examples during that reign, and the growth of the custom can be 
traced about the same period in almost any good collection of charters. What gave an enormous 
impetus to feoffment to uses, was doubtless the discovery that by its means land could practically be 
devised by will. Unfortunately, as in so many cases, we are without data as to the exact time when 
this was first done.8 
 
This thesis hopes that by arguing that uses were a creature of a common law policy, a 
clearer picture of their evolution can guide future inquiries into how uses became 
general law. This thesis proposes the following potential avenues of research to 
further understand the use as a common law feoffment in the fourteenth century. 
 
                                                          




Ecclesiastical enforcement of a common law instrument? 
 
The evidence suggests that the editor of the Select Cases in Chancery was right to attach 
weight to the idea that uses became popular as an instrument to devise land. It adds 
another dimension to the history of the use and its role as a testamentary device. Richard 
Helmholz demonstrated in ‘The Early Enforcement of Uses’ (1979) that the ecclesiastical 
courts enforced uses in the late fourteenth century.9 He did not suggest, as this thesis did, 
that the use was a common law gift with a condition. Instead, he posited that the courts 
spiritual offered a solution to the ‘implausible’ suggestion by legal historians that the 
feoffor relied on the feoffee’s good faith to carry out the agreement.10 The view that the 
use is a species of a common law gift agrees that feoffors did not have to rely on the 
feoffee’s good faith. Helmholz adduces evidence from cause papers: 
 
For example [Ex officio c. Smyth & Holyngbroke], in 1375 the feoffees to uses of a certain John Roger 
were cited to appear before the court at Canterbury for violating the directions given to them by 
their feoffor. Upon interrogation, they confessed that they had received ten and three quarters of an 
acre of land, a windmill, and a grange under Roger’s instructions that they convey it to his wife 
Margery after his death”. They admitted violation of this instruction by alienating half the land to a 
certain Hugh Pryor, but maintained that they had only done so out of compulsion and fear of Hugh. 
The judge, apparently after a brief hearing, held that the alleged fear had been “empty and 
insufficient to move a constant man”, and that the feoffees must suffer the canonical penalties for 
failing to carry out their duty.11 
 
Understanding this arrangement is a feoffment with a condition made by John in favour 
of his wife, which the feoffees did not perform, suggests ecclesiastical courts enforced 
uses during the same period as there is analogous enforcement in the common law. 
Helmholz discerned no rationale for ecclesiastical enforcement but did note that all 
causes concerned uses created by deceased feoffors.12 
 
Helmholz believed, at odds with this thesis, that the ecclesiastical courts were the first to 
enforce uses. He concluded that ‘the rise of the Chancellor’s jurisdiction over feoffees to 
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uses is not, therefore, the story of the creation of a legal remedy where previously there 
had been none. Rather it is the story of continuing enforcement in a new setting’. 13 
However, the evidence suggests that the common law and ecclesiastical courts exercised 
concurrent jurisdiction. Further, the jurisdictions were not mutually exclusive. It appears 
to be another example of the courts Christian hearing matters that legal historians 
ordinarily think of as being cognisant in the secular courts. An analogy can be drawn to 
ecclesiastical enforcement of other kinds of common law obligation in the fourteenth 
century. 14  For example, Helmholz demonstrated that common law courts seldom 
prohibited ecclesiastical courts from hearing matters related to the recovery of debts by 
executors despite the jurisdictional intrusion. 15  The same may also be true for uses 
declared in a testamentary instrument. On the other hand, the idea that the use is a 
common law feoffment also suggests that the geographic distribution of cause papers is 
misleading. Helmholz notes his evidence pointed to a possibility that the use first 
emerged in Kent in the same manner as Gavelkind.16 Palmer stated that the evidence of 
uses coming before Chancery from all parts of England was ‘debilitating for his 
[Helmholz’s] theory’. 17  This thesis agrees that analogy to Gavelkind is contrary to 
Swinburne’s assertion that the common law reckoned uses to be a general custom.18 An 
understanding of the use as a common law device suggests that cause papers, potentially 
from the archiepiscopal see of York, may show enforcement in ecclesiastical courts 
throughout England. 
 
The idea that the spiritual courts enforced uses as part of their probate jurisdiction 
appears to be the correct approach for future research.19 English ecclesiastical courts 
exercised an anomalously broad testamentary jurisdiction, significantly wider than the 
courts on the continent, which sometimes contradicted canon law principles to meet the 
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expectations of testators. 20  The idea that uses were enforced as part of probate 
jurisdiction appears to agree with recognition in Chancery that feoffees frequently acted 
together with executors to carry out the wishes of the deceased according to conditions 
stipulated in a will or schedule. The presence of a testamentary instrument may be the 
common element that allowed an ecclesiastical court to enforce a use with ecclesiastical 
sanctions. Therefore, the use made by a dead feoffee could be enforced either by the 
ecclesiastical courts or under the common law. Helmholz wondered, without reference 
to evidence, whether the ecclesiastical courts enforced uses made by a living feoffor 
under the law of oaths. 21  Stephen DeVine’s article, intending to build on Helmholz’s 
research by seeking a jurisprudential rationale for ecclesiastical enforcement, suggested 
that the spiritual courts could have conceptualised uses under the head of fidei laesio or 
breach of faith action (when a feoffee does not carry out a promise made to the feoffor).22 
George Spence, who also proposed that ecclesiastics were the first to enforce uses, 
suggested the same. 23  However, the attempt to find a jurisprudential justification is 
problematic since the canon law forbade ecclesiastical courts from hearing issues relating 
to land.24 Further research that builds on this thesis may find that since the common law 
enforced uses, an ecclesiastical court would not be the correct forum in the case of a living 
feoffor under the law of oaths or fidei laesio jurisdiction. By analogy, it would be similarly 
improper for a living feoffor to seek ecclesiastical enforcement of an enfeoff re-enfeoff 
arrangement since there is no will to support the cause being heard. Limited jurisdiction 
to hear causes concerning testamentary uses could explain the absence of cases involving 
living feoffers in the ecclesiastical records.  
 
Why the popularity of uses in the late fourteenth century? 
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Further research is also necessary to explain the reason behind the popularity of uses in 
the late fourteenth century. Palmer tied the origin of the use to the Black Death.25 His 
thesis argued that the plague brought about a change in policy in the law that sought to 
enhance the rights of landholders at the expense of tenants.26 He ties the use to a stricter 
interpretation of the legal obligations. He states that ‘the chancellor’s court of conscience, 
developing at least by the 1370s, was facilitative in reinforcing the use but coercive 
toward feoffees and others who tried unjustly to take advantage of the rigid common law 
rules’. 27  It is an unavoidable conclusion that the Black Death had far-reaching 
consequences on medieval society and English law. The evidence supports Palmer’s note 
that ‘prior to the Black Death, [the use] was an unusual and discouraged phenomenon’.28 
Future research may also build on Biancalana’s observation that ‘the devastation of the 
plague probably moved survivors toward employing new strategies of attempting to 
assert control over their affairs in the face of great uncertainty’.29 It is surprising, when 
reading the rolls series, to find fewer mentions of the impact of the plague than expected. 
The impression left by those records is that the Anglo-French War (1294 – 1298) had a 
greater effect on English society. Therefore, reference to chronicles and other narrative 
sources is necessary to measure how the Black Death affected estate management. 
 
The rise of uses has also been connected to the Hundred Years War. Biancalana argues 
that the organisation of armies through contract meant that the licences that Edward III 
granted to knights used uses as a legal privilege to encourage participation.30 The King’s 
son, John of Gaunt, received licence in 1369 to enfeoff numerous feoffees. The licence 
permitted the feoffees to enter onto John’s land on the day of his death, or within a year 
after his death, and dispose of it to acquit his debts and carry out his other instructions.31 
The advantage of the arrangement, as Palmer notes, is that it extended the assets 
available to pay debts without depriving the lawful heir of their patrimony.32 However, 
the use of contracts to organise armies during the Hundred Years War drew on a model 
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of military organisation, relying on indentured retinues, which could include service in 
any war, including those overseas and in support of the Holy Land.33 The use of contracts, 
evident during the Ninth Crusade, was ‘dramatically accelerated’ in both France and 
England during the Hundred Years War. 34  If the use developed in response to the 
Hundred Years War, then the analogous arrangements found during the Ninth Crusade 
indicate that a relationship exists between uses, the crusade movement, and the 
organisation of armies through contract. The evidence does not support the conclusion 
that uses were unique to warfare. It is also prudent to avoid adding another layer of 
mythology to the use by unnecessarily replacing the existing association to the crusades 
with the Hundred Years War. 
 
The growing popularity of uses in the late fourteenth century coincided with the period 
of general discontent that characterised the final years of Edward’s reign. 35  The 
resentment that had accrued was allowed to be expressed after his death. It culminated 
in a finding by the Good Parliament in 1376 that Edward’s favourite, Alice Perrers, due to 
her apparent exploitation of the aging king, was found guilty of treason and her lands 
were confiscated.36 However, much of the political dissatisfaction was directed at the 
figure of John of Gaunt who played a leading role in Edward’s court after 1376 and in the 
early years of Richard II’s reign.37 He was viewed as a pretender to the throne who had 
designs to usurp it, although this is not a proposition supported by evidence. 38  It is 
apparent that much of the discontent was the result of England’s war-weariness.39 There 
was no alleviation during the first years of Richard’s reign and the continual council that 
managed the realm during the King’s minority was the scapegoat for England’s woes.40 
The unrest in England culminated in the Peasants Revolt of 1381. Adam of Usk, whose 
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chronicle covered the events in his lifetime (1377 – 1421), attributed the revolt to the 
excesses of the magnates.41 On the other hand, Knighton’s Chronicle suggests that the 
catalyst was the abuses and humiliation perpetrated by the tax collectors against the 
commons.42 Nigel Saul opines that the poll tax, a taxation at a flat rate, demonstrates a 
government grossly out of touch with the mood of the country.43 This revolt, in addition 
to being a reflection of war-weariness, was also a reaction to the economic aftermath of 
the Black Death and the use of the law to secure the rights of the lords against their 
tenants.44 
 
The period of upheaval in English society reveals little about the popularity of the use. 
However, an aspect of the relationship between the law and the Peasants Revolt may 
suggest why the use was popular during this period. Adam, studying to be a civilian at the 
time of the revolt, is silent.45 However, Knighton’s Chronicle notes that the demands of the 
rebels were legal in nature, namely, recognition of their free status and the ability to hunt 
freely across the realm. 46  A defining characteristic of the revolt, however, was an 
apparent hatred of lawyers.47 Thomas Walsingham’s contemporary account of John Ball’s 
sermons, a leader of the revolt, preached to his listeners that to remove themselves from 
unnatural injustice and oppression they must ‘first kill the king’s great lords; then the 
lawyers, justices and jurors of the country’ (Primo, majores regni dominos occidendo; 
deinde, juridicos, justiciarios, et juratores patriae).48 Lawyers, the focus of discontent here, 
may be the reason why uses became popular in the late fourteenth century. The late 
fourteenth century is characterised by the growth of the peerage, a class of gentry, which 
appears to be a consequence of the much-debated changes to notions of lordship. 49 
Lawyers, in particular, became associated with the gentry and the idea of upward 
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mobility. 50  During the 1370s, lawyers had become a visible but mistrusted class of 
wealthy landholders. 51  Palmer suggests they are at least partly responsible for the 
apparent rise in litigation in the decades following the Black Death.52 The rise of the 
instances of uses during this time, therefore, could be a consequence of increasing legal 
ingenuity rather than a specific historical event. It is necessary, nevertheless, to avoid 
making the same mistake that led to the mythology that the use developed in connection 




The object of this thesis has been to explore the development of uses through the crusade 
lens and to propose a stronger argument for their origins than Maitland’s example. 
Beyond the scope of this study, however, uses became increasingly complex. 53  The 
evidence indicates that the common law continued to enforce and recognise uses. 
Biancalana accepted this possibility. 54  However, the conclusion that the use first 
developed as a species of conditional feoffment offers an exciting new way to explore how 
it transformed into the trust. Those intending to undertake such a project are advised to 
begin with Christopher St. Germain’s The Doctor and Student.55 St. Germain wrote during 
the most controversial period in the history of the use. The author acknowledges that 
although uses were being increasingly used to avoid feudal incidences, they were not 
intended to be instruments of fraud.56 St. Germain notes in A Little Treatise Concerning 
Writs of Subpoena (1532) that uses were often made ‘many times by the advice of learned 
counsel’.57 He also states that Chancery had begun to intervene on the occasion when 
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‘feoffees of trust grant a rent-charge, the feoffor has no remedy except to discharge that 
rent by the rules of the common law’.58 The author seems to suggest that the increasingly 
complex purposes to which feoffors had begun to put uses could not be reconciled with 
common law principles prior to the passage of the Statute of Uses. A greater 
understanding of the history of the use will shed light on the legal nature of trusts, in 
addition to correcting a myriad of mistaken beliefs about uses founded on overlapping 
mythologies.
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